EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement: Too Big to Fail

The analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes

The migrant crisis that has stemmed from the ongoing strife in the MENA region is one of the most devastating and consequential crises of modern times. Its impact has been felt across continents, in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, along with European Union member states and the United States. In addition to unprecedented regional humanitarian challenges, the crisis shook Europe to its core by challenging its political institutions and humanitarian values. The rise of populism and Islamophobia in the West in general is closely associated with the migrant crisis that has pushed the capacity of countries to their limits.

Perhaps no relationship has been more affected by the refugee crisis than that between the European Union and Turkey. EU-Turkey relations have been strained and undermined by the migrant crisis to such a degree that it seems to have created a “make or break” moment in Turkey’s EU accession talks. This analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes. It also seeks to understand how heightened tensions between the EU and Turkey will affect the longevity and effectiveness of the agreement.

Introduction

The migrant crisis that has stemmed from the ongoing strife in the MENA region is one of the most devastating and consequential crises in modern times. Its impact has been felt across continents, in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, along with European Union (EU) member states and the United States. In addition to unprecedented regional humanitarian challenges, the crisis shook Europe to its core by challenging its political institutions and humanitarian values. The rise of populism and Islamophobia in the West in general is closely associated with the migrant crisis that has pushed countries capacities to their limits.

Perhaps no relationship has been more affected by the refugee crisis than that between the EU and Turkey. EU-Turkey relations have been strained and undermined by the migrant crisis to such a degree that it seems to have created a “make or break” moment in Turkey’s EU accession talks. Yet, the survival of the agreement indicates that benefits derived from stabilization of the large refugee influxes and illegal crossings do exist. This analysis outlines the process through which the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP) on refugees came into being and examines the impact of the agreement, including its challenges and successes. It also seeks to understand how heightened tensions between the EU and Turkey will impact the longevity and effectiveness of the agreement.

The Joint Action Plan on Refugees

An unprecedented number of refugees from countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan have sought to migrate through Turkish territory toward a better life in EU member countries. The EU, unprepared for the dramatic flow of these refugees into its territory, brokered a deal with Turkey that has become a fulcrum in relations between the bloc and Ankara. The agreement tasks Turkey with halting the flow of refugees across the Mediterranean and Aegean seas into EU territory. In return, Turkey was to receive a jump-start to its long-stalled EU accession process as well as financial incentives to help with the burden of hosting refugee populations within its borders. The agreement has faced criticism from independent international actors, but has also largely succeeded in stemming the flow of refugees into Europe from Turkey.

For the last year and a half, the Turkish-European relationship has been framed by the negotiations, development, and implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee agreement. In many ways, the agreement has woven its way into the very framework of Turkey’s EU accession process. As of April, 2017, Turkey hosts over 3.2 million refugees^[1] and Turkish government and civil society organizations have spent around 25 billion dollars for the wellbeing of the refugees.^[2] Beyond the financial costs of meeting such monumental humanitarian challenges, Turkey’s relations with the EU have been challenged by the crisis. While Turkey has tried to pursue a humanitarian policy from the outset of the Syrian crisis, the EU has been the victim of increasing political pressures created by anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiments. Consequently, the EU has adopted a security-oriented approach trying to prevent refugees and migrants from pouring into the continent. The refugee agreement with Turkey should therefore be understood within the context of European efforts to stem the tide of irregular migration to the continent. It was also meant to ease off some of Turkey’s financial burden in hosting a large refugee population while attempting to reenergize the country’s long-stalled EU membership bid.

Under the Joint Action Plan on Refugees (JAP), the EU’s Facility for Refugees on Turkey (the funding mechanism for JAP negotiated funds) has contracted 46 projects worth over €1.5 billion, half of which has been disbursed as of 2017.^[3] These numbers underscore the vast nature and demands of providing relief to the 21th century’s greatest migrant crisis. They have dictated the framework of the Turkish-European partnership, shaping bilateral policies even on issues not directly related to the refugee crisis. For this reason, it is important to examine the process of the JAP’s negotiation and disbursements not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also through the lens of its broader impact on EU-Turkish relations since its inception. In doing so, we find that, despite increased tensions in the European-Turkish relationship, the JAP has been successful in dramatically slowing the influx of refugees through the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.

The refugee crisis facing Turkey, Europe, and the broader Mediterranean region was, by no means, a new phenomenon when the JAP was signed in late 2015. For Turkey, the first effects of the crisis were felt as early as March 2011, when refugees fleeing Syria began making their way to Turkey. The first refugee camps in Turkey were opened only two months later, and by May 2012, Turkey saw large increases in the number of Syrian and Iraqi refugees crossing into the country.^[4] As Turkey was beginning to seriously grapple with the burgeoning crisis, the United Nations (UN) released its first Regional Response Plan (RRP) for Syrian refugees.^[5] The plan recognized that Turkey, along with regional neighbors Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq were on the cusp of increasing regional insecurity as a result of the deteriorating situation in Syria. The report sought to provide for the growing number of Syrian refugees, which at that time numbered around 710,000.^[6] The report also stated, “It is worth mentioning that several countries in Europe and North Africa have noted a significant increase in the number of Syrians entering and remaining in their territory.”^[7] This acknowledged the reality that, for many of the migrants and refugees, Turkey was seen as a gateway in a longer journey into Europe, which began to see large waves of migrants flocking to its shores.

