


SETA Policy Debate



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The New Middle East and Turkish Foreign Policy



| talip kucukcan | bill park | mohammed ayoob | taha ozhan |



ABSTRACT

Arab Spring has placed Turkey's proactive Middle East policy at the top of international attention once again. With its political model that successfully blends Islam and democracy, Turkey has been presented by many scholars as a model country in the Middle East. Others, on the other hand, have warned about the danger of exaggerating the analogies being drawn between political experiences of Turkey and Middle Eastern countries. The view that Turkish experience can be a source of inspiration for those countries in the region aspiring for a democratic change is widely circulated. Turkey's future role in the region has also been discussed on a more concrete and practical level.

SETA's public seminar "The New Middle East and Turkish Foreign Policy" brought together Bill Park of Kings College, Mohammed Ayoob of Michigan State University and Taha Ozhan of SETA Foundation to discuss further the implications of Arab spring on Turkish foreign policy. In this context distinguished panellists addressed the following questions: What would be the implications of Arab Spring on the new Middle East? What would be the future role of Turkey in the region? What is the effect of the Arab Spring on Turkey's ambitious zero problems with neighbours policy?



October, 2011 | Policy Debate Series No: 2

THE NEW MIDDLE EAST AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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taha ozhan |

Edited by: Mùjge Kùçùkkeleş

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Policy Debate Series

The Policy Debate Series serves to provide a forum for fresh perspectives on controversial issues in world politics and Turkish foreign policy by bringing together experts representing diverse viewpoints and backgrounds. The series aims to bring these informed and innovative discussions to a broad audience. The presentations are transcribed from speakers' voice records and edited in a way that maintains the original content of their speech.

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THE NEW MIDDLE EAST AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Talip Küçükcan:

This is our first public event in this new building. We will continue events of this kind in the future as well. Today we will be discussing a hot topic which is on everyone's agenda. The title is "The New Middle East and Turkish Foreign Policy". The new Middle East suggests that there is now an emerging Middle East which is different from the previously constructed Middle East. We all observe fundamental changes taking place in our region to which Turkey cannot turn a blind eye. Turkish foreign policy is also being shaped in reaction to these events. Today we have three well-known speakers and we will start with Bill Park.

Bill Park:

I would like to thank SETA for inviting me to come here and speak. I am going to talk about Turkish foreign policy and the Arab Spring. The things that I want to say about Turkey require me, first of all, to give my analyses of the Arab Spring. I think the role of an academic or analyst as I am is to stand back a little bit and try to make sense or to draw larger lessons from these developments. Therefore, I do not want to focus on the drama and the exiting nature of the events, instead I will try to look at the bigger picture. The reason for doing that is my native pessimism or cynicism. In English we have an expression like 'party pooper'. This is somebody who arrives at the party where everybody is enjoying their time and having fun and etc., but the long face complains about the headache, he does not really see what everybody is happy about. Well I am that kind of person; the things that I have to say are not entirely optimistic or positive. Just one warning, I am not trying to make predictions and in fact it is quite wrong to make predictions. It is simply that my balance of assessment and analyses does not easily lead me to positive conclusions either about the developments in the region or

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about the prospects for Turkey. I might be wrong indeed; I hope I am totally wrong. I just fear that might not be the case. So why I present myself as a party pooper or miserable guy comes in.

Arab Spring is not one thing. It consists of lots of different countries and experiences in the last year. Therefore it is quite difficult to generalize the prospects for the whole region. You might say you have an Arab Spring in Tunisia; but you cannot say it is spring when you look at what happens in Syria, which is quite awful. We might say in Syria the winter has already arrived in. Even in Libya things are very nasty and unpleasant. This morning I saw BBC news reporting Amnesty International report ‘the mystery of detainees’ by the transitional government forces. So it seems to me we should not generalize too much. Lots of different experiences across the countries have happened. Some countries have no seasonal and positive changes. There are positive developments, negative developments and anywhere in between. That is one thing we need to say: it is not a single phenomenon. We might see very different outcomes and developments in different countries.

