


SETA Policy Report



SETA | Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research | January, 2012 | www.setav.org | Report No: 9

The Anatomy of Egyptian Revolution: From 25th of January to The New Constitution

SETA Policy Report



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January, 2012 | Report No: 9

THE ANATOMY OF EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: FROM 25TH OF JANUARY TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION

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SUMMARY

Since the first day the governments in the Middle East and North Africa began to tremble, the region has become the focus point for the world, as well as Turkey. Without a doubt, Egypt has played an important part in this. After having ruled the country with autocracy for thirty years, Hosni Mubarak was forced to leave office on February 11, 2011 after two weeks of intense public pressure. It was surprising that Mubarak, whose power and authoritarian rule—supported by the U.S. and the Egyptian Army—was thought to be indestructible, was overthrown in only 18 days. In fact, the revolution process in Egypt had begun long before Ben Ali was forced to leave office in Tunisia and protesters gathered in Tahrir square. This process was shaped to a great extent by the opposition, notably the Muslim Brotherhood who started getting organized in the 2000s; the youth movements that used technological savvy to get organized and the Egyptian army who refused to suppress the numerous worker strikes and protests between 2004 and 2008.

The three fundamental factors of the Arab revolution processes, “bread,” “freedom,” and “dignity,” also constituted the fundamental demands of the protesters in Egypt. Structural problems that hindered the economic development of the country and the “closed circuit” structure of wealth distribution caused by the autocratic regime prepared the platform for the people of Egypt to revolt for “bread.” Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the workers and the youth assumed leading roles in the change process in Egypt. The oppressive order of the state of exception and the anti-democratic Mubarak regime incapable of meeting the public’s demands and tendencies proved the justness of the protesters’ cause and their slogans for “freedom” in Tahrir Square. The Egyptian administration’s silence on the invasion of Iraq was the last straw in its blatant disregard of people’s dissatisfaction of the moderate relationship it maintained with Israel on Camp David platform. Meanwhile, the youth who have bonded in the increasing numbers of protests and made effective use of the social media constituted the grounds for the grand demonstrations in the recent months.

As the idea of a “New Egypt” is taking shape, each group has envisions a future for Egypt from their own perspective. In this processes of envisioning, the factors that will be determinative of Egypt’s future seem to be at the foremost the Army, the Muslim Brotherhood which is the most organized representative of the Islamist faction, Kefaya which brings different sections of the society together, the youth movements such as the April 6th movement, and the representatives of the working class. The reflections of this new landscape will reflect the shifts in the process of constructing the new political makeup of Egypt in relation to the positions political actors will take and the type of relations they will maintain with the Army.

Having failed to anticipate Egypt’s transformation, the United States now tries to influence the formation of the “New Egypt” from outside. The U.S. priority is to have a new political regime in Egypt which is as compatible with American interests in the region as possible and which allays Israeli concerns about security as possible. It would be unrealistic to expect the army which maintained

close relations with the U.S. for years to suddenly abandon politics completely. One must also note that the Egyptian army is well-liked by the Egyptian people and the army refused to intervene in the protests with violence. The Egyptian army will seek to maintain its effectiveness in the new political regime both because of its respected and powerful position within the Egyptian system and its significant role in the economy. In this vein, the “New Egypt” will be shaped to a great extent by a “negotiation” process between the army and the political actors in opposition. In this negotiation process, the U.S. is expected to exert its influence in order to shape the process according to its own interests. Therefore, it is likely that Egypt’s transition to democracy will be a long and difficult process.

The temporary constitution in Egypt was approved in the referendum held on March 19, 2011 with 77 percent yes vote. Parliamentary elections and presidential elections are expected to be held in June and September respectively. Although the Muslim Brotherhood will not nominate a candidate to run in the presidential elections, it seems that it has begun to exert its influence in the parliamentary elections and will draw significant support. Reports claiming that U.S. policy may establish a “moderate” relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood reveal the likely American approaches to the potential “Islamist” actors in the post-revolutionary political regime. It is evident that the U.S.—which has, to date, worked with autocratic leaders in many Middle Eastern countries—must now negotiate with multi-lateral political structures with multi-actors. Egypt is a typical example of this.

While the initially ambiguous American position has become increasingly clear, the EU did nothing other than stating the necessity to meet protesters’ demands. It must also be noted that the UK, made tangible efforts to carve a space for itself in the post-Mubarak Egypt. It can also be stated that while the Arab League and Iran are playing a waiting game regarding the change in Egypt, crucial actors such as China and Russia wait “cautiously and anxiously.” Because the results of the Arab revolutions are uncertain, China, concerned with the success of its economic investments especially in Africa, supports the status quo. Russia, which has had limited influence in the region under the Camp David order, similar to China, supports the status quo both because its wariness of the direction the change process in Egypt is taking and its suspicion that U.S may become the external determinative factor of that change.

On the other hand, Turkey, which has been considered a “source of inspiration” for the demands that triggered the revolutions in the Middle East, believed from the beginning that governments must pay attention to the social demands of their people. Turkey has taken a principled stance in this change process in the Middle East by becoming the first to advise Hosni Mubarak to pay attention to the public’s demands. Emphasizing that every Arab and African community deserves a constitutional state which respects human rights on the basis of justice and democracy and that the inevitable change process must be managed peacefully, Turkey reiterates at every turn that it will give any necessary support. That Turkey did not support the 2003 American invasion of Iraq has increased its diplomatic influence. Moreover, Turkey’s positive, constructive attitude during the Arab revolutions and its bold initiative signify that it will play an effective role in the “new Middle East.”

THE ANATOMY OF EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: FROM 25TH OF JANUARY TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Three Pillars of The Political Balance: Statists, Liberals and Islamists

When Egypt's political history is examined, it can be seen that three important movements have been in competition to influence the political structure and to reconstruct it—liberal, statist, and Islamist movements.¹ One of these movements, the Statist movement since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 strengthened its hold on the political process of the country, and used its power to incapacitate the other two movements on the political stage. Nevertheless, in spite of all these pressures, the competition and interaction of these three movements which are deeply rooted, both historically and institutionally, are the most crucial factors shaping the political, economic and social structure of the country.

One of the most deep-seated political movements of Egypt, the liberal movement², dating back to 19th century, was institutionalized with Egypt's declaration of independence. Egyptian liberals who adopted many of the fundamental principles of liberalism, such as the rule of law, independence of judiciary, individual freedoms, women and minority rights, basic education, political pluralism, free market, small state, have assumed a significant role in the struggle for democracy since 1922 when the country declared its independence.

In this sense, the most liberal Egyptian constitution was the one drafted in 1923. By establishing a parliamentary system based on the principle of separation of powers the Egyptians guaranteed principles such as individual freedoms, freedom of the press and accountability. However, the democratic tendency of the country did not last long—it came to a halt with a coup d'état undertaken by the Free Officers in 1952.

The defeat of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war played an effective role in the Free Officers' coup. The Officers, who carried out the coup for reasons such as the political and social degeneration during the rule of monarchy, the inadequacies of the politicians, corruption, the continuing influence of British, the weakening of the army as a result of wrong planning and bad decisions, systematically erased the traces of the old regime with the new regime they established in

1. See Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt After Mubarek*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008.

2. See Hala Mustafa, *A Policy for Promoting Liberal Democracy in Egypt*, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2006 May.

the post-coup period. The concept that best represents the regime that has governed the country since 1952 is the autocratic statism.³ This group, that lacked a coherent ideology, in an effort to compensate for this lack, adopted a model that integrates Islam and socialism—a model they fail to define consistently even today.

The institutions that are based on socialist principles—such as central planning integrated into the system as a result of the close relations established with the former Soviet Union, particularly in the 60s, state control over the economy, national development, single-party system, security focused large bureaucratic structures—followed a nationalist state and society approach with Islamist undertones in the political arena. In this sense, Nasser took a nationalist approach geared towards reviving the Arab identity, values and independence as he envisioned a pan-Arab nationalism in Egypt's leadership. This nationalist discourse was fundamentally based on Islam. The political approach of the regime that established Sharia (Islamic law) as the main source of legislation in 1981 was shaped to a great extent by Islamic references in the context of the debate between Islamist movements and political Islam. The fact that official religion of the constitutional state was determined as Islam, God's name was incanted repeatedly, the expression of ideas that contradict with Islamic principles was banned, and Islamic opinions were widely articulated in the media and the press does that mean that this movement had an Islamist character. On the contrary, adopting Islamist discourses was part of a strategy designed to eliminate the Islamist movement. As a matter of fact, the most significant Islamist movements were repeatedly alienated from politics and they were allowed only a limited existence in civil society.

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The important point in this is the statist structure was contingent on military authority rather than a civil authority. Although the authority of the regime was consolidated in the civil organs (a ruling single-party and President), the army played a key role in maintaining and strengthening the regime. In other words, although Egypt was not a military dictatorship entirely, it was governed by a political system controlled by the military. The army had a say in the government of the country. Moreover, the army, instead of participating in everyday mechanics of politics directly, used its political power indirectly, through the political and bureaucratic elites with whom it established close and complex relations; thus, not only controlled politics but the politicians as well.

Another movement the autocratic statist, who tightly regulated the political, social and economy in Egypt since they seized control of the country in 1952, interacted with was the Islamist movement.⁴ The relationship between the statist framework of the regime and the Islamist movements could be characterized as conciliatory at times, competitive, even, contentious at other times. The paths of the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ihwan'l Muslimun), the most effective representative of the Islamist movement, after having cooperated during the 1952 coup, diverged shortly thereof. The regime not wanting to compete with the Brotherhood in the political sphere, initially banned the movement completely, but later allowed the movement to be visible in the social and cultural life. However, despite having been banished from politics, the Brotherhood's call for a fair Islamist rule in the political, economic and social arena found mass support in the public and the Brotherhood became the most critical and most effective member of the opposition.

3. Bkz. Steven Cook, *Yönetmeden Hükmeden Ordular: Türkiye, Mısır, Cezayir*, İstanbul, Hayy Kitap, 2008

4. Bkz. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt*, New York, Colombia University Press, 2002.

Although Egypt's political landscape of the last 60 years reveals a political landscape in which the authoritarian state dominated politics, suppressed the opposition, controlled the media, press and the civil society, and depoliticized the society; a closer examination of the political balances of the country tells a different story. In fact, the interaction of the statist movement with the liberal and Islamist movements dialectically transformed both the statist movement and its other two alternatives. This mutual interaction and transformation paved the way for authoritarian and democratic ideologies and institutions to develop simultaneously, resulting in a neither fully authoritarian, nor fully democratic regime.⁵

Although liberal ideas, institutions and traditions were excluded from the institutional aspect of politics by oppressive, authoritarian and anti-liberal structure, their influence on the political process could not be prevented. In this sense, liberal movement, as a movement that sometimes limited and sometimes trained the main authoritarian statist movement, tried to maintain its existence by integrating itself into the legal sphere. Therefore, in Egypt's autocratic history, lawyers and judges were the most ardent defenders of liberal reforms. This group preserved its liberal identity to a great extent and repeatedly prevented some of the regime's arbitrary activities. Court decisions can provide many examples of this.⁶ In addition to the judiciary, certain political parties and civil society organizations also played significant roles in the continued existence of liberal movement in Egypt.

Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood taking a more moderate position during this interaction limited the opportunities of the regime to manipulate Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a more democratic and free attitude. They exercised a democratic pressure over the regime not only in their demonstrations where thousands of people participated but also in elections where they took part as independent candidates. For instance the Muslim Brotherhood attained significant success in 2005 elections with their independent candidates even if it wasn't allowed to establish a political party. The regime on the one hand realized superficial reforms while on the other hand it hindered these reforms through limitations and prohibitions. When this tactic of the regime was combined with the softening position of the Muslim Brotherhood; liberals and Islamist movements agreed on many issues such as weakening the regime, rule of law, protection of individual and political rights and liberal economy.⁷

As a result of the activities carried out by these two political movements, the dominant statist conception realized reforms which on the one hand were liberal enough to guarantee its legitimacy in the national and international arena and on the other hand were limited enough to maintain its control over the regime. These restricting and partial reforms can be considered as the steps taken towards maintaining the status quo by the regime. Nevertheless, because of these partial reforms, liberal and Islamist movements had the opportunity to increase the support they received for their alternative vision.

1.2 Endless Democratization

Egypt ever since it declared its independence has been ruled by autocracy after a short lasting monarchy. The struggle for democracy in this country, which has almost never experienced democracy but insistently demanded it, has been harsh. In the period between 1923 and 1952—a period although not long considered to be relatively more liberal period of Egypt's political history—a parliamentary system was established and the principles of separation and balance of powers were adopted. The ideas and institutions of this period, which can be regarded as advanced

5. In democratization literature, these regimes are called hybrid regimes. For Hybrid regimes see: Marina Ottoway, "Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism", Washington, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2003; Steven Levitsky ve Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 2002.

6. Take for instance the Egyptian Parliamentary decision to extend the Emergency Law which grants the President with broad authority. Egypt Constitutional Court limited the authorities granted to the President by this law. See Rutherford op. cit. Similarly, the Constitutional Court declared the Egyptian parliament illegal in 2000. This was significant in that it also indicates that the Court also declared 1990 and 1995 elections illegal. In this vein, 2000 elections were held for the first time under the supervision of the judiciary. Besides, the decision made by the Constitutional Court in 1999 paved the way for NGOs to take part in elections as observers.

7. See: Mubadira al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin houl Mabadi al-Islah fi Misr [The Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Principles of Reform in Egypt], March 2004.

progressive step in consolidation of democracy were eliminated from the arenas of democracy and economics by the coup undertaken by the Free Officers in 1952. Even though they lost their institutional efficiency in politics, the ideas of this period left its mark in the political and continued to influence political process as motivation for groups struggling for democracy.

When the struggle for democracy in Egypt is examined, it can be observed that although the country went through a process of reform every ten years, this reform process was symbolic and superficial, and that it has aimed to manipulate the opposition and the society. Anwar Sadat who came to power in 1970 tried to conciliate the social unrest caused by the Nasser rule that had become more oppressive and authoritarian towards the end of 1960s. For example, Anwar Sadat marked a turning point in Egypt's experience with democracy by transitioning country to the multi-party system in 1976, however, what Anwar Sadat had in mind was not a real multi-party system, but rather a controlled pluralism. In fact, under Sadat's control, only two parties loyal to the regime, representing the left and right of the political spectrum, were allowed to exist; and an electoral system that made it impossible for the National Democratic Party (NDP) to transfer power to any other party in the political arena was established.⁸

Despite the authoritarian rule, 1970s carried Egypt into a relatively more liberal political environment in which political pressures decreased, new political parties were allowed in the political arena with restrictions, and activities of the opposition movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood were not banned. Nevertheless, these reforms did not last long. In 1977 the protests that broke out because of the economic problems were violently suppressed and the government revoked the liberal reforms which were already limited. The most important obstacle Egypt faced in the process of democratization was the army, which played an effective role in suppressing these protests and took acted every time the civilian were in a bind. The army, which has enjoyed increasingly growing power and authority in the Egyptian economy especially the since the 1970s, exercises influence not only on the military industries but also civilian, agricultural and national infrastructure sectors.⁹

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The democratic reforms that moved one step forward and two steps back in Egypt during the Sadat rule, continued in the same way during Hosni Mubarak's rule who succeeded Sadat. Hopes were revived when Mubarak's release of the opponents arrested during the Sadat regime immediately after he came to power was perceived as an indicator of abating autocracy. However, the limited opportunity given to the opposition parties in 1984 and 1987 elections and the changes to the electoral law that give advantage to the ruling party NDP did not bring any notable change and the increasing criticism and complaints of the opposition resulted in the regime's increasing of pressure over political and social actors.

In 1990s with the emerging economic problems, more oppressive and authoritarian attitudes replaced the controlled political and economic reforms of 1980s. Particularly since the mid-1990s Mubarak increased his control over the political and economic system and the opposition had less and less room for maneuver. Although the Mubarak regime's control over electoral processes, such as voting, nominating candidates, campaigning, access to the media, reading the polls and announcing the results, brought the Mubarak a decisive victory in elections, it did not suppress the social opposition. Particularly, the sentencing of 54 members of the Muslim Brotherhood to imprisonment in

8. During Anwar Sadat reign New Wafd party representing the right wing and the Socialist Labor Party representing the left wing were established. Besides, Anwar renamed Arab Socialist Union as National Democratic Party and positioned it as the central ruling party. For Anwar Sadat reign see: Hamdy A. Hassan, "State versus society in Egypt: Consolidating democracy and upgrading autocracy," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 4(9), 2010 December, p.319–329,

9. Robert Springborg, *Mubarek's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order*, Boulder, Westviews Pres, 1989.

military courts right after the Brotherhood won a few seats in the parliament in 1995 elections and the detention of thousands more without charges created a political trauma in the country.¹⁰ When other economic problems such as unemployment, inflation and poverty added on top of this, the Egyptian people began to raise their voices in their demands for democracy and freedom.

By the 2000s, not being able to ignore the public's demands for democracy and freedom any longer, the regime tried to appease the demands with limited reforms. parallel to these domestic developments, when USA adopted a discourse based on democracy and human rights in the post 9/11 period and increased its pressure in order to legitimize the Iraq War, the Egyptian administration was forced to soften the autocratic structure of the regime. In the light of these developments, democratic hopes were revived once again in 2004 and 2005. In 2004, the appointment of a reformist cabinet by Mubarak, brought visible dynamism to the opposition movements and livened the streets with strong civil society movements.

The convergence of the Muslim Brotherhood that adopted a more modern and reformist attitude with the liberal movement under the leadership of Ayman Nour on the grounds of bringing democratic change, became an effective factor in effectively mobilizing the people.¹¹ In 2005, the Kefaya movement which brought thousands of people to the streets and blatantly opposed Mubarak had the function of revealing in no uncertain terms that these demands for democracy in Egypt did not only belong to a small intellectual group but to the masses.¹²

The regime responded harshly to Brotherhood's gain of 88 seats out of 454 seats in the 2005 elections due to the more relaxed campaigning regulations and access to the media for the first time. Following the elections Brotherhood members were arbitrarily arrested, new constitutional restrictions were imposed and opponent news agencies were closed.¹³

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This sharpened the struggle between the regime and the opposition in the second half of 2000s. In this sense Egypt has witnessed demonstrations of three different groups in the last five years. The first group is the above mentioned Kefaya movement. This movement, emerging in December 2004 with slogan of "no to the sultanate, caliphate and corruption" aimed to resolve the economic, political and social problems Egypt suffered during the Mubarak reign. The second group was brought together by the economic demands. Demands for raises in pay, better working conditions, prevention of inflation and employment came to the forefront in the demonstrations of this second group, rather than political demands.. The third group is the youth organized via internet since 2007. Even though this group was initially formed around economic demands, it immediately adopted a strong political discourse for change.

Despite the political pressures, Egypt has been the stage for the social opposition taking to the streets and the emergence of a strong discourse for change. The political pressures and restrictions, in fact, have been the reason

10. Jason Brownlee, "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarek's Egypt", *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4), 2002, ss. 6–14.

11. In 2004, Ayman Nour established the el-Ghad Party (the Tomorrow Party), a liberal political party, together with a young cadre separated from the New Vefed Party.

12. For more information on Kefaya movement please see: İbrahim Tığlı, *Mısır'da Sosyal Hareketler: Kifaye Hareketi ve Müslüman Kardeşler*, İstanbul, DÜBAM, Şubat 2011.

13. Robert Springborg, "Is the EU contributing to Re-Radicalization", eds. Richard Youngs and Michael Emerson, *Islamist Radicalisation: the Challenge for Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, CEPS and FRIDE, 2009, p. 1-24.

for the development of an opposition convention. Because they did not have any opportunity to voice their demands through political means, people were forced to find alternative ways. Egypt experienced more than 1,000 demonstrations from 1998 to 2004. More than 250 of these demonstrations were held in 2004 alone – a 200 percent increase from the previous year.¹⁴ The increase was partly due to the strong public reaction resulting from the implementation of a liberal economy program; and partly due to the space created for opposition by the judiciary rulings that restricted the pressures of the regime. As a result of all these developments, the groups demanding democracy have become visible. All these developments demonstrate the events that put an end to the Mubarak regime had in fact begun long before civil unrest broke out on January 25, and ironically, the attempts to suppress these political and economic demands with more authoritarian tactics, brought another authoritarian regime to its end.