Europe’s first attempt to deal with the growing number of refugees came in December of 2014 when the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the “Situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration.”^[8] The resolution was revisited in April 2015, when the 28 EU member countries agreed on a ten-point plan to increase financial resources for addressing the crisis and to expand and reinforce operations in the Mediterranean to stem the flow of migrants.^[9] In the year 2015, it was estimated that between 750,000^[10] and 885,000^[11] migrants irregularly entered Europe through Turkey. These numbers represented a 17-fold increase from 2014.^[12] “Turkey has reached its total capacity for refugees… and it would put the EU face to face with more migrants,” Turkey’s EU Minister advised in September 2015.^[13] Brussels’ first formal engagement with Turkey on stemming the tide of refugees came in May 2015, when the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn met with Turkish Foreign Minister and EU Minister for a working dinner focused on Turkey’s EU accession process. The dinner gave way to discussions on how to handle the refugee situation. By October 2015, the EU and Turkey had established the framework for the November 2015 JAP. This agreement followed a May 2015 “European Agenda on Migration,” under which the EU initially provided Turkey with funds for sustaining its refugee efforts.^[14]

The EU and Turkey formalized the JAP in November 2015. The final agreement promised Turkey €3 billion in exchange for Turkish support in curbing flows of migrants from Turkey to Greece. The promised €3 billion, which would be dispersed via a Facility for Refugees in Turkey, would assist Ankara in its pursuit of hosting displaced populations from countries such as Syria and Iraq. Along with this financial assistance, a series of other benefits were guaranteed to Turkey for its efforts.^[15] For Ankara, one of the most important of these included the establishment of visa-free travel to the EU for Turkish citizens and the opening of new chapters in Turkey’s EU accession process. The agreement also called for biannual summits to address issues facing EU-Turkey relations. Turkey’s benefit from the agreement was twofold. Not only did the Facility for Refugees in Turkey guarantee support for migrant and refugee populations as Turkey began to feel the financial strain from their numbers, it was also supposed to reenergize its long-stalled EU accession process.

Final approval for the appropriation of the €3 billion was the first major hurdle of the agreement. The member states of the EU signed off on the proposal only after Italy dropped its initial resistance to the plan. Italian objections to the allocation of funding were seen as a bid by Italian Prime Minister Renzi to secure leverage on budget negotiations between his country and the EU, rather than objections to the agreement itself.^[16] After intense internal negotiations, it was decided that the EU would provide €1 billion from its own budget. The remainder of the funds would come from the 28 EU governments based on their gross national income share. This brought Germany in as the top contributor at €427.5 million for 2016, the United Kingdom following with €327.6 million, France at €309.2 million, Italy at €224.9 million and Spain at €152.8 million, according to figures provided by the European Commission (EC).^[17] Contributions to the fund would be exempt from calculations on member state budget deficits. This is important, as EU members are required keep their budget shortfalls under check or risk disciplinary action, a reality that continues to impact members such as Italy and Greece as they battle financial instability. The final terms of the agreement on appropriation were finalized on February 3, 2016.^[18]

Top EU Contributors to the €3 billion in aid promised under the Refugee Agreement

Source: Francesca Piscioneri & Gabriel Baczynska, “Italy drops objections to EU migration fund to Turkey,” Reuters, 2 February 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-turkey-italy-idUKKCN0VA30K.

Implementation

In the wake of the inking of the JAP, Turkey began to detain persons planning to cross the Aegean Sea from Ayvacık to Lesbos. A European Commission Implementation Report on the Refugee Agreement, released in February of 2016, concluded that the overall numbers of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the EU had been trending downward since October 2015.^[22] At the same time, the EU claimed to have seen few improvements in Turkey’s ability to stem migration flows and control the vast mafia networks that have developed to smuggle people across borders and seas. Through its detention program, Turkey managed to arrest small time traffickers, but this had done little in stemming cross border flows, in the eyes of the European Commission.^[23] For its part, Turkey announced new regulations allowing many of the nearly 2.5 million refugees within its borders to apply for work permits and re-enacted policies requiring Syrians entering Turkey to hold visas. In the final months of 2016, under this refugee work permit scheme, over 11 thousand Syrian refugees had gained legal access to the Turkish workforce.  For instance, on January 8, 2016,^[24] Turkey introduced visa obligations for Syrians travelling to Turkey through a third country in an attempt to reduce transitory migration toward the EU.^[25] Turkey was hopeful that these policies would be an effective step in holding up its end of its bargain with Europe.