Second observation I remark is that we talk about ‘Spring’ as if it is something new and positive. We all assume that something better is coming, referring to pro-democracy movements. There is certainly pro-democracy forces but not exclusively so. And indeed some of the forces behind the Arab Spring might not, in any easy and direct way, lead to democratic outcomes. We have seen tribal and primary forces in Yemen and Libya. We have confessional differences, for example in Bahrain, between Sunni minority and Shia majority, and that element is also existent in Syria as well. And also we have a recent incident in Egypt between Christians and Muslims. So we have confessional factors behind the Arab Spring.

We also have as phenomenon State opportunism; people who stay in power as the remnants of the old regime. They might have good intentions to do better, but they might also act in narrow opportunist way. For instance, we have transnational government in Libya as the remnants of the old regime and this is also the case in Egypt. I am not sure if we can present these people in an exclusive and unqualified way as pro-democracy forces.

Third general negative observation I might make is democracy is not easy. If you take European example, it had taken centuries to emerge. Indeed democracy is not only a bullet box to vote. What we understand of democracy consists of lots of other developments such as emergence of civil institutions, trade unions, business and lobby groups, and universities, which are quite independent of the state. It also consists of separation of religion and state, and the secularization policies. When you look at UN index of human development reports you see much of the Arab countries in the bottom on the global scale of many of these developments. If you make the assumption these developments are necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of democracy, then you have to say that the Arab world is not yet fully developed.

Final negative observation is the revolts of the revolution might not produce democracy but a counter revolution that would repress the ideals of revolutionary forces. 1948 revolts in Europe for instance actually did not bring much change. So Arab revolutions also might not lead to democracy; forces of reaction might be stronger than forces of revolution just like other parts of the world in past histories.

So what do all these negative and pessimistic considerations lead Turkey? First of all, we have to bear in mind that Turkey's future and image in the region are not primarily in the hands of Turkey itself. Its impact depends on how the Arab world perceives Turkey. It is self-evidently the case that Turkey is far more developed politically, economically, socially and intellectually than much of the Arab World. This, in itself, is clearly attractive; however the question of whether this attraction could make Turkey a model for or inspiration for political development in those countries is hard to answer. Clearly, Turkey is in a different category; it is actually a country more similar, in some ways, to the West than to the Arab world. One reason for that is that Turkey's 1923 revolution is really quite unique. Many Arab countries, to some degree or even almost entirely, did not have that kind of experience. The problem with the Turkish model is the multiple meanings that the concept entails. In this regard, even the Turks do not know what the Turkish model is: is it a Muslim democracy or is it a secular democracy or is it a political system strictly governed by the military behind the scenes?

I think the Turkish prime minister was correct in distinguishing between secular political systems on the one hand and the religious society on the other in his recent visit to Egypt. Some people in the Arab world including those who actively took part in revolutions are not really ready for a secular political system that threatens to remove religion from the public sphere. Even in Tunisia, again just reading this morning, that the secular parties are concerned that the al Nahda movement might turn back the progress towards secular and modern system achieved before the Arab Spring. Egypt or Syria, for example, might acquire a version of Turkish Model that puts in place military guardianship of the political developments. With its economic development and democracy, Turkey might look quite a lot like a Western country than a country that has experienced compatible scenarios with the Arab world.

Another observation to make is that Turkey is not the only one in the game. Britain and France have strong relations with the Arab world as well although they are by no means entirely positive. British universities, private schools, military training establishments, its financial sectors are very influenced by Arabs. Many Jordanians, Saudis and Gulf Arabs have experienced democratization development through places like Britain. Similarly Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians, have experienced democratization and economic development through France. It is not entirely positive, but what I am saying here is that there are other experiences that Arab might like to look at. What Turkey brings is perhaps a message as a Muslim country; however it does not bring a better example of democracy, modernity, secularization and whatever else. That can be found elsewhere too.

Bill Park:
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“For Turkish foreign policy, Turkey surely has been absolutely correct under the present government in adopting pro-active and constructive neighborhood policy.”

For Turkish foreign policy, Turkey surely has been absolutely correct under the present government in adopting pro-active and constructive neighborhood policy. I do not particularly like the term ‘zero problems with the neighbors’ because the neighbors have so many problems with each other. However, what Turkey has embarked upon is an entirely positive departure for Turkey. During the Libyan crisis, Turkish foreign policy drew some reactions as the country seemed to stay on the side with Qaddafi longer than Libyan resistance would have desired. It demonstrated that Turkey needs to be careful when embracing dictators because when you switch position there is a possibility that you might seem unreliable by both dictators and populations.