1.3 Human Rights Record

In order to evaluate Egypt properly in terms of human rights, the constitutional and legal changes, its relations with international human rights organizations and its implementation of these changes must be examined. The Constitution of 1923, the first Egyptian constitution, guaranteed certain civil and political rights to all citizens, including the right to equality, ban against discrimination, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. In addition to these rights, the Constitution of 1956, drawn after the coup, guaranteed some economic and social rights. The current Constitution adopted in 1971 guarantees civil and political rights such as freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to vote and to stand in elections in addition to adopting certain principles such as rule of law and equality. The current Constitution also guarantees economic and social rights such as the right to own property, the right to work, the right to a free education at State institutions, the right to health care, the rights of the family, young persons and children and the right of women to equality with men. In addition, various constitutional amendments were made on political freedoms in 1981, 2005 and 2007.¹⁵

In addition to these amendments, Egypt became a party to many international conventions, although some with reservations, and the reports Egypt submitted were evaluated by the UN “Universal Periodic Review” mechanisms. In parallel to these policies, Egypt, which became a member of the UN Human Rights Committee, established councils such as National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (1988), National Council for Women (2000), and National Human Rights Commission (2003) among others in order to protect human rights and enhance the culture of human rights.¹⁶

A closer look into the human rights practices reveal that these regulations and institutions are not sufficient to protect rights and freedoms in Egypt. The state of emergency in effect since 1981 and impunity policies that protect those who blatantly violate the law weakened the principles of the constitutional state and human rights institutions and suspended the constitutional guarantee for rights and freedoms.

Egyptian legislation not only includes regulations that are incompatible with human rights but it also includes many provisions that violate the independence of the judiciary. The State of Exception, which has actually been in force since 1967, was retracted for an 18-month period in 1980, but it was reinstated on October 6, 1981, following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. The Emergency Law, by implementing a legal system of exception and bodies of judiciary, damaged the fundamental principles such as the rule of law and equality before the law. This law allowed the security forces to suspend the constitutional amendments that protected individual rights and freedoms for thirty years. The Emergency Law grants security officials the authority to detain people without indictments and to impose restrictions on freedoms of association and assembly, as well as restrictions on individuals’ preferences of residence

14. Marina Ottoway ve Amr Hamzawy, “Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab world”, *Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 28, 2011.

15. United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Seventh session, Geneva, 8-19 February 2009, *National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 Egypt*, s.3; For the full text see: http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/EG/A_HRC_WG6_7_EGY_1_E.pdf. Moreover see, *Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 Egypt*, s. 2. for the full text: http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/EG/A_HRC_WG6_7_EGY_3_E.pdf Last access: 09 February 2011.

16. UN *National report* ...,p. 4–6.

and travel. Illegal search and seizures and detentions without charges have become so ordinary and conventional that the people neither oppose nor demand justification for these practices.

The judiciary in Egypt also fails to act as a protection mechanism for human rights. State Security Courts established under the Emergency law are vested with a broad range of powers that encompasses offenses that could be heard in civil courts. The decisions of these courts that fail to provide even the minimum principles of due process and a fair trial cannot be appealed. Moreover, the President can intervene in the composition of these courts and appoint military personnel to the judicial panel. The Emergency Law also grants the President the right to intervene in decisions of the state security courts. The president has the authority to confirm, change, suspend or transfer to a different court. Similarly, the president has the right to refer civilian cases to military tribunals instead of regular courts. It is clear that these military tribunals, which are not only used for trials for the charges of terrorism and related crimes but also used against journalists, writers, political dissidents and parliamentarians, violates the right to a fair trial.¹⁷

One of the most important reasons the judiciary fails to protect human rights is the governments total control of the judiciary system. The Ministry of Justice is given full authority for appointment, assignment, training of the judges and prosecutors and assigning cases to the various circuits.¹⁸ Because of these regulations and institutional structures, illegal practices or human rights violations go unpunished.

Consequently, it is possible to say that violations of human rights in Egypt, is not an exception, but has become the rule. In fact, reports of civil society organizations and intergovernmental institutions indicate that not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights are systematically and often violated in Egypt. Only a glance at any report on Egypt will be sufficient enough to see these violations.¹⁹

The leading problems mentioned in these reports can be summarized as follows:

- Torture and maltreatment have become routine practices in police stations, detention facilities and prisons and sometimes even on public roads. Even though in many cases torture has resulted in death, there is no effective judgment and punitive policies against torture.
- In addition to execution of death penalty, every year many people are killed by security officials. Investigation into these killings is almost never opened. Particularly, refugees who attempt to cross the border illegally are easily killed and international investigations into these killings are not allowed.
- Because of the powers granted by the Emergency Law, people are arbitrarily detained and kept in prison for years without charges and sometimes disappear while in custody.
- Egyptian prisons suffer from severe overcrowding, low standards of hygiene, polluted water, scarcity of food, insufficient medical treatment and healthcare services.
- On the one hand Islamist groups notably the Muslim Brotherhood and Shiite Muslims; on the other hand other groups such as Copts, Baha'is and Jehovah's Witnesses suffer from violations of freedom of religion.
- Freedom of expression and the press and academic freedoms are restrained.
- Restrictions on the freedom of association make the activities of organizations, parties and syndicates difficult.
- According to the UN and the World Bank, one in every five Egyptian lives in poverty. Besides, nearly half of the population has no insurance coverage for treatment.
- Egypt suffers from severe violations of human rights in many other areas such as women's rights, children's rights and refugee rights.

17. *A Joint Report by a Coalition of Egyptian human rights non-governmental (NGOs) on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Egypt.* p. 4-5, http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/Joint_NGO_ReportEN.pdf

18. *A Joint Report*, p. 5.

19. For more information on Human Rights in Egypt see: http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/AIR2010_AZ_EN.pdf#page=77; <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/EU-egypt-council-of-association-note-april-09.pdf>; <http://eipr.org/en/report/2010/02/05/501/502>; <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm>; http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/EG/A_HRC_WG6_7_EGY_3_E.pdf; http://www.mazlumder.org/haber_detay.asp?haberID=8578; <http://en.eohr.org/2010/07/14/the-situation-of-human-rights-in-egypt-2009-introduction-summary-and-recommendations/>

Despite the above-mentioned restrictions and a terrible human rights record; Egypt has a serious and deep-seated civil society. Egyptian government resorts to several methods to justify its violation of human rights, and to divert national and international attention from its deteriorating rights record. The leading one of these tactics is exaggerating the danger represented by political Islam to the future of the state and the region.²⁰

It is clear that these military tribunals, which are not only used for trials for the charges of terrorism and related crimes but also used against journalists, writers, political dissidents and parliamentarians, violates the right to a fair trial.

2. THE BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTION: WHO ARE THE LEADING ACTORS OF THE REVOLUTION?

On February 11 when Hosni Mubarak resigned, the number of the protesters who took to the streets in cities from Cairo to Alexandria, from Ismailia to Suez had reached approximately 15 million. Egyptians of different ideological, socio-economic and education backgrounds succeeded overthrowing 30 yearlong Hosni Mubarak regime after only 18 days of protests, demonstrations and resistance under pressure.²¹ Although overthrowing of Mubarak, who was considered to be indestructible due to his power, authoritarian regime and the support he received from the USA and Egyptian Army, after such a short time came as a surprise to most, the revolution had begun long before Ben Ali was overthrown in Tunisia and protestors gathered in Tahrir Square. The determinative factors in the political processes leading up to the revolution were the opposition that began to get more organized since 2000s, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood; organized youth movements with their ability to effectively use technology; workers who went on thousands of strikes between 2004 and 2008; and the Egyptian army which supported the revolution by not suppressing the protests.

2.1 The Opposition Manifests Itself

Without a doubt, the Tunisian revolt did not launch the revolution that brought millions of people on the grounds of opposing the regime in Egypt. Even though the oppressive Mubarak regime did not allow any opposition in the political arena, the opposition has always survived in the social arena.. Globalization that has become a force in the world especially in the post-Cold War era, influenced and strengthened social movements. The opposition that has found room in room for maneuver in this way, at first avoided any direct criticism of the regime fearing it would lead to conflict, and instead expressed themselves through regional issues. In 2000, during the Second Intifada in Palestine and in 2002 in order to protest Israeli operations in the West Bank and Gaza, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets. Even if the protesters did not shout anti-Mubarak slogans, these demonstrations were clearly criticism of the regime through Israeli relations. These criticisms increased with the Iraq War. Even though Egypt did not take part in 2003 Iraq War, Mubarak never harshly opposed the war, which increased the reactions. Thousands of people who took to the streets in order to protest Iraq War in 2003 clearly showed their disappointment with the government's relations with the U.S. and Israel. Various groups began to take part in the protests against the Iraq War gradually increasing the number of demonstrations in 2004 and 2005.

20. *A Joint Report...*, p.2

21. For more detailed information on the chronology of the revolution process in Egypt: "Timeline: Egypt's revolution," *Aljazeera*, 14 February 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html> ; "Egypt's revolution: Interactive Map, *BBC News*, 11 February 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12327995>.

These protests paved the way for the opposition to merge under the same roof on the eve of 2005 elections. The increased opportunities for participating in politics before the 2005 elections also contributed to this. The changes made in this period did not aim to change the status quo but to protect the Mubarak regime by assuaging people's reaction; they nevertheless gave the opposition opportunity to make their voices heard. The opposition movements of different political perspectives, who merged on their demand for a new constitution and an electoral system, and their aim to ban Mubarak from another term in office, came together under the Kefaya (Enough) movement in 2004. They called themselves "The Change Movement." The founders and executors of the movement included intellectuals, socialists and Islamist of all walks of life. Kifaya movement assumed a significant role in the organization of the protests. Kifaya made direct criticism of the regime possible. In the 2005 demonstrations a taboo was broken for the first time and Hosni Mubarak was called to resign. During this period, Kifaya proved to be effective in raising awareness, not only in Egypt but also in the Arab world, of the protection of freedoms and the struggle against economic problems, poverty and corruption. . After 2004, the movement supported worker strikes prevailing in the country. The movement's experience in organizing demonstrations and its already wide support contributed to the success of the demonstrations when the call for Egyptians to take to the streets was made on January 25th, via the social media such as Facebook and Twitter.

Kifaya was not the only coalition formed by the opposition before the 2005 elections. Before the elections, opposition movements began to get organized and joined their forces in an environment of relative freedoms. The National Coalition for Democratic Change founded by former ministers under the leadership of the former Prime Minister Aziz Sedqi was one of those movements. The National Coalition, whose members included political analysts, economics experts, lawmakers and intellectuals, aimed to establish a channel of communication between the public in order to increase the pressure on the government to meet the demands for reform, especially the demand for a new constitution.²² However, a stronger coalition where the opposition really joined forces was the United National Front for Change. In the context of coalition, independent candidates from the New Wafd Party, the Arab nationalist Nasserite Party, al-Tagammu, Kifaya, al-Wasat, al-Karama, the National Coalition for Reform, the National Community for Democratic Change, Egyptian Movement for Change, the Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood joined their forces against the National Democratic Party.²³

During this process, liberals who were excluded, suppressed and prevented from communicating with people because they were seen as threats to the regime found the opportunity to get organized. In addition to the New Wafd Party ²⁴, in 2004 al-Ghad Party founded by Ayman Nour contributed to politics in Egypt as a liberal party. Of these two parties supporting demonstrations, al-Ghad had a limited base. When we analyze the recent developments in Egypt and the social demands, liberal intellectuals were successful in reaching people and in instilling the democratic values despite all kinds of limitations and obstacles. 2005 elections failed to overthrow the Mubarak regime; however, this process was quite significant in that it granted the opposition the opportunity to get organized and to bring opposition from all segments of the society together. As a matter of fact, we witnessed a similar coalition before 2010 elections despite all pressure. In April 2009, independent candidates from the April 6 movement, Kifaya, al-Karama, al-Wasat and the Muslim Brotherhood came together and formed the Egyptian Coalition for Change. The coalition demanded a new constitution, the abolition of the emergency laws, abolition of Camp David Accords and the release of political detainees.²⁵ During this process, Egyptian politics met yet another organization. The former

22. "Into the breach," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue No. 746, 9 - 15 June 2005.

23. "(Socialist) Labor Party," *Carnegie Guide to Egypt's elections*, <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/13/socialist-labor-party>

24. The New Wafd Party was established in 1978 in order to revive the nationalist liberal Wafd Party, one of the oldest Egyptian parties closed following 1952 coup. A product of the liberal spirit in the period before 1952, the Wafd party defends the decreased state role in economy, the free market economy, the encouragement of foreign investments, commercial liberalism, closure of the state-owned enterprises and the encouragement of the private sector. Moreover the party also supports promotion of fundamental freedoms, protection of human rights, establishment of a democracy based on multi-party system and free elections and realization of political, economic and social reforms. In addition to its political heritage, the Wafd Party is one of the strongest parties in opposition in Egypt thanks to its financial resources and its party organization.

25. *Carnegie Guide to Egyptian Elections*, <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/16/center-al-wasat-party>.

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed ElBaradei convened approximately thirty politicians, intellectuals and activists and launched a liberal movement under the name of "National Association for Change."²⁶ During this period, ElBaradei announced that he will not run for 2011 presidential elections unless a new constitution is drafted and people are called to protest the parliamentary elections which would only serve to protect the Mubarak reign.²⁷ After the elections ElBaradei left the country but when the demonstrations started, he returned to Egypt from Vienna and became a leading figure in the new era of Egyptian politics despite his weak base.

Opposing parties and movements in Egypt came together to oppose the regime since the beginning of 2000s. This period paved the way for different groups to come together under a single aim and take to the streets on January 25. As a matter of fact, the skeleton cadre of the revolution was these movements forming various coalitions with their slogans for change. Although they individually had limited effect, these movements could make their voices heard by many people and were able to resist to the regime when they cooperated with each other. The experience that the opposing movements gained during this process gave an idea about the probable political environment incase Mubarak regime is overthrown and it encouraged the ones who support the revolt. Moreover, particularly the alliances formed by the youth moved ahead of opposition parties and triggered the revolt.

Although they individually had limited effect, these movements could make their voices heard by many people and were able to resist to the regime when they cooperated with each other.

2.2 The Youth Ignites The Fuse in Egypt

Without a doubt, the youth had the most media coverage during the 18-day revolution. Moreover, because of the sheer number, enthusiasm and resistance of the youth in the streets and their efforts to keep alive the revolution and make their voices heard, the media called the uprisings "the revolt of the youth." It is true that this definition throws other actors out of focus and prevents us from looking at the full picture; however, the role of the youth movements during this period is undeniable.

Ahmed Maher and Ahmed Salah opened a group on Facebook at the end of 2007 in order to support workers of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, an industrial zone, who were planning to go on a strike on April 6, 2008. They laid the foundations for the 6th April Movement that emerged during the protests. Group's call received more support than expected and thousands of people took part in the strike on April 6, 2008 and other opposition groups also gave their support. The movement was able to call for a wide array of socio-economic reforms as well as for political change. They demanded higher wages, improved public services in health, education and transportation sectors, the elimination of government corruption, an end to police violence, torture and arbitrary detainment and creation of a fair judiciary system.²⁸ Thanks to 2008 strike, the group made its name heard by great masses and the 6th April The movement was no longer only a support group for the workers on strike but an opposition of youth where political demands were also expressed. The founders of the group had emphasized from the beginning that their group was not a political party but a platform where people who demand freedom and change come together.²⁹

26. "Profile of Mohammed ElBaradei" *Carnegie Guide to Egypt's elections*, <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/27/profile-of-mohammed-elbaradei>

27. Christopher Dickey, "One Man Versus the Mubaraks," *Newsweek*, April 20, 2010.

28. Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, "Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World," *Policy Outlook Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 28, 2011, p.2-3.

29. Samantha M. Shapiro, "Revolution, Facebook-Style," *New York Times*, January 22, 2009.

Questions how such a large number of people in Egypt took to the streets just 10 days after Ben Ali was overthrown in Tunisia put a spotlight on the 6th April Movement. Indeed the movement effectively benefited from social media and it not only convinced Egyptians to take to the streets but also drew the attention of international public opinion. The 6th April Movement had been making preparations for a long time, which had a crucial role in this success. The rising number of followers, reaching to ten thousand followers on Facebook between years of 2007 and 2009 caused a few difficulties. First of all, the movement had limited success in mobilizing vast amount of people because they did not know how to strategize and distribute the volunteer force.

Indeed the movement effectively benefited from social media and it not only convinced Egyptians to take to the streets but also drew the attention of international public opinion.

The organizers of the April 6th movement were particularly impressed by the opposition's demonstrations after the elections in Iran in which they effectively used social media and leaked footage recorded by cellphones to the international media. The second leading figure of the April Movement, Mohammed Adel, traveled to Serbia to attend training programs at "the Center for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies", with which he was clearly impressed to the extent that the movement replicated the center's logo.³⁰ The training programs focused on issues such as strategies to mobilize and organize young people, avoid violence make allies out of security forces while at the same time misleading them, and finally to choose the most efficient location for the demonstrations.³¹ Meanwhile, the movement's members improved their skills on utilizing digital technology. They strategized best ways of distributing photos and videos over the internet and improvised channels of communication in the case of a country wide shut-down of the internet. They also printed booklets containing these methods to prepare their followers in advance.

³² The movement's attempt to establish a relationship with Ushadidi, a Kenya-based non-profit organization that which develops open source software for information collection and interactive mapping, in August of 2010 was a major step forward in the movement's technological structure.³³ Ushadidi provided the movement with the necessary technological tools to capture video footage with ordinary cell phone cameras and to distribute them safely.³⁴

Despite all these preparations, demonstrations responding to 2010 elections failed to reach the magnitude of the demonstrations Iran. Nevertheless, the preparations aimed at organizing effective demonstrations in opposition to the government after the 2010 elections provided the groundwork for the mass scaled opposition movement to emerge in Egypt following the uprising in Tunisia. Therefore the efforts of the youth who organized the movement in Egypt cannot be characterized as simply starting Facebook groups and tweeting.

30. Center for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies-CANVAS is the current organization of Resistance (Otpor) movement that led similar activities as in Tunisia and Egypt 11 years ago in Serbia. In Serbia, that is in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia then, Slobadan Milosevic in the name of "Democratic Party" and Vojislav Kostunica in the name of Democratic Party of Serbia run for elections held on September 24, 2000. Milosevic refused to accept that Kostunica, who received 52, 65 % of the votes, won the elections and didn't want to resign. Ten thousands of supporters of Kostunica carried out protests in Belgrade under the leadership of "Resistance" movement. In addition to police forces who failed to stop the protests, Milosevic called tanks to the streets. Even if he wasn't willing to resign, he failed to resist to the pressure of protesters and resigned the presidency on October 6. The strategies employed by the Resistance Movement were and still are a source of inspiration for opposing youth in countries from Eastern Europe to the Middle East where authoritarian regime prevails. The book "Nonviolent Struggle- 50 crucial points" authored by the leader of the movement Srca Popovic was translated into 6 languages and downloaded by more than 20 thousand people in the Middle Eastern countries. For more information see CANVAS website: <http://www.canvasopedia.org/>

31. Tina Rosenberg, "Revolution U," March Lynch, Susan B. Glasser, Blake Hounshell (eds.) *Revolution in the Araba World: Tunisia, Egypt and the Unmaking of an Area*, Washington DC, Foreign Policy, 2011, p.127-130.

32. Maryam Ishani, "The Hopeful Network," March Lynch, Susan B. Glasser, Blake Hounshell (eds.) *Revolution in the Araba World: Tunisia, Egypt and the Unmaking of an Area*, Washington DC, Foreign Policy, 2011, p. 143-147.

33. For more information on Ushahidi see: <http://ushahidi.com/about-us>

34. Ishani, *op. cit.*, p.144-146.

Another youth movement that came to the forefront parallel to the April 6th Movement was “We are All Khaled Said”. The movement began when 28 year-old Khaled Said was killed as a result of torture and violence of two police officers on June 7, 2010. When two police officers conducted an arbitrary identification check at an internet café, Khalid Said, a client at the café, disturbed by the police officers’ attitude demanded to see the officers’ identification and the search warrant. As a response to the demand, the policemen dragged him out of the café and beat him to death in the staircase of an adjoining building as his friends and by passers watched. Initially, no charges were brought against the officers. The outcry caused by witness accounts, pictures and videos leaked to the press after the event pressured the state to charge the officers with superficial charges such as “excessive force” and “arresting without charges” instead of “attempted murder.”