Illegal Migration Organizers apprehended by Turkey

Source: Turkish Coast Guard Command, “Irregular Migration Statistics,” last updated 25 May 2017, accessed 25 May 2017, http://www.sahilguvenlik.gov.tr/baskanliklar/harekat/faaliyet_istatistikleri/duzensiz_goc_istatistikleri.html.

Tensions escalated between Turkey and Europe when Italy moved to block the proposed €3 billion of promised assistance to Turkey. While Turkey continued to work toward providing as much assistance as it could to its refugee population, EU President Donald Tusk increased pressure on Turkey to further shore up its migration strategy, stating “We have no more than two months to get things under control.”^[26] In contrast, Germany acknowledged that Turkey had “taken first steps” toward realization of its part of the agreement and that the EU must also carry out its responsibilities under the agreement.^[27] A stark departure for Europe from its strategy to rely on Turkey as a floodgate to the EU remained unlikely. However, continual infighting between EU members divided over asylum politics certainly stymied the speed with which Turkey could expect to reap benefits from the agreement. Furthermore, disagreements over the progress and results of the refugee deal led to a heightened climate of distrust between the EU and Turkey.

In April 2017, the European Commission released its fifth report on the progress of implementation of the Refugee Agreement. The report “confirmed the trend of a steady delivery of results,” by the JAP during 2016.^[28] It echoed previous implementation which also indicated a steady decline in the number of irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Europe. According to the report, the EU allocated 73 percent of the promised €3 billion and distributed €750,000 to aid agencies or missions operating inside of Turkey.^[29] The report detailed that one of the areas where the agreement was still lacking was in implementation of the “one for one return” resettlement scheme agreed upon between the EU member countries and Turkey. As of May 12, 2017, 5,695 refugees had been resettled from Turkey to the EU;^[30] meanwhile 1,093 migrants of various nationalities (Pakistanis, Afghans, Algerians, Iraqis, Bangladeshis, Iranians, Sri Lankans, and Moroccans) were returned to Turkey from Greece.^[31] The number of returns have been low, as the report outlines, but also below the number of migrants arriving into Greece from Turkey. Compared with previous reports, the European Commission says of process of returns, “Member States are advancing well with preparing further resettlement operations, including missions to Turkey to interview resettlement candidates.” The Fifth status report also outlines that Turkey is providing longer lists of referrals to EU member states to help with this process.^[32]

In February 2016, Turkey’s Directorate General of Migration Management levied charges that Greece had engaged in forcefully sending refugees back to Turkey, in violation of the readmission agreement terms of the March 2016 resettlement plan. Reports were put forward that Greek officials had returned more than 3,000 would-be migrants to Turkey between October 2015 and February 2016. In response, Turkish officials hinted at a possible rupture in the agreement. “There is a migration deal we signed, including a readmission deal with Greece. We are evaluating what we can do, including canceling the readmission deal,” Turkish Foreign Minister stated.^[33]

Number of Irregular Migrants from Turkey to Greece

* Refugee agreement goes into effect

Source: Turkish Coast Guard Command, “Irregular Migration Statistics,” last updated 25 May 2017, accessed 25 May 2017, http://www.sahilguvenlik.gov.tr/baskanliklar/harekat/faaliyet_istatistikleri/duzensiz_goc_istatistikleri.html

The EU’s strategy to stem the tide of “irregular migrants” has since been run through Frontex, the EU mechanism for border control and coastal guard. Frontex has the capacity to deploy 1,500 officers to meet regional needs. As of 2017, 600 Frontex staff are deployed to Greece to assist in migrant processing. As part of this effort, Frontex vessels were deployed to the Greek islands to patrol to prevent smugglers^[34] and assist in registering arriving migrants.^[35] In its 2017 Risk Analysis report, Frontex indicated that it had successfully rescued a total of 90,000 migrants in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.^[36] Turkey’s efforts have been manned by the Turkish Coast Guard. The Turkish Coast Guard reported that it had rescued 91,611 irregular migrants in 2015 and 37,130 in 2016. In the first five months of 2017, the total stood at 5,300 indicating the drastic reduction in numbers as a result of the JAP implementation.^[37] While the agreement has been successful in stemming the tide of refugees that was very high especially in 2015 and in the first half of 2016, there remains the challenge of many refugees still trying to make the lethally risky journey^[38] across the Mediterranean to Greece.