Taha Özhan:

Thank you very much. I would like to first lay out which Turkey we are talking about and then which Arab Spring that we have. I believe the question of how the Arab Spring has been shaping Turkey has not found adequate coverage in recent debates. In the last part of my speech, I will dwell on other actors who are somewhat involved in transformation process of the region.

First of all, over the last decade Turkey has experienced tremendous amounts of structural change. With partial constitutional amendments in September 12, 2010, several debates have been held on the dichotomy between the old and new Turkey. It would not be wrong to claim that what Turkey has been going through has just started at MENA region. There are some signs that the region would follow similar path, but it is too early to make any predictions. In domestic realm, as I mentioned above Turkey, despite existing shortages, has gone through a very big structural democratization process. In external realm, the country has taken several proactive initiatives. This was something unconceivable in the old Turkey; it is a phenomenon of the new Turkey.

And what is this Arab Spring then? First of all, it will be misleading to interpret what has happened in the region as a single, isolated development. Here we are talking about a region (from borders of the countries to their names) all determined by the Western powers after the WWI. During 1910-1920 some kind of regional order was established. After the Second World War, with the establishment of Israel in 1948, a new order based on the existence of Israel was set up. Then in 1978 this order, known as Camp David order, was revised. The new arrangement based on Western support for Arab leaders has dominated Middle Eastern affairs for the last three decades. While positioning Israel at the center of regional relations, Camp David order situated United States between Israel and Arab countries. In this power balance, local dictators were missioned to protect the order from their own people.

This unsustainable arrangement came to an end following the invasion of Iraq. The US invasion intentionally or unintentionally agitated the dynamics of regional order. In other words, reactionary neoconservative policies that led to the fall of Saddam in the post-2011 period triggered political tsunami whose true implications were to be

observed in the coming years. Surely, it will be parochial to consider occupation of Iraq as the only reason behind what is happening in the region currently. Because even if Saddam had not been overthrown, dictatorships in Arab world would not have had much oil to run their car while people's expectations are getting higher and higher. But the Iraq war had a structural effect throughout the region.

With the fall of Saddam entire regional politics have been agitated with everyone trying to fill the vacuum. This competition for influence had direct impact on people. As you recall, people of the Arab world used two slogans: first one was 'bread, freedom and dignity' and other one was "fall of the order". These two slogans are enough to understand how people have demanded change within the Middle East and North Africa. Turkey's response to the Arab spring should be assessed against this background. Turkey rejected participating in the invasion of Iraq, a trigger for the Arab Spring and thus it had already taken the first constructive step after decades of silence in its foreign policy. Right before the occupation of Iraq, Turkey intensified its relations with neighboring countries so that the cost of the invasion would not increase. Turkey maintained close relations with the Arab world under the framework of its "zero problems with neighbors" policy after 2002.

Relations with the region have been multi-faceted, encompassing diplomatic, economic and civil society dimensions since 2002. Turkey actively and positively participated in the resolution and discussion of major issues in the Arab world, reacted to Israel after its attack on Lebanon, was directly involved in the Palestinian issue and facilitated proxy talks between Israel and Syria. In addition, Turkey's sharp and clear reaction to Israel's attack on Gaza improved its image in the Arab world, which was further boosted with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's outburst at Davos. Israel's May 2010 attack on the Mavi Marmara, an international humanitarian aid ship on its way to Gaza, which resulted in the deaths of one U.S. and eight Turkish citizens, brought Turkish-Arab relations to "a different" level.

Israel's insistence on keeping with the status quo and aggressive policy has encouraged Turkey to repair its relations with the Arab world in a short period of time. Turkey has turned into a country that confronted Israel not only for its attack against Turkish citizens but also for its occupation of Arab lands and violence against the Palestinians. Accordingly, Turkish-Arab relations have transformed dramatically. In the same vein, Turkey voted against the U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran, a non-Arab country, as a member of the Security Council and thus the perception of Turkey as a country "that resists external impositions" gained strength.

To understand the impact of Turkey in the creation of the Arab Spring one may look at the background in which the slogans "bread, freedom and dignity" and "the people demand the fall of the order" emerged. Turkey has been seen as a success story for those countries suffering from a lack of democratization, economic development and distribution of income, and despised and oppressed by Israel.