A new opposition movement was born when the head of marketing for Google Middle East and North Africa, Wael Ghonim, not wanting to remain silent to the injustice, started Facebook page, “We are all Khaled Said” And the page immediately received wide support from civil society organizations. Khaled Said became a symbol of the systematic violence which has been used by Egyptian law-enforcement officers under the Emergency Law in force for last 30 years Egyptians and foreigners who were disturbed by this began to communicate and get organized via “We are all Khalid Said” page.³⁵ The communication and organization network on Facebook contributed to the success of the Khalid Said movement in mobilizing national and international public opinion against the systematic use of torture in Egypt. The founders of the Facebook page, who do not profess to any political or movement, indicated that their aim was to lift the Emergency law that grants Egyptian police the authority to use torture as a method of investigation by soliciting Egyptian and international support for stopping systematic use of torture in Egypt. The movement organized four silent resistance demonstrations last summer. While only a few hundred people took part in the first protest that aimed to raise awareness about the Emergency Law and systematic use of torture, the second demonstration attracted thousands of people in six different cities in Egypt. In the third and the fourth protests, thousands of people in England, France, USA and Thailand in addition to nine cities in Egypt participated.³⁶

When the April 6th Movement called to take to the streets on 25th of January on Facebook, the Khaled Said movement began to organize its members and tried to draw international attention to Egypt through their international connections and Facebook. Both movements published booklets instructing the demonstrators on proper conduct during the demonstrations and on how to avoid clashes with the security forces two days before the scheduled demonstration³⁷ In the next few days, 80,000 people in the country announced, on Facebook, their intentions to participate in the demonstrations.³⁸ Based on their experiences of previous demonstrations, the members of the movement were not satisfied with simply issuing announcements; this time they distributed the booklets on the streets and solicited the support of the citizens in face to face interactions.³⁹

On January 25, the support for the April 6th movement, in addition to the Khaled Said Movement, came from organizations such as “Youth for Justice and Freedom” “Popular Front for Freedom”, the Ghad Party and the ElBaradei campaign. In the demonstrations in Alexandria, Mansoura and Suez the leading organizers were the Khaled Said Movement, ElBaradei Campaign, Ghad Party and the Democratic Front. In Sharqiya and Ismailia, the April 6th Movement was supported by the National Association of Change and by many members of the Muslim Brotherhood on an individual basis.⁴⁰ The experience gained from previous demonstrations and preparations leading up to the demonstrations helped the members both to avoid large scale clashes and to make their voices heard by utilizing the great potential of the internet to make their voices heard outside the heavily censored Egyptian media.

35. Amnesty International on Human Rights in Egypt, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/allcountries/egypt/page.do?id=1011147>; El Nadim Center, <http://www.alnadeem.org/en/taxonomy/term/44>; We are all Khaled Said Movement, <http://www.facebook.com/elshaheed.co.uk?v=wall>

36. For more information see: <http://www.elshaheed.co.uk/faq/>; <http://www.elshaheed.co.uk/home-khaled-said-full-story-background-truth-what-happened-torture-in-egypt-by-egyptian-police/>;

37. “Cyber ignition: The key role of the uprising’s youth movements,” *Ahram Online*, March 7, 2011.

38. “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious?,” *International Crisis Group, Middle East/ North Africa Report*, No. 101, 24 February 2011, p.3.

39. Esam Al-Amin, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Revolution,” *Counterpunch*, February 17, 2011.

40. “Cyber ignition: The key role of the uprising’s youth movements,” *Ahram Online*, March 7, 2011.

The youth, constituting 60% of the Egyptian population, was at the forefront of the revolution in Egypt. The youth movements, especially with their effective use of social media, played important role in bringing people out to the streets. Nevertheless, the role of the youth and social media must be examined realistically. According to 2009 data, only 20% of the population has access to the internet in Egypt, and only 5% are Facebook users.⁴¹ While the youth assumed a crucial role in protests, what brought real success was the support they received from a large number of people. In this sense, the participation of organized opposition movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the support of worker movements with their strikes significantly contributed to the process. The protest attempts of the youth movements were in a deadlock at the end of 2010 because they had limited participation and the number of the policemen they had to face was higher than their number. Nevertheless, thanks to above-mentioned support, the youth movements accomplished in turning these attempts into a revolution.

2.3 Why Has The Muslim Brotherhood Faded Into The Background?

The moment the uprisings broke out in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful opposition movement, was at the center of attention. Nevertheless the Brotherhood did not give the expected support immediately and participated in demonstrations held 25th of January at individual level. It made its official announcement only three days after the second demonstration. Later on the Muslim Brotherhood preferred to remain in the background. In this sense, Islamist slogans were not shouted; Islamist flag and pennants were not used. On the contrary, protesters used a language which did not belong to any ideology. The language and the placards indicated one single aim: to overthrow Mubarak. Therefore one wonders why the Muslim Brotherhood acted like that and where it stood according to protests and how it affected the process. To answer all above-mentioned questions, we must analyze the role and history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian politics. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in Ismailia in 1928 and its headquarters were later moved to Cairo. According to Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood is neither a charity nor a political party or a local organization with limited aims. Brotherhood is a movement based on Islamist principles which was founded against moral corruption in order to create a fair and moral society.⁴² In a short period of time, the Brotherhood received support and from three branches in 1931 it grew to have 300 across Egypt in 1930 and became one of the major political opposition groups in Egypt. As a result, the regime considered the Brotherhood as a threat thus tried to suppress it. During this period, Hassan al-Banna was arrested for many times; the Brotherhood's journals were suppressed; its meetings were banned and any reference to it in newspapers was forbidden. However, the Brotherhood continued to grow in 1940s and it grew to have 2000 branches and had more than one million members in 1948. During the post-war years the Brotherhood expanded its social welfare activities, continued to set up hospitals, clinics, schools and small factories.⁴³

The Egyptian army saw the Brotherhood as a potential parallel state thus released a decree ordering the dissolution of the Brotherhood in December 1948.⁴⁴ Despite outlawed by the government and the arrest of many of its members, the Brotherhood managed to maintain its power. The Brotherhood had close relations with the leading figures of 1952 Free Officers' Coup. Even if the Brotherhood contributed to the success of the coup, it did not have a direct role in the revolution. After the revolution the army was not willing to share political power thus relations between the Brotherhood that insisted on an Islamist order and the junta quickly soured. Following the assassination attempt on Nasser in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood was held responsible for the attempt and suppressed by repressive measures by Nasser government. During this period, many Brotherhood members were imprisoned, held in concentration camps, tortured or they escaped to other countries to hide in.

When Anwar al-Sadat came to power in 1970, the pressure over the Brotherhood relatively decreased. Concentration camps were closed; the imprisoned Brother members were gradually released. However, the Brotherhood remained

41. "Egypt Internet Usage and Telecommunications Reports," *Internet World Statistics*, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/af/eg.htm>

42. Albert Hourani, *Arap Halkları Tarihi*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1997, s.406.; Cook, *op. cit.* p.43.

43. "History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," *Ikhwan Web*, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=799>

44. *op. cit.*

illegal although the government tolerated the Brotherhood to an extent. The Brotherhood also maintained its position during Mubarak reign. Despite all obstacles, it got stronger and increased the number of its members.

The devastating effect of Nasser period resulted in a change in the ideas and policies of the Brotherhood. Supported by a great number of people, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to participate in democratic election process. Though parliamentary elections in Egypt were closed to the participation of the opposition to a great extent, in 1984 elections the Brotherhood was allowed to run candidates for the Wafd Party. In 1987, the Brotherhood formed an alliance with the Labor Party. In both cases, the parties which formed an alliance with the brotherhood received more votes than all the other opposition parties combined. In 1991 Egypt supported the Gulf War, which increased the reactions against Mubarak. Moreover, the great contribution of the Muslim Brotherhood in the post-earthquake period in 1992 boosted its popularity among people. After a ten-year implicit cooperation, the Egyptian government tried to weaken the Muslim Brotherhood that gained political power both in people's assembly of Egypt and among prestigious occupational organizations in 1992. Egypt experienced a low density conflict period between the government and the Brotherhood for five years.⁴⁵ In 1995 and 1996 thousands of Brotherhood members were arrested and the Brotherhood was banned from elections.

However, the Brotherhood remained illegal although the government tolerated the Brotherhood to an extent. The Brotherhood also maintained its position during Mubarak reign. Despite all obstacles, it got stronger and increased the number of its members.

The Muslim Brotherhood run for independent candidates in 2000 elections and was able to have 17 seats in the parliament. Despite all these obstacles, the Brotherhood attained such a success. In 2004, the Brotherhood's "reform initiative" under the leadership of Mohamed Mehdi Akef stands as a landmark in the organization's political evolution. The initiative outlines 18 reform planks anchored around mostly liberal ideas. The Brotherhood states its commitment to "a democratic, republican, constitutional system of government within a framework of Islamic principles." The Brotherhood for the first time declared that the appropriate system for running the country is the parliamentary system where the party that receives the most votes in free and fair elections comes to power.⁴⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood attained a great success by winning 88 seats out of 454 in the parliament in 2005 elections held in a freer and fairer environment than before. Mubarak regime was concerned about this success thus on the eve of 2010 elections, the Brotherhood was exposed to oppression once again. During this period, many Brotherhood members were arrested and exposed to several assimilation policies. As a result Mohamed Badie won the leadership elections and defeated reformist Mohamed Habib.⁴⁷ When none of the Brotherhood independent candidates won a seat in the parliament in the first round of 2010 elections, the Brotherhood together with other opposition parties boycotted the second round of the elections due to the likelihood of fraud.

When above-mentioned historical experience is taken into account, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was exposed to violence and pressure because of its efforts to take part in Egyptian politics. The Brotherhood suffered from the most violent massacre of its history at the end of 1952 coup that it supported. As a result, the Brotherhood drew a lesson from this experience with regard to its relations with the army. Above all, the Brotherhood learnt to

45. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 28.

46. *Mubadira al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin houl Mabadi al-Islah fi Misr* [The Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Principles of Reform in Egypt], March 2004.

47. Shadi Hamid, "The Islamist Response to Repression: Are Mainstream Islamist Groups Radicalizing?," *Policy Briefing, Brookings Doha Center*, August 2010, p.5.

be determined, patient and careful. This influenced the attitude of the Brotherhood in the recent protests in Egypt. Another reason for which the Muslim Brotherhood did not seize the ultimate control is that it did not want to disturb the spirit of protests supported by different groups. If an Islamist revolution was carried out by the Brotherhood, then it would not only lose support of some people but it would also face international pressure. The Brotherhood did not want the army to realize Brotherhood's dominance and change its attitude. The Brotherhood was not willing to see that the army prolonged the regime by suppressing the protests as it did many times in the past. As a result, the Brotherhood preferred to be in the background. In the end, the Brotherhood announced that it will not directly take part in demonstrations but it will let its members to participate in demonstrations. The young members of the Brotherhood came to the forefront during protests and assumed a leading role in mobilizing masses. Besides, the Brotherhood also showed that it favored reconciliation with other opposition groups and supported ElBaradei thus put the process at ease. It would be wrong to disregard the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in recent protests and underestimate its support because of this attitude. Similarly, it would be also wrong to state the Brotherhood as the fundamental leading actor in this process. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood will hold its crucial position in Egyptian politics as one of the most significant actors of the Egyptian politics in the post-Mubarak period as indicated by the 77.2 percent "yes" vote received with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood in the referendum on constitutional amendment held in March 2011.

As a result, the Brotherhood drew a lesson from this experience with regard to its relations with the army. Above all, the Brotherhood learnt to be determined, patient and careful.

2.4 Skeleton Crew of The Revolution: Workers' Movements

Workers' movements in Egypt had a crucial role in the success of the protests thanks to both their role in paving the way for the revolution in the past and their economic and massive pressure during the demonstrations. It is possible to say that the Egyptian revolution began thanks to workers' strikes long before the demonstrations in Tahrir Square. The strike wave that began in 2004 actually goes back to the privatization process beginning in 1991 when agreements were made with IMF and World Bank. During this period, 314 public-sector enterprises were listed eligible for privatization and by mid-2002 190 firms were privatized. Even though the law prohibited collective redundancy after the sale, firms fired a great number of workers to make their enterprises more attractive to buyers before the sale.⁴⁸ This increased unemployment in Egypt. In 2003 the Unified Labor Law was enacted thus workers lost many rights and the Egyptian Trade Union Federation continued to seize the monopoly.⁴⁹

The Egyptian Trade Union Federation is a government authorized establishment founded in 1957. From 1962 to 1986, the president of ETUF served simultaneously as the Minister of Labor. All local unions are affiliated with the Federation by law. While a local union can only be formed if the federation recognizes it; no more than one general union may be formed for workers engaged in a common industry. For instance, local unions of all textile workers are affiliated to the General Union of Textile Workers. Strike is legal in Egypt. However the legislation permits a strike if two-thirds of the 23 members of ETUF approve it. These members are loyal to the government or they are top government officials of the National Democratic Party. The federation has approved only two strikes through its history.⁵⁰ All these provisions made it possible for Egyptian workers to claim their rights through unions. Particularly because of the privatization wave, great strikes broke out and the government came face to face with workers.

48. *Justice for All: The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt*, Washington DC, Solidarity Center Report, 2010, p. 13.

49. *Justice for All: The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt*, p. 28.

50. "A Historical Perspective on the Popular Uprising in Egypt: Historian Joel Beinin on the Egyptian Labor Crisis," *The Human Experience*, <http://humanexperience.stanford.edu/beininegypt>; *Justice for All: The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt*, p.11.

In this sense, Ahmad Nazif's initiatives were the last straw. In 2004 he took office as the prime minister. In July 2004 President Hosni Mubarak appointed a new cabinet headed by Ahmad Nazif. Nazif privatized 17 enterprises during the first year of this cabinet also called "Businessmen Cabinet." This privatization wave had a devastating influence on workers and low-income groups. In Egypt where poverty line is US\$2 a day per person, 10 million Egyptians earn less than US\$1 a day while 40 million earn less than US\$2 a day. The average basic monthly wage for a textile worker in Egypt is around US\$ 44.50 and this is raised at most to US\$ 75. According to World Bank, 44 percent of Egyptians live near or below the poverty line. Under these circumstances, workers' life conditions became much tougher as a result of privatization and the new labor law. Therefore, workers reacted to the conditions, leading to the first great social outburst in the second biggest sector of Egypt, textile.

In 2006 24,000 Ghazl al-Mahalla textile workers went on strike although it was illegal. This was followed by the second great strike in 2007. Strikes spread to one sector to another from transportation to food, from oil to health sector.⁵¹ On April 6, 2008 workers called for a national strike in al-Mahalla al-Kubra. Also thanks to the efforts by the April 6 Youth Movement, there was a high participation in the strike. Nevertheless the police took over the factory before the strike. Many people were killed, injured and many workers were arrested during the following conflicts.⁵² From 2004 to 2008, 1.7 million workers engaged in more than 1,900 strikes, protests and sit down strikes. Therefore, they had a significant pressure over the regime.⁵³ Soon after the youth, opposing parties and the poor participated in these strikes and criticized the regime, laying the foundations for the revolution. The greatest contribution of this process was that it weakened the regime and encouraged people.

When the youth movements called for protest on January 25, there were ongoing strikes in many regions in Egypt. As a matter of fact, the first to pay attention to this call was workers. However, they failed to make their voices heard because there was not any umbrella organization that would represent workers other than ETUF and other affiliated local unions. After they announced their aim to form a new union federation independent of the ETUF, their support became much more visible.⁵⁴ Even though Mubarak resigned and the Egyptian Military High Command came to power, worker strikes are still going on in Egypt. Khaled Ali, a labor lawyer for the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights states in an interview that the success of the revolution for the workers is not simply the departure of key officials from the old regime but workers demand an improvement in their living standards, social justice and want to guarantee that their lives will get better in the future thus the success of the revolution depends on meeting these demands.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the Egyptian Military High Command increases its pressure on workers day by day. It is willing to put an end to strikes claiming that they worsen the economic situation. However, workers are not content with the promises and announce that they will remain on strike until their demands are met.⁵⁶

2.5 The Role of The Army in The Revolution

When protests of people who took to the streets on January 25 spread to the whole country, all eyes were on the attitude of the Egyptian army as far as the future of the Egypt is concerned. Indeed the army assumed a significant role in the success of the protests and the overthrow of Mubarak.

Egyptian army had a crucial influence on the future of the country because it seizes a privileged position as an actor that has shaped the last 6 decades. Egyptian army is estimated to have about one million officers together with reservists in addition to about five hundred officers. The 10th greatest army in the world, the Egyptian army draws its

51. Michael Collins, "Forces Behind the Egyptian Revolution," *Economic Populist*, 11 February 2011, <http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/forces-behind-egyptian-revolution>.

52. *op. cit.*

53. "Egypt's Mahalla workers strike, bring demands to the military," *Ahram Online*, 16 February, 2011. 2011 *Justice for All: The Struggle for Workers Rights in Egypt*, p.14.

54. Joel Beinin, "Egypt's Workers Rise Up," *The Nation*, March 7-11, 2011.

55. http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/18/egyptian_uprising_fueled_by_striking_workers

56. "Egypt's Mahalla workers strike, bring demands to the military," *Ahram Online*, 16 February, 2011.

strength from its dignified and powerful position within the system. The Egyptian army is a respected organization because it assumed a great role both in saving the country from imperialism and in the wars fought against Israel. Indeed what contributed most to the image of the army was the system founded after the Free Officers' Coup that terminated the monarchy in 1952. After the coup, officers undertook a thorough reconstitution of the political system rather than reform. In this context, they completely changed the current liberal economic structure; adopted democratization limited with their own dominance and built a system where they seized a privileged position.⁵⁷ Even though the officers did not hold the power within this system, they had a decisive role in regime stability thanks to their domination on the regime.

The Army strengthens its privileged position notably thanks to bureaucrats of military origin. In Egypt in addition to the president, the prime minister and a majority of Egypt's 26 governors are senior-ranking military or police officers.⁵⁸ Because the civilian governors had military origins, state elite and military elite shared a common vision. As a result, the army has become one of the most crucial political actors although it stayed out of daily politics.

The army draws its strength also from its influence over the economy.⁵⁹ The system allowed the army to have its own affiliates so that it became economically self-sufficient. As a result the army has become a significant economic actor. It is possible to analyze the history of the Egyptian army not only from military perspective but also from economic perspective since 1950s. The army manages around twenty big factories and it is known that it exports 230-300 million dollars annually.⁶⁰ Holding a visible and profitable share in the fundamental commercial and industrial sectors, the army has become the only and the most significant economic entity in the country thanks to its diverse portfolio including the manufacture of weapons, electronics and consumer goods; infrastructure development; various agribusinesses and services in tourism and commerce since the beginning of 1980s.⁶¹ The army has investments in almost every sector from cosmetics to mineral water. Besides it seizes the economic control thanks to its members in the High Policy Committee where fundamental consumption prices are set. Moreover, special relationship with the army is a must for sustaining an enterprise in private sector in Egypt.⁶² Today the exact economic power of the Egyptian army remains a mystery. Although Egyptian government embarked on a program of privatization and structural adjustment during the mid-1990s, the military declared that it cannot announce its economic assets.⁶³ But Paul Sullivan, a National Defense University professor, estimates that it is accounting for 10 percent to 15 percent of Egypt's 210 billion dollars economy.⁶⁴ One of the significant resources of the army is without doubt US military and economic assistance consisting of about two billion dollars annually since 1979. In 2007 US announced that it would provide Egypt with 13 billion dollars in military aid over a ten-year period as a part of a larger arms package to the region. On the other hand, the economic aid has decreased in the last decade. While Egypt received 815 million dollars in economic aid in 1998, this amount decreased to 411 million dollars in 2008 and to 250 million dollars in 2009. Egypt tried to receive this aid as a donation. The Congress approved 50 million of the aid as a donation to be employed in education, science and technology in 2010. Egypt receives 1.3 US dollars annually in military aid under the framework of Foreign Military Financing –FMS.⁶⁵

Egypt also receives Excess Defense Articles (EDA) worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Moreover, Egyptian officers also take part in trainings under the framework of IMET- International Military Education and Training program where 1.4 billion dollars were allocated for 2010. When we also add 6.6 million dollars of funds for counter terrorism, border control and technical cooperation, the total US military and economic aid to Egypt for 2010 reaches

57. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

58. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 76.

59. For more information see: Ömer Murat, *The Role of the Egyptian Military as an Economic Actor in Business*, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi (unpublished master thesis,) 2006.

60. Taha Akyol, Eğrisi Doğrusu Programı, *CNN Türk*, 6 February 2011, <http://www.cnnturk.com/cnnturktv/default.aspx?PageID=56>.

61. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 63.

62. Murat, *op. cit.* p.50-53.

63. Cook, *op. cit.* p. 64.

64. Ken Stier, "Egypt's Military-Industrial Complex: Why the Generals Wield Such Power," *Time*, 9 February 2011.

65. Foreign Military Financing provides grants and loans to foreign countries to help countries purchase weapons and produced in the United States and acquiring defense services and military training.

to 1,558 billion dollars.⁶⁶ Above-mentioned aids were under the direct control of the army and they consolidated its power. These aids were a part of the strategic relations between Egypt and US; therefore, especially high-ranked officers attributed great importance to these relations and people were not allowed to even question these relations. As a result, Us-Egyptian relations always depended on Pentagon-Egyptian army relations. In other words Egyptian army has become a decisive actor not only in domestic politics but also in foreign politics.

