A Window of Opportunity in Türkiye-U.S. Relations

It has been nearly a year since the Trump administration came to power, and during this period we have seen Washington pursue a policy that favors direct engagement with Türkiye. From the transition to a ceasefire and reconstruction phase in Gaza to the integration of the SDF in Syria, from peace efforts in Ukraine to opening a new chapter in bilateral relations, we have observed President Erdoğan being part of a much closer and more productive dialogue process with President Trump on many issues. Erdoğan’s particularly intensive efforts to secure a ceasefire in Gaza contributed to Trump exerting meaningful pressure on Israel on this issue for the first time, while we also saw that Erdoğan’s perspective on how stability should be achieved in Syria was largely embraced by Trump. It was inevitable that the cooperative working dynamic built around regional issues would also positively affect bilateral relations, and for some time now there have been strong signals that the problems between the two NATO allies regarding defense cooperation may be overcome.

FROM BIDEN TO TRUMP

The Biden administration preferred to freeze problematic areas in relations with Türkiye but did not take critical initiatives to resolve them. Issues such as the S-400s, FETÖ, and the status of the SDF in Syria were left on ice, and when the purchase of new F-16s came onto the agenda, a solution was produced only in connection with the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. Biden avoided taking risks to lift CAATSA sanctions that would pave the way for defense cooperation, instead deflecting responsibility to Congress, and continued to repeat the standard position regarding a potential F-35 sale. His full support for Israel’s genocidal policy in Gaza blocked any positive progress in Turkish-American relations. Although no crisis occurred in the Biden-Erdoğan bilateral relationship, Biden chose not to take risks on issues that could have been resolved through leadership diplomacy.

With the Trump administration, new dynamics emerged in Gaza and Syria that directly concern Türkiye, and it was known that Trump wanted to take initiative in resolving problems in bilateral relations as well. Ankara pursued an extremely active policy on these issues, making a major contribution to achieving a ceasefire in Gaza. Trump’s pressure on Netanyahu to insist on the permanence of the ceasefire and his plan for the reconstruction of Gaza brought onto the agenda the deployment of a peace force to which Türkiye would also contribute. Israel opposes Türkiye sending troops to Gaza, but it is clear that an international force not acceptable to the Palestinian side would also be ineffective. Trump’s openness not only to Türkiye’s involvement but also to adopting its perspective on securing peace shows how much ground has been covered compared to the Biden era.

In Syria, the Trump administration’s effort to move forward in close coordination by seeing Türkiye as the most critical actor in the integration of the SDF into Damascus also stood out as a positive dynamic. As Ankara launched the process of a terror-free Türkiye, it insisted that this goal could only be achieved by ensuring Syria’s territorial integrity. Trump’s desire to ultimately withdraw from Syria while avoiding a chaotic exit similar to Afghanistan made close cooperation with Türkiye essential. Statements by Syria special envoy Tom Barrack that took these dynamics into account also indicated how closely the Trump administration had aligned with Türkiye’s policy. Both the U.S. and Türkiye demonstrated their will to work together to ensure stability in Syria by closely monitoring the implementation of the March 10 agreement between the SDF and Damascus.

A NEW ERA IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

The rapid progress made on Gaza and Syria during the Trump era contributed to the emergence of a new window of opportunity to resolve critical problem areas in bilateral relations. It is known that Trump views Türkiye’s purchase of the F-35 positively and is even open to its reentry into the program. It is also common knowledge that while Trump is open to lifting CAATSA sanctions, the biggest obstacle in this regard is the S-400 issue. Most recently, a social media message posted by U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye Barrack on this matter pointed to the possibility of a new development. Reports that Türkiye could return the S-400s to Russia were also a clear indication that there is emerging political will on the Ankara-Washington line to revisit defense relations. In a context where Israel opposes Türkiye’s acquisition of the F-35, persuading Congress will not be easy for Trump, but if Türkiye takes a step on the S-400 issue, the balance could shift suddenly.

Lifting CAATSA sanctions could pave the way for strengthening defense relations between Türkiye and the U.S., producing positive results as well in the context of Europe’s efforts to increase defense spending. Opening the door to joint projects between Turkish and American defense companies would also encourage Western firms that have kept their distance from Türkiye’s defense industry. Reopening the path for defense relations, which have constituted the most critical constant of Turkish-American relations during and after the Cold War, would usher in a new era both in terms of developing Türkiye’s national defense industry and enhancing its regional power projection. Leadership diplomacy has always been important in bilateral relations, and the Trump-Erdoğan relationship’s determination to overcome problems stands out as the most critical harbinger of the new period. If this dynamic produces a lasting framework for joint action in Syria, leads to the acceptance of Türkiye’s role in the Palestinian issue, and normalizes defense relations, it will generate enduring effects on Turkish-American relations.

[Yeni Safak, December 19, 2025]