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These two slogans opened avenues of understanding to see and compare the Turkish experience with “economic development, democratization and resisting external impositions” and “questioning global and regional order”: Turkey has become the largest economy of the region although it does not enjoy any oil revenue, it has taken structural steps toward democratization, it has clearly showed its reaction to Israel when necessary and it has established relations with the West without letting others oppress its people. People who want to change toward a model based on Turkey enthusiastically welcomed Prime Minister Erdogan, openly asking him to fill the political vacuum after the Arab revolutions

We must also dwell on the ignored effects of the Arab Spring on Turkey. Just as Turkey had a role in the transformation of the Arab world, the Arab world will also play a significant role in the formation of the new Turkey. First of all, Turkey’s relations with the countries affected by the Arab Spring have recently increased tremendously. There has been an intensive interaction between public officials, NGOs, universities, businessmen and ordinary people. As such, Turkish intellectuals, NGOs and the media did not have difficulty in finding local information sources with regard to the social dynamics shaping the Arab Spring

As a result, while the Middle East was not at all included in the agenda of the old Turkey, it started to be treated as almost a “domestic issue” for the new Turkey. Even the Turkish media, which had difficulties in getting rid of the habits of the old Turkey in terms of both its ideological orientation and quality of journalism, has quickly begun to adapt to the new situation. To gain a better sense of the implication of this development, we can compare it with the reaction of the Turkish media, the Turkish Armed Forces and the civilian bureaucracy toward former Prime Minister Erbakan’s government visit to Islamic countries in 1996. The reaction to Erbakan’s visit was so strongly negative that it was used as an excuse for the infamous military intervention of Feb. 28, 1997. We can observe a stark contrast with the reaction toward Erdogan’s Arab Spring tour in September 2011. While Erdogan was accompanied by the current generals from the Turkish Armed Forces, Erbakan was the very target of the military. Further to that we witness a visible decline in the impact of the Orientalist tendencies in the perception of the relationship with the Arab world in the media.

Turkey has refreshed its social and historical memory of each and every country that experienced change and revolution. The Arab image in Turkish society is in a process of dramatic transformation and re-imagination. Accordingly, a different image is set to replace what has been presented as “the Arab image” or “the Arab world” during the period of the radical modernization in the early Republican era. In the following years, we will probably see that the Turkish social imagination will refresh its memory, coming to erase the negative legacy created by the radical secular modernization.

While seeking to tackle the challenges of covering the Arab Spring, the Turkish media has tried to remedy its lack of capacity in dealing with the Arab world. The debate on its

lack of capacity in the end has turned into a debate on Turkish modernization's glaring neglect of Arab affairs. Similarly, thanks to the Arab Spring, a Turkish state capable of talking with the Arab world for the first time in its modern history has emerged. The bureaucracy of the new Turkey tries to keep up with this new period in an impatient and sometimes inexperienced way but has acted self-confidently in adapting to the developments in the Arab world. In brief, the Arab Spring is poised to spark an unexpected adjustment and transformation in Turkish bureaucracy and civil society.

Lastly, I would like to touch upon Israel and the US. As two big stakeholders in the region, the position of these states will define the future of the Arab spring. United States, in my opinion does not want to be seen as an obstacle to the Arab Spring. It is a very intelligent move on the part of Obama Administration. Position of US was 'let's support but let's control it'. With the fall of dictators that helped the protection of the Camp David order, US will now face direct demands of the people in the region. The biggest question of the next decade for the US will be how the US would respond to people's demands.

Regarding Israel, Israel is one of the two actors who openly and bluntly declared that they were against this change. The other country was Saudi Arabia. Israel well knows that change will put an end to the Camp David order. Israel has to make its decision at this intersection, but one thing seems certain: Israel can no longer sustain this outdated order. If they want to be geographically part of this region they have to stop living mentally in another capital.

Mohammed Ayoob:

I would like to thank SETA for inviting me to this panel. Being the last speaker has certain advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are much of what we want to say might have been said, the advantages are that you can comment on something that others have raised. I would like to begin with a comment on something that Bill Park mentioned during the panel, and I hope that will not be knocked down from my 20 minutes. My presentation will be quickly re-ordered. It will focus on issues of change and continuity as a result of or related to what is called Arab Spring. I noticed, in a couple of minutes, Bill Park's remarks at some points imply that there is dichotomy being a secular democracy and being predominantly Muslim state with a Muslim society. This is one of the viewpoints that spread in the west.