Because of the above-mentioned position of the Egyptian army, its attitude during the protests was an object of curiosity since the beginning. People were right about their argument that army would directly influence the developments. At the beginning, it was thought that army might react in a harsh way when the regime-military relationship was considered. Nevertheless, the army preferred to adopt a cautious attitude towards developments. It even protected protesters from the attacks of the police and supporters of Mubarak and tried to show an impartial attitude. However, it must be noted that this "impartiality" of the army must be carefully analyzed and this doesn't necessarily mean that the army stopped guarding the regime. It is true that the army enforced Mubarak to resign thus significantly contributed to the revolution. Nevertheless, the most crucial obstacle to democratization in Egypt is that the army will try to maintain its privileged position.

As a result, Us-Egyptian relations always depended on Pentagon-Egyptian army relations.

2.6 The Success of The Protests

Various factors contributed to the success of the protests in Egypt. First of all, people from different age, education, income levels and ideologies came together with a single aim. Even though different groups came together, one did not try to suppress or exclude another thus conflicts were avoided. Besides, even though each group had its own leader, none of them came to the forefront thus possible domestic competitions were also avoided. Second of all, each group was competent at mobilizing their members and coordinating with each other. Therefore, the pressure over the regime increased and disorganizations and turmoil were avoided. In addition to these, there are other factors that contributed to the success of the protests. For instance, the protesters did not resort to violence; they adopted a peaceful language and tried to get the support of the army from the beginning of the protests.

During this process, one of the crucial decisive factors was the strategy of internet and media. Protesters went beyond the media controlled by the government and pulled out all the stops in order to reach to not only Egyptian people but also international public opinion and contact international media. In this sense, the broadcasts of Al-Jazeera played a key role. Despite the pressures of Mubarak regime and its targeting directly Al-Jazeera journalists, the world public opinion was informed of what really happened in Egypt thanks to the efforts towards continuing broadcasting.⁶⁷ Finally, the perseverance, courage and resistance of the Egyptian people had without doubt the greatest influence

3. THE NEW POLITICAL BALANCES: CHANGING ORDERS

The protests in Egypt that broke out on January 25 turned into a revolution due to the support they received from the people and politicians regardless of their ideology. Autocratic leader, Mubarak was forced to resign after ruling

66. Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, June 15, 2010, p.4-6.

67. Hugh Miles, "The Al-Jazeera Effect," *Revolution in the Arab World: Tunisia, Egypt and the Unmaking of an Area*, Washington DC, Foreign Policy, 2011, p.161.

the country for 30 years and thus marked a turning point in Egypt. Following his resignation, the difficult task of maintaining the delicate equilibrium between freedom and security waited the Egyptian army which seized power through the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. The Army, whose next course of action remains ambiguous is stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it faces pressures both from the Egyptian people and the International society to meet people's demands of freedom and rights. On the other hand, it faces the difficulty of rebuilding daily life in Egypt under the threat of economic instability due to the financial crisis that ails the region, particularly Libya.

Although the course of the transition period and political life in the post transition period remains unclear, the only thing that is clear is that the security vs. freedom balance that will determine the political struggle in this period will be shaped by the interaction between the revolutionary movements and the Army. The army has been the most significant actor that authoritarian political regime relied on since 1952 Free Officers' coup. The Army emerged out of the revolution that forced Mubarak out with its power intact. At the end of the revolution that removed Mubarak from power, the army was able to safeguard its power. The army promised to hand over power to a civilian administration through elections in six months' time. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that it will lose its leading role in politics. As a matter of fact, the army is the fundamental institution that will manage the transition period; pave the way for civilians in the political process and shape the political system in the new period.⁶⁸ Therefore it would be too naïve to expect the army to give up all its power not only in politics but also in economic and social life and hand over the power completely to civilians.

The only thing that is clear is that the security vs. freedom balance that will determine the political struggle in this period will be shaped by the interaction between the revolutionary movements and the Army.

However, it must be noted that the army will not be the sole actor that influences the political processes in Egypt. The Egyptian revolution distinguishes itself from other colorful revolutions carried out with the support of the West in that it restrains the army or any other actors from stopping the new process or safeguarding the old regime. As a result, the reconciliation, conflict and negotiation between the army and the revolutionary movement will shape the following period notably the transition period in Egypt. The revolutionary movement brings together different political, ideological, economic and social actors thus it may have difficulty in devising a consistent and comprehensive political project in the post-revolution period. However, the movement will compensate for this weakness thanks to its discipline in mobilizing masses and unity. The revolution taught people to realize their power and resist to the threats of the security forces. Egyptian people overthrew a dictator who had been ruling the country for thirty years in only 18 days. Therefore, they will not be passive citizens who give in to the pressures of the state and the army or they will not be excluded from political processes as it was in the past.

During the protests the army acted as an arbitrator between the regime and people. From time to time it favored the regime; however, it declined Mubarak's demands to suppress the demonstrations and maintained its impartial and reliable position in people's eyes. The military administration met the fundamental demand of the revolution by contributing to Mubarak's resignation. Afterwards, it abolished the parliament; built a Constitutional Amendments Committee consisting of the most reliable judges and constitutional experts of the country; launched studies on constitutional amendments; lifted the bans on political parties and groups and instructed prosecutors to judge three ministers and one party leader who were under investigation for corruption and bribery.

Above-mentioned initiatives satisfied the Egyptian people with regard to their fundamental demands. However, army's cautious attitude towards meeting other demands of people since it came to the power evokes confusion.

Even though the military administration announced in its first statements that it will meet 35 demands⁶⁹ presented by the coalition formed in the aftermath of Mubarak's resignation, it made a limited progress and adopted a reluctant attitude towards meeting a great majority of demands. As a matter of fact, the army did not abolish the regional and local administrations appointed during Mubarak rule; did not release political prisoners and adopted a resultant attitude towards judging politicians and businessmen including Mubarak and his sons for allegations of corruption. Without doubt there have been some positive developments regarding long-term demands of people such as the overthrow of an authoritarian leader who had been ruling the country through intimidation and fear and approval of the constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum on March 19, 2011. However, the constitution still has some problematic parts because the army rushed in the referendum. For instance, it still grants broad authorities to the president and it is still easy for the government to abuse the political system. As a result, the revolutionary movement trusts in the role the army assumed during protests and in the aftermath of Mubarak's resignation; however, it doesn't throw caution to the winds.

In this sense, the army failed to prevent people from taking to the streets even though it met the most fundamental demand by contributing to Mubarak's resignation. People continued to come together to voice their demands in the Tahrir Square on Fridays. Both ongoing protests and strikes in the Tahrir square in the post-Mubarak period aim to put pressure on the army so that it meets the demands. On the other hand, the army cannot disregard these demands as far as current situation of the country is concerned.

Temporarily taking over, the army launched a new process for Egypt. From now on the bilateral interaction between the army and the opposition will answer the questions such as how the political life and the military-civilian relations in the future will be, whether or not social demands will be met and which actors will assume which roles in the political arena. In this sense, the interaction between different groups of the revolutionary movement including secular, liberal, leftist, nationalist and Islamist actors will determine the characteristic of the opposition. On the other hand the interaction between these actors and the army will shape the political structure of the country in the near future.

Nevertheless, the weak and fragmented structure of the opposition movements limits their capability to influence political processes. Accordingly, they risk having less negotiating room than the army. Even though the revolutionary movement draws its strength from the discipline and unity during the demonstrations, its fragmented structure⁷⁰ will cause actors to adopt different positions regarding a comprehensive political plan during and after the transition period.

Nevertheless, the alliance between liberal and democratic groups and the Muslim Brotherhood did not last long; the discord between the two became much more visible during the referendum. While the Muslim Brotherhood just like the National Democratic Party, the representative of the military administration and the old regime, called for the approval of the changes, other opposition movements led by ElBaradei and Amr Moussa declared that they would veto the referendum. There was such a discord fundamentally because the Muslim Brotherhood wanted

69. Revolutionary groups formed a loose coalition in order to realize their demands. The main coalition of the 25 January revolution including the most active groups and parties presented 35 demands to the new military administration. These demands included all aspects of Egyptian life from politics to constitution; from judiciary to security and economy. Some of the most significant demands included the transfer of power from Supreme Council of Armed Forces to a transitional five-member civilian presidential council consisting of the head of the military; the dissolution of the lower and upper chambers of the parliament; the dissolution of all regional and local councils; the dissolution of the last government appointed by Mubarak and led by Ahmad Shafiq and the establishment of an elected and representative congress to draft a new constitution. Moreover they also demanded the release of all political prisoners; the end of the state of emergency law; the dissolution of the state security apparatus that had been ruling the country through fear and intimidation; the dissolution of the ruling party and confiscation of its assets; investigation of all politicians and businessmen including Hosni Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak and putting them on trial for corruption and firing board chairmen and chief editors of the state print and electronic media who were supporting the regime.

70. For instance, the National Union Movement led by liberal Mohammed Bradei received support from a wide range of political groups from the 6th April Movement to Kefaya; from We are all Khaled Said to 9 March Movement; from the Tomorrow Party led by Ayman Nour to nationalist Karama Party; from Liberal Democracy Front to the Muslim Brotherhood.

elections to be held as soon as possible. Thanks to its sound organized structure, the Brotherhood enjoyed a more advantageous position than other relatively new opposition movements which needed time to get organized before the elections.

This move of the Muslim Brotherhood in the referendum indicated that it was not willing to remain behind as it did during the revolution period. Thanks to its sound organized structure, long-lasting political experience and great public support it received, the Brotherhood alone could have been the most powerful candidate. However, as mentioned before it remained behind and preferred to support the coalition of the revolutionary movement from the beginning of the protests until the overthrow of Mubarak. In their statement in New York Times on February 9, the Brotherhood announced that they do not intend to take a dominant role in the forthcoming political transition. Stating that they desire a systematic transition period for the unity of Egypt, they added that they are not putting forward a candidate for the presidential elections scheduled for September 2011.⁷¹ Similarly in their following statements they declared that they do not intend to seize the majority in the parliament and they only intend to win 35 to 40 percent of the seats. When the Brotherhood cooperated with the army and supported constitutional amendments in the referendum, it actually gave a message to the Western world through Egyptian army. The Brotherhood indicated that they are ready to cooperate with U.S. if their demands are met and they are given a place in the political arena. Even though it is claimed that the Brotherhood tries to gain power by correctly interpreting this uncertain period through above-mentioned initiatives, it would be wrong to expect from the Brotherhood to get out of this process without any transformation.

Considering the history of the Brotherhood in Egyptian politics, the Brotherhood has transformed to a great extend as a result of its interaction with the dominant statist mindset representing the regime and liberal movements. It is highly possible that this transformation may continue in the forthcoming period in line with both the Brotherhood's interaction with other political groups and the need for reconciling the differences within the movement. As a matter of fact, the Brotherhood is not a homogeneous group. According to the analysis of Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brook, the Brotherhood brings together people from a wide range of political and social background such as traditional, reformist, young, old, urbanites, villagers, educated, uneducated people among others.⁷² These groups agree on the necessity of coming to the power through democratic and peaceful means not with radical and armed struggle. Nevertheless, they have different opinions on political Islam and democracy. Therefore, it is expected that these differences will come to the forefront in the upcoming period as there will be more political alternatives. As a matter of fact, we had witnessed the first signs of this during the protests. The pragmatic and cautious position adopted by the traditionalists disappointed the Muslim Brotherhood and again young members of the Brotherhood were concerned about the separate talks of traditionalist leaders with Omar Suleiman. Similarly, even though the Brotherhood called for supporting constitutional amendments in the referendum, some reformist groups within the movement announced that they will veto the amendments in the referendum claiming that amendments are insufficient.⁷³

Therefore, the analyses on "real" aims and intentions of the Brotherhood in the West and the evaluations concerned that Egypt is in between Islam and free democracy disregard two significant aspects. First, as mentioned before the analyses conducted on the Brotherhood consider the movement as a homogeneous structure and ignore differences within the group. As a matter of fact, the Brotherhood is the greatest representative of the Islamist movement in Egypt and it is inevitable that new Islamist movements appear in a freer political environment in the forthcoming period. Second, the political balances and dynamics in Egypt are much more complicated than it seemed during the revolution process. It is possible to say that Egypt is politically at the crossroads. Nevertheless it is not between radical Islam and democracy but between illiberal democracy⁷⁴ and real democracy.

71. Essam el-Erian, "What the Muslim Brothers Want", *The New York Times*, 9 February 2011.

72. Robert S. Leiken ve Steven Brook, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood: Friend of Foe?", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007.

73. Muslim Brotherhood Reformists and El Baradei reject Egypt's referendum, *RT News*, March 19, 2011, <http://rt.com/news/line/2011-03-19/>

74. The definition, "illiberal democracy" was first used by Fareed Zakaria in his article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1997. For more information; Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1997.

The Egyptian army—which will play a crucial role in political processes in the upcoming period—may realize a more liberal political order when compared to previous period through limited and pseudo-reforms and open channels to intervene in politics. If such a scenario is to come true, the transition to democracy in Egypt will be a long, tough and obscure process. The second scenario is that the army may respond to the demands of the revolutionary movement through extensive reforms. If this is likely to come true, the army will pave the way for a liberal political environment in real terms and accelerate the development of democracy. However, considering the fact that the army will not be willing to lose its powerful position in the old regime, this scenario is less likely to come true even if the army tries to adopt an impartial image recently. In both cases, Egypt will enjoy a partially freer political life and the most significant factor that will determine the democracy process in Egypt will be the domination of public movements over the army.

These groups agree on the necessity of coming to the power through democratic and peaceful means not with radical and armed struggle. Nevertheless, they have different opinions on political Islam and democracy.

Consequently, it would be wrong to analyze the Brotherhood without considering social dynamics when evaluating the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in political transformation. As a matter of fact, this approach would attribute a passive role to the democracy struggle of people and other political movements such as liberal, secular and nationalist movements having a serious role in the country for a long time. Even though limited number of people supported the call of liberal and democratic groups for vetoing the constitutional amendments in the referendum held 19th of March and the amendments were approved by 77 percent yes vote, these movements will be more capable to influence the political system in the medium term.

The politicization process launched by the revolution in Egypt has already paved the way for many political groups. For instance, the quickest effect of the new era was the removal of the bans on al-Wasat Party, a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded by a reformist group and has been struggling for becoming party since 1996. Besides, the establishment of independent unions representing the workers' movement- the driving force of the revolution- can be regarded as a sign for the process of becoming party in order to represent denominational demands in political arena. In this vein, considering the new emerging political groups, it is uncertain whether or not the Brotherhood will preserve the social support it received when there was no alternative for the movement.

On the other hand, the attitude of local and international actors will also have a significant role in the new period although not as significant as the role of domestic actors. As a matter of fact, U.S. and European countries—which played a leading role in the appointment of Omar Suleiman to vice presidency—supported the overthrow of Mubarak until the second week of February; however, they changed their attitude later on and declared that Mubarak should stay in power until elections to be held in September. Nevertheless, revolutionary movement did not make any concessions and Mubarak was overthrown thus U.S. and European countries began get prepared for the Islamist party period likely to appear in the wake of September elections. In this sense, the report dated February 16 prepared by the White House is quite significant. The report compares views of Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood and analyzes political Islam, democracy and nationalism.⁷⁵ The report draws attention to distinctions between Islamist groups and argues that U.S. must pay attention to these distinctions when analyzing Islamist groups. Moreover, the report also suggests that the Brotherhood's peaceful attitudes that mix Islam and nationalism make it different than other Islamist movements and adds that U.S. should pave the way for the Brotherhood to engage in the

75. Scott Wilson, "Obama Administration Prepares for Possibility of New Post-Revolt Islamist Regimes," *Washington Post*, March 4, 2011.

political system. It warns that if U.S. fails to do so, U.S. and the West will not be able to keep up with developments in the region. Moreover, the report indicates that the Western world should and will change its attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood.

Putting an end to about 60 years of authoritarian regime, popular revolution entered a new era in the wake of the overthrow of Mubarak. A tough and painful process is ahead of Egypt in this new era. One still doesn't know what kind of a political system this incomplete revolution will bring. In this sense, the consensus dating back 1980s between Islamist and liberal powers on fundamental areas of liberalism such as rule of law, protection of individual and political rights will strengthen liberal institutions in the upcoming period; however, it is uncertain to what extent it will pave the way for democracy. If we are to consider current situation of Egypt, it is possible to say that the integration of the democracy in the system would be a slow, up-and-down process.

The report also suggests that the Brotherhood's peaceful attitudes that mix Islam and nationalism make it different than other Islamist movements and adds that U.S. should pave the way for the Brotherhood to engage in the political system.

4. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: WHICH EGYPT FOR WHICH ACTOR?

Egypt has been continuously been subject to foreign intervention and occupation because of its geo-strategic location throughout its modern history with the exception of brief periods. External powers continue to exercise powerful influence on the country's politics. Although it gained its independence in 1922, Egypt remained under British influence until the coup carried out by Free Officers' Movement in 1952. During the first period of the Cold War, in which Egypt preserved its relations with both the Soviet Union and U.S., the U.S. supported Egypt in developments such as 1952 Egyptian Revolution and 1956 Suez Crisis and tried to protect Egypt from the Soviet influence.⁷⁶ U.S. accomplished this when Anwar Sadat deported Russian advisers in 1972 and the Camp David Accord was signed in 1978. the regional system established by the Camp David Accord and U.S. regional policies must first be examined paying special attention to Israel's security concerns in order to meaningfully analyze Egypt's regional activities. Egypt has become the primary agent of the "moderate" Arab regimes along with Jordan that joined in 1994. Therefore, the U.S. and Israel are the leading actors that closely follow up both the uprising process and the democratization steps taken in the post-Mubarak era. Besides, the period that Egypt is experiencing is of particular concern to many global and regional actors. Because they will directly influence the process itself, it is quite significant to analyze their relationship with Mubarak regime and their expectations and concerns in the post-Mubarak period.

4.1 The Obscure Position of The United States of America

According to the U.S.- which became closer to Egypt during the Cold War and was the most pivotal actor with regard to Egypt's foreign policy particularly after 1979- Egypt is an important country due to its strategic location dominating the Middle East, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Africa, its large population, its leading role in political and intellectual leadership in the Arab world, its contribution to Israel's regional policies and its dominance over the Suez Canal through which 8% of the world sea trade is carried. During the Cold War years, the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed with each other to win over Egypt. Egypt is also indispensable in terms of the U.S.'s access to oil and its efforts to safeguard Israel's security. Moreover, the fact that Egypt shares borders with suspect admin-

76. Lillian C. Harris, "Egypt: Internal Challenges and Regional Stability," *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, 1988, p.86

istrations from the U.S. perspective such as governments of Sudan, Libya and the Hamas authority in Gaza increases Egypt's value for the U.S.

Camp David Accords mediated by the US President Jimmy Carter and signed by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israel President Menachem in 1978, lead to Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 and had important consequences for all three countries involved. Egypt was the first Arab country to recognize Israel. In return for peace between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. had promised billions of dollars of financial and military aid to both countries. Although the U.S. had given financial and military aid to Egypt before 1979, with the accord and the peace treaty established a mutual dependency and the aid was regularized. This economic relation allowed the U.S. to become closer especially to the Egyptian army and the political elite. Moreover, Egyptian army trained by the U.S. system and equipped with U.S. technology constituted one of the strongest ties between two countries. Although the U.S. paid attention to preserving Israeli superiority over Egypt through these aids, it granted billions of dollars in aid to Egyptian army thus solicited Egypt's assistance when necessary. Egypt sent the highest number of soldiers after the U.S. and the UK to the Gulf War in return for the cancelation of its debt of 4.5 billion dollars to the U.S.⁷⁷ In addition to the support of combatant forces, Egypt's involvement in the war played an important role in legitimizing the war in the Arab world. There was a disaccord between two countries because of the Strategic Cooperation Agreement U.S. signed with Israel and Israeli occupation of Lebanon and because Egypt reestablished its diplomatic relations with Russia. However, Egypt supported U.S. regional policies in the Gulf War as it did the same regarding "war against terrorism" in the post-9/11 era and assumed a leading role in assimilating these policies in the Arab world. In this sense, Egypt, the leader of pro-Western bloc particularly in organizations such as Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation, served as a bridge between U.S. and these organizations.

U.S. tried to maintain its financial support to civil society in Egypt through USAID; however, it had a limited influence over democratization.⁷⁸ While on the one hand civil society criticized U.S. for not giving enough support; on the other hand Egyptian government did not want civil society organizations to be supported. Upon the intervention of Egyptian government, a great majority of these aids granted through USAID were transferred to state related institutions or directly to state projects. Moreover U.S. did not have any dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, U.S. had a limited influence over civil society in Egypt and it had almost no connection with Egyptian people.