Another important component of the JAP implementation has been the deployment of NATO vessels to assist in patrolling Aegean waters. In February 2016, NATO responded to a request from Germany, Greece, and Turkey to assist in efforts to address the situation in the Aegean Sea. The alliance, in coordination with Frontex, began to conduct “reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal crossings,” between Turkey and Greece.^[39] In October 2016, Ankara called for an end to the mission, saying that the agreement’s effectiveness in reducing irregular migrant crossings rendered continued patrols unnecessary. “This was a temporary mission, and the goal has been reached,” the Turkish Defense Minister asserted.^[40] However, NATO, particularly Germany and Britain, continued to push the virtues of NATO presence in the Aegean Sea. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg put forward that the organization has continued to be integral to the effort to curb migrant flows, as its vessels were able to operate in both Greek and Turkish territorial waters. He also cited NATO’s ability to more effectively deal with smugglers than the respective countries’ coast guards as reason for continuing the mission.^[41] As of early 2017, NATO continues to hold a presence in the Aegean Sea, despite continued Turkish assertions that the mission has outlived its utility.^[42]

In its fifth report on the implementation of the agreement in March 2017, the European Commission reported that the agreement produced “tangible results” with substantially reduced number of crossings (less than 50 per day since the Commission’s forth report) and loss of life. The report also stated that the number of arrivals outpaced the number of returns from Greek islands to Turkey. Contracts for projects totaling 1.5 billion euros had been signed but the disbursements had only reached 750 million euros.^[43] The pace of resettlement and disbursement of funds for projects under the JAP appears less than ideal despite steady progress. Nevertheless, there seems to be enough success that there is less talk of canceling the agreement altogether.

European Disunity on Refugee Policy

In the months before the signing of the JAP, European leaders felt that it was important to have a plan to deal with refugee influxes in place before the spring of 2016. As the waters warmed in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, migrants would again begin to flow in masse toward Europe. As EU leaders rushed to complete the refugee agreement, many European diplomats feared a sharp increase in numbers would weaken the EU’s position in negotiations. German Chancellor Merkel was also trying to close growing divisions between Germany and its critics in the EU and head off a push by the central European states, led by Poland, to close the Macedonian-Greek border.^[44] Divisions within the Union over whether and how many refugees to accept became ever starker as the agreement came into effect.

In 2015, Germany accepted close to 1 million asylum seekers, and Merkel in return fielded criticism from members of the opposition and her own Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party.^[45] Speculation had already begun that Merkel’s refugee policies may cost her politically in Germany’s 2017 elections. EU immigration policies also had a major impact on the political environment of multiple EU member countries. In France, Marine Le Pen, the candidate from the far-right National Front party gained considerable traction in the run-up to the May 2017 presidential elections. Le Pen campaigned on an anti-immigration and anti-EU platform that inspired a wide scale populist movement in the country.^[46] In the United Kingdom, the pro-Brexit movement infused its campaign with anti-immigrant sentiment stemming from the refugee crisis that ultimately helped to push the country to vote to break from the European Union.^[47] In many ways, the refugee issue threatened not only coherence vis-à-vis the refugee policy but also the EU unity itself.

In December 2016, the European Union moved to allow for the return of asylum seekers in EU member countries to their first port of entry, in compliance with the Dublin Regulation, which dictates that the nation responsible for processing asylum requests is the country where the seeker first entered the bloc.^[48] This system of processing had broken down at the height of the refugee influx. The policy was expected to be re-implemented in March 2017. European Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans asserted in December 2016, “This will provide further disincentives against irregular entry and secondary movements, and is an important step for the return to a normally functioning system” of migration in the European Union.^[49] The move was criticized by Greek Migration Minister who insisted that Greece was still unable to adequately respond to the influx of refugees.^[50]

The issue of burden sharing on migration intakes was a subject of discussion at the December 15, 2016 European Council meeting, the final communique of the discussions urged, “Member States should further intensify their efforts to accelerate relocation” of migrants. This statement was buttressed by indications from Timmermans that the EU might step up procedures to sanction member states that remain unwilling to shoulder the burden of accepting refugees and migrants. “The [European] commission might start infraction procedures and we will certainly consider [sanctioning members]” Timmermans said on February 8, 2017.^[51] Lack of unity among the EU members over the broader refugee policy as well as the implementation and funding of the JAP constituted a major hurdle preventing effectiveness of the agreement. Moreover, the disputes of the various aspects of the agreement led to increased strains between the EU and Turkey. Germany under Merkel remained at the forefront of smoothing these relations to ensure effective implementation and prevent complete breakdown of the refugee agreement.

Refugees / Migrants Resettled Under 1:1 Mechanism (April 4, 2016 – May 12 2017)

Source: “Relocation and Resettlement – State of Play,” European Commission, 16 May 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170516_update_of_the_factsheet_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf.

Source: Huseyin Gazi Kayak, “Turkey takes more than 1,000 migrants under EU deal,” Anadolu Agency, 23 May 2017, http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-takes-more-than-1-000-migrants-under-eu-deal/824434.