I would like to point out that Turkey demonstrates very clearly that you can have a predominantly Muslim secular democracy and there is no dichotomy being a Muslim on the one hand and secular democratic on the other. The values of the secular state can be reconciled with Muslim societal values. And I think you find references –especially in late couple of years in particular- that Islamist Prime Minister Erdogan or religious AK Party; it is always the adjective of the party with Islamist prime minister or Islamist roots on western press. Nobody talks about Christian G.W.Bush who was a president of USA

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for eight years and pursued the evangelically driven foreign policy particularly on the Middle East especially on the issue of Israel-Palestine. It was a deliberate attempt. What is most interesting that these adjectives certainly became very popular in the American press after the Davos incident where Prime Minister Erdogan walked out of the panel upon his clash with President Shimon Peres. One last word, societies are defined on strict lines in the West; Muslim societies are defined as becoming fundamentalist. I think the prime example of that was provided by the person -who might be called the leading fount of superficial knowledge Milton Friedman. Some of you might have seen this article in New York Times about his trip to Fatih in Istanbul and he saw lots of people going to the mosque in prayer time and he said: ‘O my God, Turkey has become fundamentalist’. If you go to the mosque or church at prayer time, you come to conclusion that Turkey or the US has become fundamentalist. That sort of analysis has been prevailing in Western press and western academia as well.

When we talk about the Arab spring we have to mention the elements of change and continuity. I think the major demonstration of change, at least in terms of the perception of change outside the Arab world about the Arab world was the exclusion of the myth that Arabs in particular and Muslim in general by certain religious-cultural characteristics are innately undemocratic. All these religious-cultural characteristics that were given about the democracy deficit in the Arab world have started to change. Democracy deficit in the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab component of the Muslim world rather stems from specific domestic and international reasons. Also keep in mind that Arabs make up of only 20 per cent of the Muslim population.

But even that 20 percent has now demonstrated clearly that the values that Arabs uphold such as ‘freedom, liberty and economic opportunities are no different from those of other people around the world. The other myth that the Arab spring has destroyed -although there is resistance to accept this- is the myth of Islamist takeover of the Arab world once the dictatorships fall. And this was what the Arab dictators like Mubarak of Egypt or Abdullah II of the Jordan had always used vis-a-vis Washington. What the events of the last ten months or so in the Arab world demonstrates is that , Islamist groups -although they joined the movements later on were not the initially leading forces in the uprisings. There was a wide array of social forces that came together almost spontaneously when the barrier of the fear was broken: the demand was that the old regimes must fall and must go. While the Islamist parties, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia, were part of those demonstrations, they were not the leading forces. I do not think they will be the leading forces of transformation process. The other thing related to this point is that when democratic opening takes place, Islamist movements or parties that appear to be monolithic will not remain so. Egypt is the prime example of a country they have now begun to fracture. I argued in my ‘Many Faces of Political Islam’ that when democratic openings take place, two things happen to Islamist movements: they get fractured or they are banned. Take the example of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; there is a generational struggle within the movement

between the younger and older generation. The Wasat Party, which is the more liberal wing of the party, has broken away from the Brotherhood. The example of Al-Nahda, Rachid Gannuchi, is also similar. We saw this in Turkey as well; the AK Party emerged out of the older Necmettin Erbakan's party as a party that had to make major fundamental changes to survive. This will happen all around the Muslim world. As democratic things take place, ideological purity would be sacrificed for political pragmatism. This is all for good, because without political pragmatism and with ideological rigidity, democracy cannot be adopted. People in Washington, New York and hopefully in London have noticed these changes. Let me stop talking about these changes at this point and move to continuity.

The continuity that I see is that -Egypt is a good example- the regimes do not change overnight. Mubarak may have been overthrown but the structure of the regime and the army continues to remain in place. Day after Mubarak fell I published an article on the website of Foreign Policy which I had titled 'the Tyrant is dead: long live the Military' from the British King is dead: Long live the King. The military has portrayed itself as putting distance to the old regime, but I argued that they will stay in power. Again the example of Turkey is very interesting. I argued in the article that it took sixty years for Turkey to finally be able to impose civilian rule over the military. I think the democratic consolidation in Turkey turned irreversible. So you cannot expect the army interference any more.