In the wake of protests in Egypt, U.S. called Mubarak for reform and emphasized transition to democracy in Egypt in its later statements. Upon Mubarak's statement that "If I leave now, chaos will begin," U.S. underlined that the transition process shall be launched immediately. From the beginning of protests until Mubarak announced his resignation, U.S. administration adopted an obscure attitude; however, it emphasized democracy after Mubarak resigned. Thanks to this obscure attitude, Washington tried to minimize the inconveniences to occur if it took a side in an uncertain period. Obama administration wanted to avoid being accused of cooperating with authoritarian regimes by not openly supporting Mubarak regime while it also wanted to prevent people from thinking that these protests are a U.S. complot by not openly supporting the protesters. This indicates the lack of unanimity in U.S. administration. As a matter of fact, the White House and U.S. department of state gave contradictory statements.⁷⁹ Because of this stance during the protests, U.S. influence over the change process in the post-Mubarak era remained limited with the army and a few civil society organizations.

4.2 Israel's Concerns and al-Fatah- Hamas Conflict

Since its establishment in 1948 until the peace agreement signed in 1979, Israel was in state of war with Egypt. During this period, the two countries came face to face in 1948-49 War, 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War and 1973-74 Yom Kippur War. During this period Egypt as the greatest power of Arab alliance became the biggest threat to Israel

77. Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, *A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.171

78. Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt; The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, 2011, p.27

79. Inside the White House-State Department rift on Egypt, *Foreign Policy*, 9.2.2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/09/inside_the_white_house_state_department_rift_on_egypt

in the region. The success of Egyptian and Syria troops against Israel in the beginning of the Yom Kippur War put an end to the myth that Israel is “unbeatable”⁸⁰ –Arab-Israel wars until that date and Israel’s decisive victory in Six-Day War had contributed to this myth-. Israel lost this war and it could only gather strength thanks to U.S. aid. As a result, U.S. increased its influence over Israel while it convinced Israel of the necessity that Israel should make peace with Arabs.

The Camp David Accords in 1978 and Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 put an end to the state of war between two countries. Thanks to this agreement, Israel neutralized the strongest Arab state and enjoyed concrete guarantees such as the disarmament of Sinai Peninsula, the establishment of early warning systems and deployment of international peace force and psychological guarantees such as the recognition of Jewish State.

Following Camp David accords, Egypt got closer to U.S. and tried to assume a key role during this process and to revive the peace process between Israel and Palestinians and other Arab actors. These efforts were accelerated after Hosni Mubarak was appointed President. Egypt aimed to regain its prestige in Arab world it lost because it signed a peace treaty with Israel, to boost its reputation in the West, to strengthen the “moderate” actors in the region and to prevent radicals from taking advantage of the conflict environment and thus to get financial support from U.S. and Arabs.⁸¹ Even though the normalization efforts between two countries were hindered because of Sabra and Chatila massacres committed by Israel in 1982, Egypt continued to emphasize the importance of diplomatic process for the resolution of Palestinian issue and maintained the “cold peace” with Israel.⁸² In this vein, Egypt served as a mediator in the Madrid Conference held in 1991 and in Oslo Agreement signed in 1993.

U.S. adopted an Israel-centered attitude towards the developments in the Middle East. As a result, its allies like Egypt in the region paid attention to Israeli concerns and priorities. In the wake of peace treaty, Egypt offered certain advantages to Israel. In addition to psychological aid that a Muslim country gives Israel, the military and economic cooperation was also crucial to Israel. Egypt became one of the tourist attractions for Israeli tourists, paving way for economic cooperation. With the agreement worth 2.5 billion dollars signed in 2005, Egypt guaranteed to sell natural gas to Israel for 15 years.⁸³

Moreover, the two countries also signed significant agreements on security. Particularly after 9/11 attacks, they increased their cooperation in security regarding terrorism and Islamic radicalism. With the Philadelphia Agreement signed in 2005, Egypt agreed to deploy 750 national guards along Philadelphia route situated in the border in order to prevent arms smuggling. Again with another agreement signed in 2007, Mubarak guaranteed to increase intelligence and security studies in order to prevent arms smuggling to Gaza. During Israeli attack on Gaza beginning in December 2008, Egypt closed borders with Gaza and caused humanitarian crisis in Gaza to increase.

Egypt is the second leading actor of Gaza blockade that has been imposed since Hamas won elections, first being Israel. Even though it relatively softened the blockade conditions in the wake of Mavi Marmara attack, it did not completely remove the blockade. In the post-Mubarak period, the government to be elected by people in Egypt will probably be loyal to Camp David Accords but it seems that the new government probably will not clearly support Israel in issues such as Gaza blockade as it was the case in Mubarak rule. Moreover, Egypt will probably decrease or remove the restrictions at the Rafah border. As a result, one can foresee that thanks to this change, the Gaza blockade of Israel—which aims to weaken Hamas through containment policy and restrictions—will become meaningless. This indicates that Israel will not guarantee its south border considering Hezbollah prevails in its north border, Lebanon.

Egypt served as a mediator in reconciliation works between al-Fatah and Hamas. Even though it tried to show its reconciliatory side, it indirectly contributed to not only political marginalization of Hamas—which is of Muslim Brother-

80. Marsot, p. 157

81. Harris, p. 81

82. Kenneth W. Stein, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations”, *Middle East Review of International Studies*, Volume 1, No. 3 - September 1997

83. Here we must remember the argument of Egyptian opposition that Egypt sell natural gas to Israel below market price: “Egypt: Israeli gas prices could rise 70%”, *Haaretz*, 01.03.09 <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/egypt-israeli-gas-prices-could-rise-70-1.271154>

hood tradition—but also the continuation of the status quo regarding Palestinian issue by supporting Palestinian Authority during this process.

Israel which clearly supported Mubarak together with Saudi Arabia believes that the new administration to be established in the post-Mubarak period poses a threat to Israeli interests. During protests, Israel was particularly concerned that the Muslim Brotherhood will come to the power⁸⁴ thus adopted a discourse that preferred Mubarak-centered stability to democracy.⁸⁵ After Mubarak resigned, Israel addressed to West's fear of Islamist radicalism through Iran and Muslim Brotherhood. It stated that the recent developments in Egypt may turn into something similar to 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution if the Muslim Brotherhood comes to the power.⁸⁶

Consequently, Israel risks losing its closest ally in the region thus it has to move Egyptian-Israeli cooperation—which it preserved with the help of Mubarak, Egyptian army and U.S.—onto a different level. Egyptian-Israeli relationship, known as cold peace, in fact indicated the cooperation between administrations despite people. When millions of people took to the streets in Tahrir Square, they proved that Egyptian people are the new actors and in the post-Mubarak period Israel will no longer continue to get guarantees as it did to date despite Egyptian people.

Palestinian authority also shares the same concerns about the change Egypt undergoes. Documents on Palestinian Authority broadcast by Al-Jazeera—which was perhaps thrown out of focus by the protests in the Arab world—launched debates on the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. In such an environment when Mubarak, one of his greatest supporters against Hamas, resigned; Mahmoud Abbas administration had the second shock. Because of the pressure on Palestinian National Authority caused by Palestinian documents and Egyptian protests, chief negotiator Saeb Erekat resigned and called on Palestinian Authority to hold an election.

The government to be elected by people in Egypt will probably be loyal to Camp David Accords but it seems that the new government probably will not clearly support Israel in issues such as Gaza blockade.

In terms of Palestinian issue, Egyptian people will expect the administration to keep the al-Fatah-Hamas balance in the post-Mubarak period. This may put an end to special treatment al-Fatah got by Mubarak because he felt antipathy towards Hamas. If the Muslim Brotherhood is to take part in administration, Hamas will find a party it can establish a dialogue in Egypt and will pave the way for al-Fatah-Hamas reconciliation which is crucial for the resolution of Palestinian issue. Moreover, if the Brotherhood is to find a place in Egyptian democratic system, it would be able to break certain taboos about establishing dialogue with Hamas in order to resolve the Palestinian issue.

4.3 Arab World and Iran are Playing The Waiting Game

Before 1979, Egypt was one of the leader countries in Arab and Islam World; however, it lost its prestige when it came under U.S. influence following the Camp David Accords. During this period, the Arab League came together in Baghdad and decided to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against Egypt. Nevertheless, Egypt was able to mend the fences with Arab and Muslim countries particularly thanks to its attitude towards Israeli occupation of Lebanon. It rejoined to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League in 1984 and 1989 respectively. Besides, it strengthened its relations with Gulf countries where there is a high U.S. population and continued to get financial support from countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

84. "Peres praises Mubarak for his contribution to peace," *Ynet*, 5 February 2011, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4024283,00.html>

85. "Peres stands by embattled Egyptian counterpart," *Jerusalem Post*, 31 January 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=206054>

86. "With Upheaval, How Large Is The Opening For Islam?," *NPR*, 4 February 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/04/133440196/with-upheaval-how-large-is-the-opening-for-islam>

Egypt's relations with the member countries of these organizations varied. Egypt established good relations with "Moderate Arab regimes" such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan through their common protecting power, U.S. It acted together with Saudi Arabia and Jordan in U.S. operations in the region such as the Gulf War while its relations with countries such as Libya and Sudan remained to be problematic. Under the framework of African Union, Egypt struggled with Libya on Israel and got support from non-Arab African states. During this period, Egypt also cooperated with countries such as France which was willing to control Libya. Moreover, Egypt cautiously followed up Sudan because of its control over the Nile and the Islamic radicalism in the North Sudan. On the other hand, Sudan's sensitivity to Egypt's historical interventions negatively affected the relations.

It is possible to say that the Arab League consisting mostly of authoritarian Arab regimes are concerned about the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. These are the regimes that will primordially be exposed to domino effect. As a result, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference failed to seize a strong position. During this period, Egypt received the greatest support from the "moderate" Arab leaders in the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia King Abdullah called protesters as "infiltrators who seek to destabilize Egypt,"⁸⁷ the President of the Palestinian Authority Abbas called Mubarak and expressed his support for him and Egypt.⁸⁸

Democratization efforts launched in Tunisia and continued in Egypt had a broad repercussion in many Arab countries. The ongoing conflict in Libya, the announcement of Ali Abdullah Saleh that he will not run for next elections and ongoing demonstrations in Yemen, cabinet change in Jordan, protests in Syria and the pressure over the President Bashar al-Assad about reform and protests in Algeria and other countries in the region brought into mind the questions whether or not the status quo in the Middle East can survive.

Egypt established good relations with "Moderate Arab regimes" such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan through their common protecting power, U.S. It acted together with Saudi Arabia and Jordan in U.S. operations in the region such as the Gulf War while its relations with countries such as Libya and Sudan remained to be problematic.

It must be noted that the resignation of Mubarak and democratization efforts of Egypt—which has been a leader country throughout the modern history in Arab world—assumed a crucial role in shaping the future of the Arab world. Egypt's leading role was restricted because of its authoritarian regime and the cooperation with U.S. and Israel. However, Egypt will reassume its leading role thanks to democratization and economic development. Moreover, this will have a broad repercussion not only in countries but also in institutions bringing together Arab and Islam world such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Arab League.

In addition to Israel, people also wondered Iran's reaction to the revolution and change movements in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran interpreted the change in Egypt as an Islamic-centered crucial step towards the establishment of a new Middle East. According to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the events in Egypt echo its 1979 Islamic Revolution as he also stated in the anniversary of Iranian Revolution.⁸⁹ In this sense Iran on the one hand supported protesters while on the other hand it contributed to Western concern that Islamist will come to the power in Egypt. Iran's above-mentioned statements did not contribute to Egyptian opposition's efforts to receive international support in such an environment where questions such as "will Egypt be a new Iran?" are discussed.⁹⁰

87. "Egypt protests draw mixed reaction in region," *CNN World*, 29 Ocak 2011 http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-29/world/egypt.middle.east.reaction_1_egyptian-people-egyptian-president-hosni-mubarak-populous-arab-nation?_s=PM:WORLD

88. "Abbas calls Mubarak to express support," *the Jerusalem Post*, 29 Ocak 2011 <http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=205766>

89. "Iran says Egypt events herald Islamic Middle East," *Reuters*, 1.2.2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFHAF13756420110201>

90. "Egypt's real parallel to Iran's revolution," *The Washington Post*, 7.2.2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti->

During Mubarak rule, Egypt and Iran were the two countries that conflict with each other; however, in the post-Mubarak period they will try to mend the fences. Nevertheless, the military bureaucracy in Egypt will preserve its power to some extent and Egypt will have the potential to rise as a regional power in the upcoming period thus the relationship between the two countries will be restricted. There will be a competition between the two both in the Middle East geopolitics and in the Islam world. Particularly because Egypt lost its influence over Islamist movements and its intellectual leading role in the Islam world, this void will be filled by Iran thus the competition between the two will continue.

4.4 Where is The European Union?

European influence in Egypt has gradually diminished since it gained its independence from UK in 1922 and the British domination was minimized in 1952. During this period, perhaps the most significant development was that UK and France were the main weapon resource of Israel against Arabs and these countries attacked Egypt together with Israel in Suez Crisis in 1956. Suez Canal—which is a crucial canal in terms of access to oil and colonies—has become the main reason lying behind European interest in Egypt.

The European Union continued to cooperate with Egypt particularly in economic and energy areas. Within the scope of European Neighborhood Policy, Egypt receives foreign aid from the EU annually since 1995. In this context, Egypt promised to abide by democratic and human-rights norms in exchange for EU aid and trade preferences about € 100m- € 150 m a year.⁹¹ Within the scope of foreign aid, the EU supported reforms on democratization, human rights, bureaucracy and law in Egypt and tried to improve the productivity of Egyptian economy and competitiveness, to maintain development process and to enable efficient utilization of natural resources.⁹² The EU acted in parallel with Egypt as far as the peace in the Middle East was concerned. It attached importance to Egypt's role during this period and cooperated with Egypt on security issues, immigration, weapons of mass destruction and terror in the post 9/11 period. From time to time there has been tension between the EU and Egypt particularly regarding human rights. Here the inconsistent attitude that the EU adopted towards human rights in Egypt is noteworthy. One must also note that the EU's criticisms of Mubarak regime on human rights violations in Egypt in 2000s were only limited to the violations that affected liberal movements and people. For instance, while EU showed a harsh reaction to the imprisonment of Ayman Nour or liberal intellectual Saad Ibrahim, it remained silent when the Brotherhood members were arrested in the wake of 2005 elections.⁹³

During protests, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was the EU member who gave the clearest support to Mubarak. Nevertheless, most of the European leaders and EU authorities emphasized that the demands must be met.⁹⁴ In its official statement the European Council underlined that the transition process towards meeting the demands should immediately start.⁹⁵ When Mubarak resigned, European leaders increased their emphasis on democratization of Egypt. UK Prime minister David Cameron called for the abolition of state of emergency, the inclusion of the opposition in democratization process and the release of political prisoners while chancellor of Germany⁹⁶, Angela Merkel emphasized that Egypt must not rush in elections.⁹⁷ UK also tried to assume an active role in Egypt in the post-Mubarak period. David Cameron was the first leader to visit Egypt in the post-Mubarak period; however, his visit to Egypt was seriously criticized because a committee consisting of weapon merchants accompanied him.

cle/2011/02/06/AR2011020603398.html

91. "Talking tough (ish) to Mubarak", *The Economist*, 4.2.2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/02/eu_and_egypt

92. *Egypt: Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013*, European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_egypt_en.pdf

93. Nathalie Tocci ve Jean-Pierre Cassarino, *Rethinking the EU's Mediterranean Policies Post-1/11*, IAI Working Papers 11, 6.3.2011, p.5

94. *Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Egypt*. 3 February 2011. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119132.pdf

95. *European Council declaration on Egypt and the region*, The European Council, 4 February 2011 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119143.pdf

96. "David Cameron's Egypt trip poses political risk," *BBC*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12532480>

97. "Early elections probably not good idea," *Reuters*, 5 March 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/05/egypt-germany-merkel-idUSLDE71404D20110205>

Cameron met authorities such as prime minister and minister of defense during his short visit and avoided meeting the Muslim Brotherhood, which indicated that UK will maintain its policy it adopted during Mubarak rule in the post-Mubarak period.⁹⁸

Despite the insistence of some EU countries on maintaining their policies in Egypt or in the region, change movements in the Middle East notably in Egypt required the EU to revise its policies in the region and to change its policies to some extent according to the new dynamics in the region. Social demands will be more represented in the policy-making process than before in Egypt thus there will be shifts in the dynamics of EU's priorities with regard to the Middle East and EU's policy in the region will change accordingly.⁹⁹

4.5 Russia is Concerned About The Domino Effect

Russian-Egyptian relations date back to Cold War years. The relationship between two countries was strengthened particularly during Gamal Abdel Nasser rule and it determined Egyptian position regarding Western and Soviet bloc until Anwar Sadat deported Russian advisors in 1972. During this period, Russia provided logistic support to Arab alliance notably to Egypt against Israel supported by the U.S. Nevertheless, the relations between the two countries deteriorated when Egypt took the side of U.S. in the wake of Camp David accords and Russia was deported from Egypt. Since 1986 their relations have relatively come back to normal. In 1990, the two signed economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation agreement.

The volume of trade between Russia and Egypt is about two billion dollars and there is a strong cooperation between the two countries particularly in tourism and energy. Following the signature of an agreement in 2010, an Egyptian-Russian free trade zone was created. The Russian Gazprom and Novatek companies cooperate with Egypt in energy sector. Besides, Russia is the country that sends tourists to Egypt the most.

Dmitry Medvedev was one of the few leaders to meet Mubarak when protests broke out. He emphasized that conflicts must be resolved through peaceful and legal means. Contrary to Europe and US, Russia did not call for reform and transition. Instead, it argued that the issue must be resolved within the boundaries of Egypt.¹⁰⁰ Russia adopted such a position during and after the protests mainly because it considered the events in Egypt as a domestic problem.¹⁰¹

Russia was concerned that U.S. will seize the control of this process and shape Egypt in the post-Mubarak period according to its interests. Therefore, it opposed to foreign intervention in internal affairs of Egypt though it often resorts to the intervention in internal affairs of other countries. In this sense, Russia avoided the risk that these demands for change affect its own domestic policy and Central Asian republics where Russia has high population. Developments in Egypt also influenced Central Asia and Caucasus Republics which are similar to Egypt in political and administrative sense. These are the countries where Russia increased its influence particularly during Vladimir Putin period. Therefore, Russia cannot easily tolerate these developments' influencing these Republics when Russia's recent experiences in Georgia and Ukraine are considered.

Russia took this position also because it was concerned that Islamists will come to the power in the post-Mubarak period in Egypt, which is a widespread concern among Western world. In 2003 Russia added the Muslim Brotherhood along with its more radical splinters such as al-Gama's al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad to the list of terrorist organizations and accused these groups of providing financial and humanitarian support to liberation movements

98. "Cameron attacked for Egypt visit with defence sales team in tow," *the Independent*, 22 February 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-attacked-for-egypt-visit-with-defence-sales-team-in-tow-2221695.html>

99. see. Nathalie Tocci ve Jean-Pierre Cassarino, *Rethinking the EU's Mediterranean Policies Post-1/11*

100. "Russia's Medvedev wishes Mubarak peaceful end to Egyptian crisis," *RiaNovosti*, 2 March 2011, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110203/162439808.html>

101. "Russia and Egypt: an old relationship," *Aspenia*, 11 February 2011, <http://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/russia-and-egypt-old-relationship>

in North Caucasus.¹⁰² Therefore, Russia believes that if the Muslim Brotherhood is to come to the power in Egypt, it will influence Islamist movements in the North Caucasus that Russia struggled with for a long time. During Mubarak rule, Russia was in close cooperation with Egypt in terms of Arab warriors in North Caucasus and financial support. In the post-Mubarak period it is concerned that this cooperation will be broken if the Muslim Brotherhood is to come to the power.

4.6 China Prefers The Status-quo

China also took a similar position towards the developments in Egypt and adopted a cautious policy towards the effects of these developments both in domestic politics and the status-quo in its region. From the moment events broke out in Egypt, China focused on the effects of these demonstrations in China rather than in the Middle East and preferred to limit Chinese public opinion's freedom to get information on the developments. China Propaganda Department forces Chinese media to utilize official news agency and self-censor when broadcasting the news on the developments taking place in Egypt¹⁰³, which proves that China is concerned about the developments in Egypt. China is similar to Egypt in its regime, attitude towards the opposition and international criticisms it receives regarding human rights thus it fears from the challenge issued by Egyptian people to the current system. It is known that although China may be rising economically, the one-party regime and the pressure over the opposition dissatisfy Chinese people.¹⁰⁴ Besides, the economic and social similarities between the two countries are noteworthy. Even though the two countries are inclined to enjoy economic growth, they have much in common regarding income inequalities, unemployment rate among university graduates and corruption. As a result, China cannot ignore the development taking place in Egypt.¹⁰⁵

Contrary to Europe and US, Russia did not call for reform and transition. Instead, it argued that the issue must be resolved within the boundaries of Egypt.

Moreover, like Russia China is also concerned that US will control the change process in Egypt and shape it according to its own interests. Perhaps this is the greatest danger if events in Egypt are to spread to China. Faced with the recent developments, China must on the one hand focus on its own domestic politics while on the other hand take into account the situation of one of its leading allies, North Korea. Because, China cannot accept a scenario where the recent developments in the Middle East influence North Korea and the South Korea takes the advantage. In addition to economic cooperation and providing a large market for Chinese products, North Korea is also crucial to China in terms of security. North Korea serves as a buffer zone not only between China and South Korea but also between 29,000 US soldiers and China. This gives China the advantage to decrease the number of the soldiers in the north-eastern border¹⁰⁶ and China is not willing to lose this advantage.

In addition to politics, although unstable there is a medium-scaled commercial tie between China and Egypt. The volume of trade reaching 6.24 billion dollars in 2009¹⁰⁷ has quickly increased since 2004.

102. "Russian reaction: Restrained and cautious," *the Hindu*, 14 February 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article1451970.ece>

103. "China's reaction: Built a Wall," *The Economist*, 5 February 2011

104. "How Russia and China see the Egyptian Revolution," *Foreign Policy*, 15 February 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/15/how_russia_and_china_see_the_egyptian_revolution?page=0,0

105. "Why Egypt should worry China," *Project Syndicate*, 8 February 2011, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eichengreen27/English>

106. "The China-North Korea Relationship," *Council of Foreign Relations*, 7 October 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>

107. "Egypt, China eye closer economic tie," *china official website*, 27 September 2010, http://www.gov.cn/misc/2010-09/27/content_1710522.htm

In fact, Egypt is not an attraction center for Chinese investors; however, Egypt is a crucial center for the commercial activities of Chinese investors in Africa. The volume of trade between China and African countries exceeded 100 billion dollars. Moreover, billions of dollars loan granted by Chinese government to African countries proves how Africa particularly Egypt is crucial to China.¹⁰⁸

5. REMOVING THE TRACES OF THE OLD REGIME

5.1 Will The Constitutional Amendments Be Sufficient?

The current Egyptian constitution adopted in 1971 by a public referendum has been amended three times to date. It was partially amended by Anwar Sadat in 1980. In 2005 and 2007, 34 articles of the constitution were amended. These amendments were proposed by the National Democratic Party in order to remove the traces of the socialist system from the political and economic life and move towards capitalism.

Immediately after seizing power in the wake of Mubarak's resignation, the Egyptian Army suspended the constitution and established the Egyptian Constitutional Review Committee consisting of esteemed legal experts. The Committee began to work on the constitution without delay. Nevertheless, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces opposed the idea of drafting a new constitution despite constitutional demands of the revolutionary movement and preferred to hold elections with the current constitution only with limited amendments. In fact, the limited constitutional amendment plan of the army was included in the reform package it announced before Mubarak resigned. However, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces appointed a committee consisting of reliable experts who do not have any connection with the former regimes thus the army legitimized the change.

The Committee drafted the new amendments in only 10 days and presented the constitutional amendments proposal on 26th of February. Egypt is known for its longstanding election limitations and corruption; however, these amendments include arrangements in order to pave the way for a fair and free elections in the country. Therefore, they will relatively meet the longstanding demands of the opposition and civil society. Moreover these amendments allowed for a brief period of public discussion and possible further changes before a public referendum held on 19th of March. The proposed amendments shorten the presidential term and create a two-term limit, increase the number of eligible presidential candidates, restore judicial supervision of elections and restrict the ability to declare and renew a state of emergency.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, some surprising amendments raised questions whether or not these amendments serve specific agendas within the army or other leadership circles. Particularly, an amendment in the eligibility criteria for the presidency disqualifies any Egyptian having dual nationality or any married to a non-Egyptian. The above-mentioned amendment was not demanded by the opposition or civil society and was suspected to be designed to exclude expatriates such as Egyptian-American Ahmed Zewail from running for presidential elections. Besides, it is still unclear whether or not Mohammed ElBaradei's Egyptian-born wife has foreign ties although he himself denies these rumors.

Even though Muslim Brotherhood member Sobhi Saleh was in the Committee; the Committee did not address Article 5 of the constitution banning any political activity with a religious frame of reference. The Muslim Brotherhood could still try to establish a political party through forming a platform that will meet the current constitutional requirement; however, the movement announced that it will not apply to parties committee. As a result, the Brotherhood will prefer not to go beyond internal preparations for establishing its new party before elections. This party tentatively named the "Freedom and Justice Party" is led by Saad al-Katatny who led the alliance of independent Brotherhood deputies in the parliament elected in 2005.

Constitutional referendum was held on March 19. The amendments were passed with 77 percent in favor. While the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi movement, National Democratic Party voted in favor, liberals including ElBaradei and

108. China's economic invasion of Africa, The Guardian, 6.2.2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/06/chinas-economic-invasion-of-africa>

109. Nathan J. Brown ve Michele Dunne, "Egypt's Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others," *Carnegie Endowment Commentary*, March 1, 2011.

Amr Moussa, called on youth movements and people who ask for more radical changes to veto the referendum. Despite all deficiencies the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood supported constitutional amendments must be interpreted as its effort towards paving the way for democratic means and change. The Muslim Brotherhood didn't want to oppose to Egyptian army and was willing to get rid of Western accusations about radicalization. As a result it preferred to remain in the process and strengthen its position. Because of the disaccord during the referendum process, Egyptian people were worried about the referendum results. Nevertheless they supported amendments and launched the election process. It is still uncertain how the approved constitutional amendments will be applied in the upcoming period. But 19 March referendum is quite significant in that Muslim Brotherhood's support was welcomed by people and this referendum verified the crucial role the Brotherhood will play in the new political process.

Despite all deficiencies the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood supported constitutional amendments must be interpreted as its effort towards paving the way for democratic means and change.

The Proposed Amendments in Detail

Generally speaking, the constitutional amendments were welcomed by Egyptian people; however, a great number of activists who believed in a more radical change say that there is no point in making minor constitutional amendments. They also argue that it makes more sense to start drafting a new constitution without delay. Some worry that elections will be held in a still inchoate political environment.

Despite such concerns, many political figures and some opposition movements are enthusiastic that political amendments are imminent and they support the new amendments. So far most of the commentary has focused on general thrust of the amendments. Nevertheless, more detailed reactions are likely to be seen in the future.

The most significant amendments are as follows:

- Candidates will have three ways to get on the presidential ballot: nomination by a party with at least one parliamentary seat, endorsement by 30 members of the parliament or getting 30,000 signatures of citizens eligible to vote.
- The president will serve for four years and his term will be limited to two terms.
- The president will be obligated to appoint at least one vice president.
- The judiciary will assume the active supervision of elections and will be the final arbiter of the validity of legal objections to results.
- The president or half of the members of the parliament will be able to call for a new constitution and a 100-member assembly can be convened to draft a new constitution.
- The president may declare a state of emergency with parliamentary approval; any extension beyond six months will require the approval in a public referendum.
- The article cancelling provisions on human rights in terrorism cases will entirely be removed.

5.2 Towards The Elections in Egypt

According to the decision of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces dated February 28, 2011, parliamentary elections will be held in June while presidential elections will be held towards the end of summer. In the wake of above-mentioned decision, there emerged several debates on the best election procedure to elect a political mechanism

that would provide democratization in the post-Mubarak period. Egypt used to hold elections before. However, this current election system is questioned not only because of the problems resulting from the structure of the election system but also because the regime was able to dominate elections. When the army declared that the new government to be established in the wake of elections in June must carry out the constitutional works, the election procedure to elect the parliament—which will determine the new Egyptian constitution—became much more crucial.

Egypt has a bicameral parliament. In the Shura Council, there are a total of 264 seats. 176 members of the parliament are elected through a two-round system for six-year terms while 88 members are directly appointed by the president to serve six-year terms. Whereas, the People's Assembly includes 518 members 508 of which are elected while ten of which are appointed by the president. Presidential elections are held in every 6 years and according to the constitutional amendments made in 2005, a candidate must get at least 250 signatures from Shura Council, People's Assembly and municipal councils.¹¹⁰

When the army declared that the new government to be established in the wake of elections in June must carry out the constitutional works, the election procedure to elect the parliament—which will determine the new Egyptian constitution—became much more crucial.

The country is divided into electoral districts in the elections for Shura Council and People's Assembly and each electoral district is given two votes. Egypt's electoral rules are similar to those used in France and in some countries in the Middle East.¹¹¹ According to this system, a second round of voting is held for four candidates who received the most votes if no majority choice emerges from the first round. One of the influences of the socialist policies of Abdel Nasser period over the election system is the obligation that at least one seat in each district is reserved for a worker or a farmer. During Mubarak rule a special quota of 64 seats was granted to women in the name of affirmative action; however, this served as a method of the party in power, the National Democratic Party, to strengthen its control in the parliament.¹¹²

According to the constitutional amendments package prepared by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and passed on 19th of March, it was decided to establish an independent election commission consisting of experienced judges and to grant the judiciary the authority to control the elections. It must be noted that these amendments will be for the benefit of elections considering the criticisms about the lack of control and the manipulation of the results in Egyptian elections. In this sense, we must remember that 2005 elections where judges took charge in were the least shady elections in the 30-year history of Egypt. Each of these changes is a step towards democratization; however, there are still lots of problems on the technical aspect of the election system.

One of these problems was the outdated and flawed voter registration lists. For instance, it was very common to see the lists including the names of the dead and bogus names. Some people voted more than once and some voted by getting fake certificates of residence.¹¹³ Moreover, Egyptians had a limited window to apply for voting cards and they

110. "Constitutional and legal framework," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/01/constitutional-and-legal-framework>

111. "Trade-offs in electoral reform," *New York Times*, 18 February 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/17/how-to-have-fair-elections-in-egypt/trade-offs-in-electoral-reform>

112. "Egypt's pro-women election turns ugly," *Foreign Policy*, 27 November 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/27/egypts_pro_women_election_turns_ugly

113. "No need to start over," *New York Times*, 17 February 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/17/how-to-have-fair-elections-in-egypt/no-need-to-start-over>

had to register at police station despite the high number of voters. As a result, voters' lists could not be updated and many people at voting age could not exercise their constitutional rights.¹¹⁴

One of other issues to be resolved is the international supervision of elections that Mubarak regime insistently opposed to and considered as an intervention into the sovereignty of Egypt. To date, NDP opposed to international supervision of elections claiming that countries that have full sovereignty like Egypt do not need international supervision.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless this issue is quite crucial for countries like Egypt that are in the early stages of democratization. Similarly, paving the way for civil society organizations to actively work at ballot box is quite crucial for the benefit and legitimacy of election results.

The participation rate to elections which was only 35 percent in 2010 parliamentary elections is another problem that must be resolved. This lack of participation resulted from the legitimacy problem of the regime, the above-mentioned problems in the preparation of the voting lists and rigged elections. However, it is possible to foresee that this problem will be resolved in the post-Mubarak period. In addition to technical issues, embracing the system also influence the participation rate to elections. In this sense, the participation will increase as opposition groups in Egypt will be willing to take part in the new system which they hope will fairly represent people's will.

Egypt came out of 30 year-old Mubarak rule and single-party regime. Considering the elections in Egypt will be held in June, it is difficult to make certain arrangements in the election system. Similarly, it is quite difficult for the opposition—has been systematically limited, banned and even convicted to date—to complete electoral preparations in a short period of time and carry out an effective campaign. The current election system in Egypt and the date of the next elections will be for the benefit of the big and more organized groups such as NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand the current system will create problems with regard to the representation of small parties and small and even medium scaled groups that actively participated in demonstrations.

At the beginning it was believed that taking steps towards resolving these problems will be a better idea than making radical changes in the election system.¹¹⁶ According to this approach, the government to be established following June 2010 elections and to carry out constitutional works may as well carry out works for election system in parallel to the constitution. Besides, it may determine the best election system according to the political, social and geographic structure of Egypt and this system can be used in the presidential elections to be held at the end of summer. This approach is a realist analysis of the political situation in Egypt in general. Nevertheless, the election system must be amended so that all of the movements that represent each and every Egyptian take part in the parliament. Otherwise, the dispersed and disorganized small opposition groups will continue to be alienated in the post-Mubarak period.

6. TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS: TOWARDS A NEW MIDDLE EAST?

The future of Turkey- Egypt relations largely depends on the outcome of the current crisis in the regional order and the kind of response these actors will produce. As both countries seek to resolve the crisis, their cooperation and competition will be determined by how Egypt emerges out of its domestic political turmoil. While Turkey's foreign policy activism deeply affected the political order in the region, the outlook of the New Egypt will determine the New Middle East in its positive and negative aspects.

Turkey filled the political vacuum in the region left by the U.S. through its pro-active foreign policy in the last decade. Egypt, on the other hand, gradually lost ground as its policies were regarded as closely aligned with Israel and the U.S. Turkey strengthened its "dignified" stance especially during the Post-Davos period. As much as it could not talk to the Arab regimes, Turkey was able to speak to the Arab people, which greatly increased its influence in the region.

114. "Votes for all," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 2010, Sayi: 1006, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1006/eg8.htm>

115. "Neither US Congress nor Obama can force election monitoring on Egypt, says NDP," *AlMasr Al Yevm*, 20 November 2010, <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/251123>.

116. No need to start over, *New York Times*.

While creating a significant sphere of influence in the Middle East, Turkey has yet to turn this momentum into concrete policies. In this sense, events in Egypt constituted the first serious test for Turkey's newly acquired prestige and standing in the region.

If Egypt adopts democracy then Turkey's role in the region will increase and Turkey's gains in the region will be more permanent. Even though a competition between two countries is likely to happen, if Egypt comes out of this turmoil as an economically and politically strong actor, this competition will empower both countries. However, if Egypt adopts the opposite and the current situation turns into an institutional coup d'état then this would virtually be a catastrophe. In this case, Turkey will also gain ground as Egypt's potential is diminished, if not crippled. Because a military government in Egypt will lose both time and energy in order to balance Islamist and liberal opposition and thus will consume Egypt's potential to become a leader in the region. And this would mean that Turkey's job will be more difficult in the region, however, its prestige might still persist. As a result it is possible that Turkey will not find a partner from which it will get help or with which it will share its role in terms of regional policies and region-based approaches. In the medium term, the region will waste its time with "crisis management." Consequently, the need for developing human resources, capacity building, and sustainable development projects would take longer, rendering the emergence of the New Middle East more difficult in the long run.

If Egypt comes out of the turmoil as a stable country at peace with its Islamists as well, then the regional actors can produce genuinely regional policies in the quest for a new regional order. In this way, we can speak about the possibility of a new kind of politics and the emergence of a regional order, which takes into consideration the local actors' concerns during crises similar to the Libyan one. If Egypt goes the opposite direction, then foreign intervention will increase and the local actors will lose ground as the region's disingenuous political structure may be strengthened. As such, if Egypt comes out of the current turmoil as a powerful and democratic country, from Turkey's perspective, the regional dynamics would be strengthened, a genuinely regional order can be established, and regional peace and stability would be achieved.

Overthrown Mubarak government had a privileged position in the region as a facilitator of the "Camp David Order."¹¹⁷ Mubarak's Egypt was a problematic Egypt with its so-called "Cold Peace" with Israel and close to \$2 billion in US aid annually. The country supported the Arab world's normalization with Israel through the Peace Process and reduced its regional vision to US interests all the while being unresponsive to the economic and political problems of its people.¹¹⁸

Although it has a key strategic location as a transcontinental country situated in the Mediterranean Basin, the Egypt as described above cannot afford its current weak standing in the region. Whenever the strategic order is reset in Afro-Eurasia, Egypt became either the leading actor or one of the most crucial actors. However, Egypt, which links Mediterranean Sea to Indian Ocean and manages not only sea routes but also water resources in the inner parts of Africa, lost its prestige during the Mubarak reign. Nasser left a "defeated Egypt" and in the post-Sadat era Egypt was faced with the burden of yielding to Israel's policies while trying to survive with the economic help by the US. Moreover, Islamism in the Middle East gained ground and Islamist movements turned into political ones while Baathism lost ground. During this period, Mubarak regime tried to survive the crisis through a moderate Baathism and by oppressing Islamism. As a result, Egypt gradually lost its regional influence along with its domestic legitimacy.

Egypt's role during the Mubarak era was leveraged as it represented the Palestinian cause, defended Palestinian rights, and negotiated with Israel during the period starting from Madrid Conference to Oslo Accords. However, in the post-Second Intifada period, Egypt did not side with the Palestinians as a whole but Arafat and Abbas at the expense of the Islamist opposition, thus, weakened itself in terms of shaping the regional dynamics. Egypt had

117. Here what is meant by Camp David Order is the status quo set between Israel and Egypt after 1979. What lies behind this status quo is that West Bank and Gaza were left to Palestine and Egypt became the guarantor. Following Oslo Accords while Israel violated the agreement Egypt tried to maintain the status quo.

118. "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background\ Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request" Jeremy Sharp, June 15 2010, Congressional Research Service Report. Washington D.C.

gained trust during the Oslo period; however, it lost prestige over the last decade. Moreover, events at the Rafah gate especially after Hamas won the elections in Gaza had a negative effect on the country. Besides, it remained silent about Israeli attacks thus became the victim of the Post-Davos era. Egypt became at odds with Turkey and the Gaza administration about almost all issues during the Post-Davos era and adopted a “partisan” approach in Palestinian politics. As a result, Egypt was faced with a legitimacy crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Egyptian revolution had various domestic reasons from economic crises to years of economic disenfranchisement, from new organizational tools such as social media to Mubarak’s corrupt family member. However, the end of the “Camp David Order” became crystallized by Turkey’s foreign policy over the past decade. Turkish foreign policy activism in the Middle East contributed to the downfall of authoritarian regimes such as that of Mubarak. Baathist structures faced legitimacy crisis as a result of the changing regional politics in the Post-Davos era. The new politics in the Middle East indicated that it is impossible to do politics only through anti-Israelism. It also indicated that there is not a direct causal relationship between democracy and supporting Israel. Besides, it proved that relations with the West can be permanent, consistent, and dignified. Therefore, it knocked the bottom out of Baathist structures. And now we will witness that each and every one of the Baathist structures undergoes similar processes.

Under the framework of the “New Middle East Order,” these developments will take place according to leaders’ reliability and their capability to govern. Some of them will result in civil war; some of them will create a revolution and some of them will overthrow their leaders through democratic means. The greatest challenge for Turkey during this era is to help create the new language and the terms of discourse of the New Middle East. Turkey must not watch but manage this process (as it was the case in Egypt, Libya, and Syria). If Turkey can realize these then it may pave the way for turning this process started in Egypt into a truly new regional order.

During this period, Mubarak regime tried to survive the crisis through a moderate Baathism and by oppressing Islamism. As a result, Egypt gradually lost its regional influence along with its domestic legitimacy.

6.1 Old Egypt’s Function

Egypt-Turkey relations are not only bilateral but also regional and global at the same time. Accordingly, it is possible to summarize Egypt’s role during Mubarak reign, its regional role and its importance with regard to global order as follows:

- to maintain the Camp David Order: to legitimize security needs of Israel and to support solutions based on Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah without offending Israel.
- to control Islamism as an alternative political and intellectual movement in the Middle East: to control Islamist political movements both through El-Azhar and by intervening in the religious information processes.
- to provide passage from Mediterranean Sea to Indian Ocean through Suez Canal: This has a military importance in that it provides the navigation of warships and their fast transition from one region to another. Moreover, it is also fundamental as it enables the transition of oil and gas tankers from the Gulf to Europe. Therefore, its importance is to protect indirectly the diversity of European energy supply routes against the monopoly of Russia and to control oil prices.
- to protect Baathism in the region where numerous Islamist movements become an alternative for the power and to provide Baathist regimes with training on intelligence and fight against terrorism.

- to control Islamist administrations expected to rise in case they come to power.
- to fight against terrorism: Egypt became instrumental in the post 9/11 era in terms of intelligence because Egyptians also held important positions in al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, in addition to providing intelligence, Egypt created an atmosphere of fear thus contributed to global paranoia in order to strengthen the regime against Muslim Brotherhood.
- to protect the status quo in the East Mediterranean: to become a protector of the Camp David Status quo and maintain stability through the Egyptian army, one of the powerful armies in the world.
- to balance the influence of Iran in the region, to prevent its expansion: to balance the resistance in the Middle East on behalf of the Camp David Order.
- to provide Sunni Crescent plan, which aims to contain Iran and which is supported by the Saudi regime, with human resources and ideological support and to support and sustain this strategy.
- to maintain its position as a political leader of the Arab World and to control the Arab public opinion that isn't content with the current order in the region.
- to control and influence African politics and the Nile geopolitics through the Sudan; to assume a key role in any intervention to be made in inner parts of Africa. The events in Egypt will determine American-Chinese struggle over Africa in terms of both the control of transit routes and African politics in general.