Take the difference between Egypt and Syria, for example. In Egypt, military was able to distance itself from Mubarak for number of reasons. In fact, they had over the years resented Mubarak's attempt to impose his son as a successor. In Syria, given the nature of Syrian military, army will find great difficulty to put a distance to the Assad regime. When it comes to Israel, it, more or less, follows the same patterns of European settlements in America, Australia or New Zealand. This is one of the fundamental reasons why you find so much empathy in North America or in the Western world in general with Israel. Israel has been basically repeating the same experiences that European colonies underwent in the 18th and 19th centuries. This does not mean that I challenge the right of Israel to exist as a state. Israel is now given in the hearts of Middle East. However, its policy through the occupied territories makes it difficult for the people of the Middle East to recognize it to be part of the Middle East.

There is another aspect of continuity: apprehension in the West about the rise of political Islam. Political Islam is highly contextualized with its different forms and faces. The fear about the political Islam is related to the association of political Islam with the resistance to the hegemon. I do not have time to go into the details. There is a long history going back to mid-19th century. In the beginning of European colonialism in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world, Islam was used as a vehicle for opposition or resistance to colonial rule. Islamist movements still carry that character. That is the reason why there is certain degree of apprehension in many of the Western capitals about the political Islam. In other words, it is not related to what these people

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wear or how they live. These are superficial reasons. The real reason is that political Islam, despite its super manifestations, has, in the final analysis, certain potential to act as anti-hegemonic force in this part of the world.

The third and final point I want to make is the role of the regional and global powers in the Middle East. Here, Turkey and Iran, as I argued in an article published in *Insight Turkey*, come to the forth as regionally preeminent actors. The future of the Middle East will not be determined by Riyadh or Cairo, but by what happens in Ankara and Tehran. Turkey is in the Eastern Mediterranean and Iran is in the Persian Gulf. I do not have time to go into details about why I consider them to be preeminent powers, but the major reason is that they have both the hard powers and soft powers. Turkey has much more soft power than Iran, but Iran has the hard power in terms of its location and oil resources. Also thanks to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iranian security environment has vastly improved.

Lastly, I would finish by mentioning two things. One is the issue of the Iranian nuclear aspirations; I am not technologically qualified to make a determination on whether the Iranians are on the way to the bomb or how long it takes to get there. To me it makes eminent sense that they would be attempting to acquire a nuclear capability that would act as deterrent force in their geo-strategically location. Considering nuclear armed Russia to the north- which is not being friendly- and considering nuclear armed Israel to the West -which is hostile-, considering nuclear armed Pakistan –with which it has superficially good relations-, it makes eminent sense that some people in Tehran would be thinking of the nuclear option as a deterrent.

I do not think this immediately has impacts on Turkish interests as some people do. There are several scenarios rolling in the press lately about the possible effects of nuclear missiles shelled in Turkey by NATO and of differences over Syrian issue on Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey and Iran are, in a way, bound to emerge as the major regional powers. It is extremely important for both Ankara and Tehran to exercise caution as the relations between Iran and Turkey remain the key for stability and prosperity in the Middle East in the next decades to come.

Talip Kucukcan

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Bill Bark

Bill Park is a senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence Studies, King's College, London University. He was formerly Principal Lecturer at the JSCSC, Bracknell, and at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. From 1981 to 1991 he was Visiting Lecturer (Part-time) at City University, London, and from 1975 to 1978, Lecturer in International Politics, Liverpool Polytechnic. He has widely published many articles on Turkish politics in several journals such as *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, *European Security*, *World Today*, *Mediterranean Politics*, *Defense Studies Journal*, and chapters in edited volumes. Park's recent chapters include *Turkey and the US: a transatlantic future* (in *The Future of Transatlantic Relations*, 2011); *The EU and Turkey: bridge or barrier* (in *The security dimensions of EU enlargement: wider Europe, weaker Europe?*, 2007); *Developing a national security concept: assessing new threats to security* (in *Security sector transformation in south-eastern Europe and the Middle East*, 2007) and etc. He has two forthcoming books coming in 2011: *Modern Turkey: people, state and foreign policy in a globalized world* (Routledge, 2011) and *The AKP and Turkey as a regional power* (Stanford University Press, 2011).

Mohamed Ayooob

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