6.2 New Egypt

In terms of military tutelage and borders of political arena, the events in Egypt can be compared to the latest reform period in Turkey in the last decade. The New Turkey redefined its strategic choices and interests. It improved its relations with its neighbors thus created a different image than the 28 February Order. Similarly, if the current transition period in Egypt can be managed and controlled well then we can see a New Egypt.

The way New Egypt is shaped, the actors who will have a share in politics, and the regime to be adopted will deeply affect Turkish policies in the region. As it was also seen when the Prime Minister Erdoğan called for Mubarak to step down, the New Turkey will have a significant role in the formation of the New Egypt contrary to the Old Turkey. This may result in unpredictable developments in the region.

What Kind of Egypt?

There are 3 possible scenarios for Egypt:

1. Military coup and modification of the Old Order: When we consider how powerful Egypt is, it is necessary to bear in mind this scenario. However, domestic, regional, and global conditions make this impossible for now. Military coup following the events in Tahrir will be not only too difficult but also in the limelight. Moreover, the Egyptian Army will probably be unwilling to assume the risk of being responsible for the ongoing economic crisis. Last but not least, doubts about the limits of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Army relationship reduce the probability of external support for coup d'état thus reduce the probability of coup d'état itself.
2. Regime of Military Tutelage: The Army will be in charge structurally and it will hold political and military powers while civil government acts as a technocrat government. This regime of military tutelage worked out well in Turkey during the Cold War era but it couldn't resist the New Turkey. However, this system is still possible in Egypt. If necessary veto mechanisms are adopted and authorizations are given accordingly then this scenario may be possible as a transition order in order to mitigate the Islamist movement. Turkey must be the first country to oppose such a system based on freedom in daily life and life style, delegation of authority in economy and strict control in politics and bureaucracy. Because such a scenario means that the Camp David Order will regain its legitimacy. Such a scenario is highly possible. However, it is necessary to convince both Islamists and Liberals that the opposite is in the interest of the country.

3. New Egypt: The third scenario is the most difficult but the most probable one. Besides, according to Turkey this is the most reasonable and necessary scenario. The New Egypt will need to delegate authority to civilian actors and, create a new constitution. Moreover, bureaucratic elites must also withdraw from politics. Thus, it will take a few years until the New Egypt is formed, becomes powerful, and contributes to the regional order as a serious actor. However, Turkey must assume an active role and share its experiences in order to realize this scenario.

Accordingly, as far as its strategic interest is concerned, Turkey wants an Egypt which pays attention to people's demands, which promotes rule of law, where each and every one of political actors is represented, which has solved its legitimacy problem and which is economically powerful and democratic. In its foreign policy, Turkey wants economic integration and freedom of movement in the region. Under this framework, Turkey believes that political positions in the country will not only affect the country itself but also the whole region. Thus, the fact that Egypt becomes democratic and stability is ensured is not only crucial to Egypt but to the whole region.

Thus, it will take a few years until the New Egypt is formed, becomes powerful, and contributes to the regional order as a serious actor. However, Turkey must assume an active role and share its experiences in order to realize this scenario.

New Egypt for the New Middle East

Turkey's position will also change in line with the government to be established in Egypt. If the first and second scenarios become realities, an oppressive and authoritarian Egypt will give harm to the region. Normalization of Islamist movements will be prolonged; it will contribute to the deadlock in the Palestinian issue, support sectarian discrimination and threaten the stability in the region. On the other hand, a democratic Egypt will be both a rival and a significant partner for the New Turkey in the region. If the first scenario becomes a reality, there probably will not be any change in the above mentioned policies. If the second scenario becomes a reality, only a few of the above-mentioned policies will be amended and there won't be any serious change, either. However, if the third scenario becomes a reality, Egypt will undergo radical changes. Accordingly, the following changes are possible:

- In terms of the Camp David Order: the current status quo is unsustainable. New Egypt will have to adopt a tough policy against Israel because of public pressure. If the New Egypt changes its pro-Fatah attitude then Palestine-Israel relations will also change. An Egypt inclusive of the Muslim Brotherhood will contribute to the normalization on behalf of Hamas in Palestine, will put an end to the isolation of Gaza, and thus will force Israel to make peace in the medium term. All these developments will force Egypt to modify the Camp David Order on behalf of Palestine.
- In terms of controlling Islamism as an alternative movement: If Islamism is controlled ideologically through Al-Azhar and if the political oppression on Islamism is decreased, Islamist movements starting from Egyptian Islamism will heave a sigh of relief, be diversified and above all will seize the opportunity to normalize. Islamism has been isolated from the power for a long time. If it gives up its reactionary policies then it may become a real political actor and an alternative for government.
- In terms of eliminating Baathism : Egypt is an ideological center for the Baathist Arab regimes. If this regime is overthrown, an era will come to an end thus Arab nationalism will be normalized and a more fundamental but more powerful, moderate Arab nationalism will appear. Islamists must be involved in this period in order that this new nationalism does not turn into anti-Turkism.

- In terms of controlling Islamist administrations expected to rise in the region: If Islamism is normalized then this will not be the case. As a result, we may see more independent countries and various Islamism forms in Arab countries.
- In terms of protecting the status quo in the East Mediterranean: Any critical relation between New Egypt and Israel will change the military balance in East Mediterranean.
- In terms of decreasing the influence of Iran in the region: Iran-oriented tension policy may result in a more different balance of powers including Iran. If the Muslim Brotherhood controls its Salafist wing and takes part in power; all security balance will change, Saudi Arabia will become isolated, the Gulf Policy will completely change and the region will be more independent of outside influences.
- In terms of supporting and sustaining the Sunni plan, which aims the containment of Iran and which is supported by the Saudi regime: This policy may become totally meaningless. As a result, real political tension and interests may replace sectarian fights in the region. In terms of controlling the Arab public opinion: Egypt may have a more effective role in regional leadership and thus contribute to bringing Islamist movements to participate in democratic politics.
- Thanks to its role in certain areas of the region it may on the one hand restrict Turkey's influence but on the other hand may share Turkey's responsibilities thus may relieve Turkey of the heavy burden of bearing the momentous changes in the regional order.
- In terms of Africa: the New Egypt may control the African and Nile geopolitics through the Sudan and assume a key role in any intervention to be made in inner parts of Africa. An Egypt, whose security concerns are different, may deepen its relations with the Sudan, help Sudan take part in the international system, restrict the influence of China and limit the US influence. An Egypt which can become a leader in the region may have a great influence in balance of powers in Africa and create the same effect as Turkey' did in the post-Davos era.

7. CONCLUSION: TURKISH PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEW EGYPT

Turkey refused to be a part of Iraq occupation thus made a breakthrough in its foreign policy. It has sustained this policy in recent years. Turkey has become a model for the countries in the region in economic development, political participation and democratic political order. Turkey can negotiate with all parties when there are domestic or transnational problems; it actively takes part in the resolution of the problems and closely follows the regional developments. Particularly its foreign policy in Tunisia and Egypt was in parallel with its regional vision. Because Turkey has a fair political imagination different from other regional and global actors, it must not disregard these developments and must assume an active role in determining the future of these developments. As a matter of fact, domestic and international public opinion—who agree that a new regional order must be established—demanded Turkey to assume an active role during this process. The Prime Minister Erdogan's clear and leading reaction regarding Egypt met these expectations to a great extent.

9/11 attacks caused a shift of axis in global political and economic debates. In the wake of 9/11 attacks the ones that felt the most that the current system will no longer continue were U.S. and satellite states in our region. U.S. interestingly contradicted with itself. On the one hand it knew that satellite states and artificial regional orders were indispensable for the American global system; on the other hand it launched debates on a new order in order to control these debates.

At this point it must be noted that Turkey has a different position than U.S. and countries in the region. The recent developments and Turkey particularly during AK Party rule prove that Turkey is a powerful soft power and effective regional actor. Moreover, Turkey also has a strong leader. In this sense, Turkey has become a legitimate actor to make justice-oriented interventions in regional developments thanks to Tayyip Erdogan's image. It is clear that Erdogan will hold its leadership power during this process in a controlled way. Turkey distinguishes itself from other actors in the region in ten ways:

1. Turkey is a local part of the region both geographically and sociologically.
2. Turkey is the only actor that can talk to all leading actors in the region (governmental or non-governmental) without any mediator. It has intensive official relations with global actors, unions, institutions and platforms. It has a high level experience in talking to and working together with the West.
3. It has a “controlled relation (tension)” with Israel.
4. During AK Party rule Turkey has adopted dominant, positive and solution-oriented policy towards the problems in the region. It did not take any steps that will lead to suspicions about its role as an arbitrator.
5. It is the strongest economy in the region despite the lack of energy resources.
6. It represents the most healthy and realistic political system of its region. It strengthened this image thanks to recent democratization initiatives in the country.
7. Contrary to many countries in the region, it does not have any colonial and post-colonial history.
8. Regarding developments in the last eight years, it showed the courage to put an end to Cold War reflexes. It proved its sincerity by adopting clear attitudes towards many issues from UN vote to Gaza, from Georgia war to Israeli attacks.
9. It can establish the most intensive relations with the countries in the region in terms of aid, NGOs, intellectual relations and civil initiatives.
10. Turkey adopts the following attitudes and policies towards the developments in the Egypt:
 - Turkey does not want anything—which it does not want to happen in Turkey—to happen other countries in the region. It will not want it in the future, either.
 - Turkey wants the justice to prevail in the region and makes efforts accordingly.
 - Turkey wants that people in the region but other foreign actors must determine their future by themselves. It makes efforts to realize this.
 - Turkey supports changing the 40 year-old status-quo which has not brought any peace and stability to anyone.

Geopolitics of The Turkey-Egypt Relations

Turkey did not become a party to Iraq occupation. In this sense, it proved that it is a different actor and it opposes the status quo. In the wake of Iraq occupation, Turkey was alienated from the regional status quo and brought in leverage to the change process thanks to the EU process. Egypt, the third leading actor of the Middle East geopolitics after Turkey and Iran, preserved both regional and national status quo during the same period. In the wake of Second Intifada process, legitimacy crisis of the Mubarak regime became much stronger. Faced with U.S. occupation of Iraq and Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Gaza, Egypt became an ineffective actor. It must be noted that Egyptian status quo remained in between regional order and change demands in the wake of political and social developments deeply affecting the Middle East. Although other countries in the region were also affected, the tension in Egypt was much greater. During the same period, Turkey underwent a swift change process and transformed itself. In this sense, Turkey became a success story for the countries and people in the region thus became the catalyst for regional change.

Turkey believes that the change vision in the region is in line with Turkey's democratization. This perspective is often reiterated by Turkish foreign policy-makers and decision-makers. Faced with Turkey's regional role, a democratic Egypt will also take a position in the medium term. Nevertheless, this possible tension will lead to competition and accordingly to quality. The change in Egypt has not yet resulted in a structural transformation. If we compare Egypt with the Turkish political history, in a short period of time we will see whether Egypt will experience 1946 when multi-party system was adopted or 1960 when tutelary system was established. The developments in April indicated that the change process in Egypt will be painful as expected.

One must not expect from democratic Egypt to immediately contribute to the positive role of Turkey which is always left alone against the regional problems. Turkey's stance towards Israeli attacks on Lebanon and attacks on Gaza made people question the legitimacy of Egyptian government. Particularly after Israel attacked Mavi Marmara aid ship, official and semi-official Egyptian media clearly took position against Turkey. One can expect that this position of Egypt can change to some extent in the new period. It is evident that a democratic Egypt will not adopt a similar Israeli policy that Mubarak adopted. However, what the limits of this change will be is the question.

Turkey and Israel did not have any bilateral problems until the attack on Mavi Marmara. Before Gaza flotilla raid, Turkey-Israel relations were strained because of Palestinian issue. Egypt on the other hand was convicted to a tense peace because of previous wars with Israel and Palestinian issue. Indeed thanks to this relationship, Mubarak regime was able to seize the power for decades. The limits of the change to occur in Egypt-Israel relations will also indicate the political limits for Egypt for it to become a full democratic country. Finally, Egypt can attain success both in democracy and in its regional position as long as it changes the order established by Camp David accords. And this will require time.

Egypt can contribute to the establishment of regional order by closely working together with Turkey which tries to positively contribute to the fragile structure of Iraq affecting the whole Middle East. The faster Iraq will recover from the occupation, the faster the countries in the region will have a regional perspective. Otherwise, proxy wars or tensions will postpone peace environment. Similarly, change pains in Syria will also challenge both countries. Even though Libya is a neighboring country of Egypt, it has preferred not to intervene in the ongoing process. On the other hand, Turkey intervened in the tension in Libya and came at the center of debates. Turkey did not make enough efforts to work together with Egypt in Libyan issue. Of course problems within Egypt prevented such a process. An Egyptian perspective that includes both competition and cooperation must shape the new Turkish vision of Egypt. Turkish support at the beginning of change processes will positively contribute to the relations in the future. Turkey needs an Egypt which will assume a positive role in problems stemming from Israel and Iran. As seen in the developments in Libya, Turkey's regional perspective will be reciprocated as long as other powerful actors in the region support Turkey. Turkey supported Egypt by taking risks and it must turn this support into a political strategy.

The pan-Arabism tends to regain strength in the wake of change in Egypt and whether or not it will be controlled depends on Turkey's early steps. It is necessary that particularly non-state actors struggle for preventing this danger or keep it within manageable limits. Civil society organizations in Turkey and Egypt must cooperate with each other so that Turkey can speak Arabic and Egypt can speak Turkish. Turkish and Egyptian intellectuals, academicians, journalists and civil society organizations must make serious investments so that they follow each other via their own languages rather than through English media.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Political Relations

The legal structure of Turkey-Egypt relations has been completed to a great extent thanks to 52 agreements signed between two countries.

In March 2007 during the meeting between then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul and his Egyptian counterpart within the scope of Arab League meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, it was agreed to provide a strategic basis for Turkey-Egypt relations. Moreover, under the framework of the Expanded Ministerial Conference of the Neighboring Countries of Iraq, the Memorandum for a Framework for Turkish-Egyptian Strategic Dialogue was signed by Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Aboul Gheit on November 3, 2007 in Istanbul.

According to above-mentioned memorandum, the two countries aimed to increase cooperation in political, economic and cultural areas and to coordinate attitudes in multilateral organizations such as UN and OIC. Moreover, the memorandum included necessary arrangements to hold an annual meeting at foreign ministerial level; to hold annual consultation meetings between undersecretaries of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and to hold meetings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials when necessary.

In this regard within the scope of cooperation mechanism, upon Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit's visit to Turkey on November 21-22, 2010 the third meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held.

Turkey and Egypt are expected to sign a common political declaration for creating the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between two countries. During Egyptian Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Aboul Gheit's visit to Turkey on November 21-22, 2010 the two countries agreed on the declaration. However the establishment of the above-mentioned mechanisms will be postponed because of the recent developments and government change in Egypt.

The fifth political consultation meeting at deputy undersecretary level among Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Turkey was held in Cairo on July 27, 2006. The sixth meeting was held in Ankara on January 12, 2009.

On January 15, 2008 Egypt-Turkey Inter-parliamentary Friendship Group was established in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Turkey Friendship Group in Egyptian parliament was established on April 19, 2006. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Foreign Affairs Commission paid its first visit to Cairo on February 24-27, 2008. Egyptian Intra-parliamentary Friendship Group visited Turkey on November 30- December 4, 2008.

In the wake of uprisings leading to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, Turkish president Abdullah Gul visited Egypt on March 3, 2011. This was the first presidential visit to Egypt following the resignation of Mubarak. During the visit, developments in Egypt were discussed and it was decided that common study groups in political, economic and social areas must be established.

Moreover, within the scope of president's visit, it was also agreed that the representatives of political parties and groups in Egypt and some of the youth that led grassroots movement will be invited to Turkey so that they will benefit from Turkish experience in democracy. In this sense necessary preparations were launched.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Egyptian Attitude in Eastern Mediterranean

Egypt recognizes Southern Cyprus as the sole legal representative of Cyprus. Egypt is one of the countries that adopt the most negative attitude towards "Cyprus" in meetings held under the framework of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Egypt opposes the designation "Turkish Cypriot State" used in OIC documents in March 2004 and is chary of the mentions of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Since 2003 Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus has increased its efforts to sign bilateral agreements with countries in Eastern Mediterranean regarding their jurisdiction on the seas. In this sense, Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus signed exclusive economic zone delimitation agreement on February 17, 2003. Turkey has not recognized this agreement, which was put on the records by Egypt and UN. It was found out that Egypt signed the "Framework Agreement concerning the Development of Cross-median Line Hydrocarbon Resources" with Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus on May, 4 2006. The authorized official of the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum was the authorized body within the scope of the agreement and added that they had not received any demands regarding the initiation of the agreement from the Ministry.

On the other hand, it was also found out that Greece took initiatives towards signing a delimitation agreement with Egypt. In this sense, Turkey took necessary initiatives and expressed its opinions and demands.

The fifth maritime consultations between Turkey and Egypt were held in Cairo on June 24-25, 2009. Consultations were categorized under two headings: "the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction" and "bilateral maritime relations." Thanks to the bilateral negotiations we expressed our opinions on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction to Egypt. (During the consultations a Memorandum of Understanding for improving the cooperation between Istanbul (MARPORT) and Alexandria ports and for strengthening sea lines of communication was signed.)

The Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of Greek Cyprus, Antonis Pascalides paid a visit to Egypt on October 27-30, 2008. During his visit, it was written in the press that Egypt guaranteed to provide natural gas to Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus from 2013 forth.

The president of Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, Christofias visited Egypt on April 7, 2009. During this visit, the two countries signed four agreements. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus Markos Kyprianou visited Egypt in November 2009. He met the secretary-general of the Arab League. Finally, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aboul Gheit visited Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus on May 5, 2010. During his visit, it was claimed in the Greek press that Egypt will support their arguments on "Cyprus" in the meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of OIC.

Egypt Petroleum Minister Sameh Fahmy represented Egypt government during the events held for the 50th anniversary of Independence Day of Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus on October 1, 2010. During his speech Sameh Fahmy stated that relations between two countries in many areas including natural gas and oil are improving. Sameh Fahmy added that high level bilateral political consultations are going on regarding regional and international problems in UN, EU, Union for the Mediterranean and international forums and people appreciate Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus' principled attitude towards supporting Palestinians and peace in the Middle East.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

High Level Visits

- President Abdullah Gul and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu paid a one-day visit to Egypt on March 3, 2011.
- Then Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak visited Turkey on March 22-23, 2007; February 11-12, 2009 and December 15-16, 2009.
- Abdullah Gul visited Egypt on January 14-16, 2008 and July 20-21, 2010.
- Abdullah Gul participated in Middle East Summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh (January 18, 2009) and Non-Aligned Movement's Summit (July 15, 2009).
- President of the Egyptian People's Assembly, Fathi Sorour visited Turkey on January 28-30, 2009.
- Then the chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Köksal Toptan visited Egypt on January 28- February, 2008 in order to participate in video conference of the Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States.
- The last visit to Turkey from Egypt at prime ministerial level was in 1994.
- Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a business visit to Egypt on May 2, 2005 and January 1, 2009.
- Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gheit visited Turkey on January 11-12, 2007; September 13, 2008; December 29, 2008 and finally on June 10, 2010 on the occasion of the third meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum.
- Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan visited Egypt on October 17-18, 2007.
- Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu visited Egypt on September 1-4, 2009 and March 2-3, 2010. He accompanied Abdullah Gul on January 18, 2009 to participate in Middle East Summit. Davutoglu visited Egypt on September 9, 2009 in order to deliver a speech in the inauguration meeting of Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League and on March 21, 2010 on the occasion of OIC Darfur Donors Conference.
- Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Aboul Gheit paid an official visit to Turkey on November 21-22, 2010 on the occasion of the Third Consultations on Strategic Dialogue.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Economic Relations

- The effect of the recent developments in Egypt on commercial relations and bilateral investments is still a mystery.
- Free Trade Agreement between Egypt and Turkey came into force on March 1, 2007. Thanks to this agreement, the trade volume between Turkey and Egypt increased by two and a half times in three years. In this regard, the trade volume, which was 1.1 billion dollars in 2006 reached to 3,241 billion dollars in 2009 and to 3,187 billion dollars in 2010.
- Major export items are automobile, semi-manufactured iron/non-alloyed steel products, petroleum oils and minerals. Major import items are rice, different kinds of coal, copper wires, petroleum and other hydrocarbons and chemical fertilizers.
- The first meeting of Common Committee created within the scope of Free Trade Agreement was held in Ankara on June 18-19, 2007 while the second meeting was held in Cairo on March 22-23, 2008.
- Turkish investment in Egypt increased from 60 million dollars to 1.5 billion dollars in the last five years.
- Former Egyptian Minister of Industry and Trade Muhammed Rasheed visited Turkey on April 27-29, 2010. During his visit, the quota of Egypt's cotton yarn export to Turkey and the enlargement of the Free Trade Agreement were discussed. Rasheed paid another visit to Turkey on the occasion of the 26th meeting of COMCEC (Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in September 2010.
- Thanks to this visit, "Memorandum of Understanding establishing a High Level Consultation Mechanism on Trade and Economic Issues" was signed in Istanbul on October 6, 2010.
- Within the scope of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce Chairman Ahmed al-Wakil's visit to Turkey on September 4-6, 2010, memorandum of understanding on establishing a Turkish-Egyptian Joint Chamber of Commerce between the federation and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges was signed on September 3, 2010.
- The founding agreement for the foundation of "Turkish Industrial Zone" was signed in January 2007. This Zone will be built on a 2 million-square-meter plot of land in the 6th of October city and enable 150 companies to work and provide 22 thousand employments. On January 14-16, 2008 Abdullah Gul broke ground for the project.
- Works continue for the exportation of Egyptian natural gas to Turkey (Kilis) through Jordon-Syria thanks to the Arab Gas Pipeline Project.
- Another project that the two countries are involved in is Seven Countries Interconnection Project. The project was launched by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Afterwards Libya, Lebanon and Palestine participated in the project.
- The foreign branch of IsBank in Cairo came into operation on June 21, 2010.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Military Relations

- Turkey and Egypt signed “the Agreement on Military Training Cooperation” in 1987 and “Memorandum of Defense Industry Cooperation” in 1988. In November 2009, the two signed “Memorandum of Understanding on Military Training, Technical and Scientific Cooperation.”
- Turkey-Egypt First High Level Military Dialogue Meeting was held on April 6-10, 2009 in Cairo while the second meeting was held on March 23-24, 2010 in Ankara. The third meeting was scheduled to be held on March 21-24, 2011 in Cairo was postponed because of the developments in Egypt.
- Former Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Admiral Metin Atac visited Egypt on February 10-15, 2008. This was the first visit paid to Egypt from Turkey at Commanders of Naval Forces level. Moreover, then Turkish coast guard chief, Can Erenoglu visited Egypt on June 23-26, 2008.
- Egyptian Minister of Defense and Military Production, field marshal Hussein Tantawi visited Turkey on November 17-21, 2009. Then Chief Commander of Turkish Armed Forces, Yasar Buyukanit visited Egypt on April 14-17, 2008 and then Chief Commander of Turkish Armed Forces Ilker Basbug visited Egypt on May 29-30, 2010.
- In line with the fulfillment of the off-set obligation under the scope of the exportation of 46 F-16 fighting falcons, 627 Jeep Cherokee-KJ command and control vehicle worth 20 billion dollars were imported from Egypt.
- Exercise called Sea of Friendship (Bahr el-Muhabbe) was hosted by Egyptian Naval Forces in Eastern Mediterranean with the participation of two frigates, one oil carrier, one helicopter and one underwater demolition team from Turkey and similar vehicles from Egypt between 29 September and 4 October 2010.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Cooperation in Security

“Cooperation agreement against Crime between Republic of Turkey and the Arab Republic of Egypt” signed by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries on July 26, 1999 and put into force on July 27, 2000 constitutes the legal framework of the cooperation in security between two countries.

During the visit of the Minister of the Interior Saadettin Tantan to Egypt on May 20-23, 2000, a “memorandum of understanding” in order to increase cooperation in security was signed between Egypt and Turkey. The last meeting of the Joint Commission established in accordance with cooperation agreement on security dated 1999, was held on March 6-10, 2006 in Ankara. Under the framework of the decision on “increasing the cooperation and relations between the police of the two countries” during this meeting, Turkish National Police provided training for the staff intelligence and struggle against organized crime departments of Egyptian National Police. Within the scope of the training, 25 Egyptian personnel participated in training program titled “struggle against terrorism and organized crimes” held on November 20-24, 2006.

The course titled “Internal Security Intelligence” prepared by Turkish National Police for the staff of Egyptian police department was held at Intelligence Academy between 31 May and 12 June 2009.

10 personnel from Egyptian police department participated in the course titled “Technical and Electronic Intelligence Course” held in Turkey on March 22-28, 2010.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Cultural Relations

- “Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Arab Republic of Egypt” signed on May 18, 1966 and “2001-2004 Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange Program” signed on May 29, 2001 are the two fundamental agreements that form the legal framework of Turkish-Egyptian cultural relations. The latter will be in force until the new program is signed. Parties agreed on the text for the new program.
- Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in Cairo was opened on the occasion of Minister of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu on March 2-3, 2010.
- The house in Helwan district of Cairo where our national poet Mehmet Akif Ersoy spent part of his life was decided to be converted into a museum.
- Izmir and Alexandria became sister cities. Necessary steps are being taken so that Ankara and Cairo also becomes sister cities.
- In 2010-2011 academic year, 20 scholarships in total 5 postgraduate, 5 research and 10 undergraduate scholarships were granted to Egyptian government.
- Two Turkish instructors appointed by Joint Commission of Culture, one in Al-Azhar University and one in Cairo Turkish Cultural Center work in Egypt.
- Cooperation between related institutions continues towards establishing a Turkology Institute within the scope of Cairo University.
- Scientific and Technologic Cooperation Agreement was signed between TUBITAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) and Egyptian Ministry of Education and Scientific Research on December 5, 2008. The protocol came into force on the same day.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Consular Relations

- Three thousand Turkish people live in Egypt. About 500 Turkish with dual nationality live in Egypt. The number of the Turkish people who acquired Egyptian citizenship is expected to be about 150-200.
- Thirteen Turkish citizens are in Egyptian Department of Corrections. Our efforts towards their transfer to Turkey for the execution of their punishment in accordance with "the Agreement for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons" continue.
- "Agreement on the Compensation for Assets, Rights and Interests of our citizens in Egypt" between the Republic of Turkey and the Arab Republic of Egypt" was signed on June 4, 1981 and came into force on August 1, 1982. Above-mentioned Agreement stipulates the compensation for assets, right and interests of our citizens in Egypt who were exposed to nationalization, confiscation and land reform policies in 1950s. The duration of the agreement which was four years was extended for two more years at the end of each two-year term. Besides, as our citizens' compensation demands were not met, the agreement was extended for two more years on August 4, 2008.
- Within the scope of the Agreement, the demands of our citizens are mostly related to house, workplace, agricultural lands and farms. During the time stipulated by the agreement, 1099 files were prepared and submitted to Egyptian party. Egypt accepted 256 of the files and rejected 843 of them.
- The 9th meeting of Turkey-Egypt Joint Commission on Real Estate was held in Ankara in 2003. It was demanded from Egypt to propose a date for the 10th meeting to be held in Cairo.
- Upon our suggestion about visa exemption between Turkey and Egypt, Egyptian institutions suggested preparing a safe list including representatives of works council and federation, scientists and artists. They also suggested providing these people with long lasting visa that would enable multiple entries. Our suggestion about signing a visa exemption agreement supported by Readmission Agreement will be addressed in the following consular consultations.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Relations in Information

- Egyptian News Agency MENA (Middle East News Agency) and Anadolu Agency (AA) signed a news exchange agreement in 1987.
- Turkish Radio and Television Association (TRT) and Egyptian Radio and Television Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 18, 2009. They agreed to cooperate with each other in exchanging radio and television programs, preparing programs on national days and programs for kids and youth and paying high-level mutual visits.
- Turkey applied for uplink permission from Egyptian institution for TRT Channel in Arabic that began broadcasting on April 4, 2010. Egyptian institutions stated that they will consider giving the permission only after they watch TRT Arabic Channel for a while. TRT received an official letter stating that it would be better for TRT to send a committee to Cairo so that they get a result. TRT has not yet paid this visit.
- Draft Protocol on Press Cooperation is going to be signed between Directorate General of Press and Information and State Information Institution of Egyptian Ministry of Information.

TURKEY- EGYPT RELATIONS

Visits to Egypt

January 19, 2010, Nihat Ergun

The Minister of Industry and Trade Nihat Ergun visited Egypt in order to participate in the Turkey-Egypt Industry and Trade Bridge Program.

March 2-3, 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu visited Cairo upon the invitation of Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit. On the occasion of the visit, the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs within the scope of "Framework Memorandum of Turkish-Egyptian Strategic Dialogue" was held. Ahmet Davutoglu participated in the Inauguration Ceremony of 133rd Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Arab League and delivered a speech.

March 21, 2010, Ahmet Davutoglu

OIC Darfur Donor's Conference was held in in Cairo and Co-chaired by Turkey and Egypt. Turkey took part in the conference with a committee led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Davutoglu. During the conference it was declared that 60-75 million US dollars will be granted to projects in Darfur on health, education and agriculture areas between 2010 and 2015. Participants donated 850 million US dollars.

May 29, 2010, İlker Başbug

On May 29, 2010 Başbug met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and later the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Marshal Hussein Tantawi. At the end of last year, Tantawi visited Turkey. When Turkish Israeli relations were strained in the wake of Gaza attacks at the end of 2008, the military relations between Ankara and Cairo began to grow and the two countries carried out sea exercises.

July 20-21, 2010, Abdullah Gul

Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a visit to Egypt upon the invitation of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Abdullah Gul participated in graduation ceremony of War Colleges accompanying Egyptian president. The two Presidents had the chance to meet tête-à-tête.

November 21-22, 2010, Aboul Gheit's visit to Turkey

Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit paid an official visit to Turkey upon the invitation of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu.

First of January 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Egypt was postponed

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan stated that his visit to Egypt was postponed and he would not pay this visit until everything settles down in the country.

February 3-4, 2011, Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Qatar

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu visited Qatar during his visit to countries in the region concerning the developments in Egypt and met Qatar Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Hamad bin Casim bin Cabir El-Tani.

March 3, 2011, Abdullah Gul

Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Egypt together with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu. They met the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Marshal Hussein Tantawi that undertook the power in the wake of overthrow of Mubarak. The Turkish President Gul became the first president to visit Egypt in the post-Mubarak period.

April 11, 2011, Ahmet Davutoglu

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu was received by Egyptian Prime Minister Issam Sherif and met Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Nebil El-Arabi.

ANNEX: THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION (JANUARY- MARCH 2011)*

January 17	A man tried to set himself on fire in front of the Parliament in Cairo, the capital of Egypt. This act reminded the young man who set himself on fire in Tunisia, provoking people to take to the streets and causing Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to give up his 23 years of rule.
January 18	An unemployed man who tried to set himself on fire in Alexandria died in the hospital. A lawyer tried to set himself on fire in front of the government building in Cairo.
January 20	Two workers who tried to set themselves on fire were injured.
January 24	Egyptian opposition leader Mohammed al-Baradei declared "if Tunisians did, so must Egyptians."
January 25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-government protests broke out. Thousands of people took to the streets. Two protesters clashing with the police died in Suez. A police officer was beaten to death by protesters in Cairo: 200 persons were taken into custody. Security forces fired tear gas to disperse thousands of protesters in Cairo. U.S. called on Egyptian government to listen to people's demands.
January 26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thousands of protesters held demonstrations despite the ban. The police used tear gas, baton and even stones in order to disperse protesters. When protestors reacted by throwing Stones, 15 police officers were injured. During demonstrations 2 persons died in Cairo. Protesters hurled Molotov cocktails to an official building in Suez. 55 protesters and 15 police officers were injured.
January 27	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least a thousand people were taken into custody. A person died in the North of Sina. Anti-tank rockets were used against the police. Demonstrations torched the fire station in Suez. Conflicts broke out in Ismailia. Baradei stated that he is ready to lead the transition. France called on Egypt to respect the freedom of expression. U.S. announced that violence is not a solution. Late in the night the regime took "resolute measures."
January 28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ten thousands of protesters clashed with the police throughout the country. Police used tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons. Mohammed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood participated in demonstrations. Protesters torched governorate building in Alexandria. Protesters in Cairo torched two police stations and the building of the ruling party. Internet services were shut down. Foreign journalists were exposed to harsh intervention of security forces. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak demanded from army to cooperate with the police and ensure the security. He ordered a curfew in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez. Many Western countries expressed their concerns. U.S. announced that it may revise the aid particularly the military aid to Egypt. U.S. Department of Defense announced that Chief of the Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces Sami Anan will cut his official visit short and return back to Egypt. At least 25 persons died, hundreds of people were injured throughout Egypt. Mubarak delivered a short speech on state TV and stated that he discharged the government; a new government will be established. Besides he vowed to carry out reforms.
January 29	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Police withdrew. Protesters began to plunder shopping centers in Cairo. Demonstrations in Tahrir and other regions in the country continued. The President Mubarak appointed chief of the Intelligence, Omar Suleiman as the first deputy prime minister.
January 30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bread and food stocks diminished. Banks were shut down, oil stocks in petrol stations decreased. ElBaradei participated in demonstrations held in Tahrir Square. U.S. President Barack Obama sent a message to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak through his special delegate. He stated that the regime could not wait to begin an orderly transition.

* Information was gathered from following links:

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/feb/05/egypt-protests>

<http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/02/08/live-blog-feb-9-egypt-protests>

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/9390387.stm

<http://www.trt.net.tr/haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=3e503f33-3c1f-418d-9326-6a1a1d1ea3a1>

January 31	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrations continued. • Mubarak appointed his new cabinet which involved old figures. The most striking thing was that he appointed a retired police general as the minister of the interior. • Opposition groups boycotted the new cabinet.
February 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hundreds of thousands people took to the streets in Tahrir Square. No one was injured during demonstrations. There was not any clash either. Security Forces were not there. There were only military forces in order to prevent any possible clash. • Around 11 pm Mubarak announced that he will not run for presidential elections to be held in September. • Obama called on Mubarak to systematically change the regime through peaceful means and to include the parties in opposition in this transition period. • The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Egyptian administration to be the one to take the first step for the peace, security and stability of Egypt and to take necessary steps to meet social demands. Protesters in Tahrir Square welcomed his call in Cairo.
February 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soon after Mubarak announced that he will not run for next elections, Mubarak supporters took to the streets. They rode on horses and camels and attacked vulnerable opposition groups with sticks. The police also helped these attacks. The number of fatalities and injuries was not recorded.
February 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Christiane Amanpour interviewed Hosni Mubarak at ABC. Mubarak stated that he had enough but if he goes now Egypt will be in chaos. • The conflict between reformists and Mubarak supporters continued. Mubarak supporters, security forces and other groups used violence against Egyptians. Many local and foreign journalists were also exposed to the violence. Many journalists were arrested.
February 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After Friday prayers hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Tahrir Square and called this day "the Day of Departure." They walked to the government building and demanded Mubarak to leave. However, Mubarak refused to leave.
February 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The gas pipeline between Israel and Egypt was attacked. • UK Prime Minister David Cameron warned Egyptian government to accelerate reforms. • Hillary Clinton gave the signals that U.S. government will support reform movements under the leadership of Omar Suleiman. • Talking to Reuters, ElBaradei stated that any support to Omar Suleiman or Mubarak will be a failure for reform process.
February 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 13th day of the demonstrations in Egypt. Opposition leaders including the Muslim Brotherhood met the government.
February 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wael Ghonim—who was thought to launch the uprisings in Egypt—was released after 12 days.
February 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ten thousands of people took to the streets in the second week of the resistance to protest Mubarak regime. • The Muslim Brotherhood announced that they allow one week for Mubarak to resign.
February 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Rights Watch announced that 302 persons died in demonstrations since the start of uprisings in Egypt. • Around 10 thousand workers went on strike in Mahalla and Suez. • U.S. demanded from Egypt to realize reforms, however, Omar Suleiman stated that hurried reforms will lead Egypt to chaos. • Talking to ABC, Suleiman stated that Egypt lacks the culture of democracy to realize the change that protesters demand.
February 10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The special representative of Russia for the Middle East met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. It is believed that Moscow called on Mubarak to realize a peaceful and stable transition process. Following his meeting, Salтанov stated that they do not want Russia to offer any recommendations because they have trust in the wisdom of the Egyptian people and the government. • The White House increased its pressure on Egyptian administration through statements voiced by Robert Gibbs and stated that Egyptian administration must take a step towards change without any delay. Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Ghit accused U.S. Vice President Joe Biden of imposing American policies to Egypt. • It was claimed that Egyptian Army took reformist protesters into custody and tortured them. According to the Guardian, the photos showing that a Mubarak supporter catch a reformist protester and surrender him to a soldier prove above-mentioned allegations. • Late in the night Hosni Mubarak announced that he will not resign but he will delegate his authorities to Omar Suleiman. Mubarak stated that there will be a peaceful transition process and demands of the opposition are legitimate. He added that a new constitution will be drafted during this process. Adding that he will not leave Egypt, Mubarak said that he wants to die in Egypt.

February 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Following the statements of the President Hosni Mubarak, Omar Suleiman delivered a speech on TV after midnight and called on protesters to go back their homes. Mubarak's statements disappointed people. When Mubarak did not resign as expected, the crowd in Tahrir Square surrounded the TV building, keeping anyone from entering or leaving. ElBaradei called army for duty. He added that or else Egypt will explode. The army announced its support for Mubarak's transition plan and vowed to ensure a fair election. In the evening Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Hosni Mubarak resigned. The army came to power. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces abolished the parliament and suspended the constitution. It was announced that the elections will be held in September and the army will be in power until the elections. Speaking after Mubarak's resignation, the United Nations General Secretary Ban-Ki Moon stated that Egyptian people's call for democracy was heard and added that UN stands by Egyptian people. U.S. Vice President stated that this is a historic day for Egypt and added that Mubarak's resignation will pave the way for democracy in the country. Obama stated that Egyptian people have spoken and their demands have been heard and Egypt will never be the same. Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Salehi stated that they congratulate the great nation of Egypt on this victory and share their happiness. Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa called the change in Egypt as "White Revolution" and stated that he looks forward to the future to build a national consensus in the coming period. European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton stated that she welcomes the resignation of Mubarak who listened to his people's voice. She also called on Egypt to establish a broad-based government. Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel was the first to react to the resignation of Mubarak. Merkel stated that Mubarak served his people by resigning. The leading opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood called February 11 the "Victory Day" because Hosni Mubarak resigned. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that he welcomed the resignation of Mubarak.
February 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 30 year-old regime ended in 30 seconds in Egypt. Thanks to mass protests, a new political period began.
February 14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Egyptian army wanted workers—who demanded an increase in their wages in line with the increase in food prices—to end the protests.
February 15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Egyptian Revolution risks to be taken over by the army. Key political activists announced concrete details of the democratic transition period and warned Egyptian people.
February 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amnesty International members in Egypt announced that we cannot talk about a reform in Egypt without human rights reform and added that the pressures of Hosni Mubarak must be eliminated.
February 17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amnesty International claimed that Egyptian army tortured protesters.
February 21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UK Prime Minister David Cameron was the first to visit military authorities in the wake of Hosni Mubarak's resignation.
February 24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Old friends of Hosni Mubarak will be tried for corruption.
February 26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protestors stated that Egyptian military fired into the air and used batons in order to disperse protesters in Tahrir Square (Egypt-World News- guardian.co.uk).
February 27	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Experts in the constitutional reform committee of the temporary government proposed eight amendments to the constitution.
February 28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All banned books started to be circulated at Street sales and newspaper kiosks.
March 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Amr Moussa stated that he is ready to run for presidential elections and added that he is aware of his responsibilities and duties.
March 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf saluted people in Tahrir Square and vowed to rebuild Egypt.
March 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protesters stormed Mubarak's headquarters.
March 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The revolution turned out to be good for women. Many women tell that they have trust in revolution and they believe that their rights will be protected.
March 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11 persons died more than 90 persons were injured during the crash between Muslims and Christians in Cairo.

March 10	· Activists attacked in Tahrir Square as ElBaradei confirmed his candidacy.
March 18	· Egyptians disagreed on constitutional amendments. Counter-revolutionists expressed their fears.
March 19	· Egypt with its population of 45 million held a free referendum for the first time after Mubarak. 41.2 percent of the people voted.
March 20	· 77.2 percent of the voters voted in favor while 22.8 percent of them voted no.
March 21	· The military announced that it will hand over the government to the elected party. The Military is expected to announce the date for presidential elections.
March 22	· Counter-revolutionists expressed their concerns that early elections will destroy democracy.
March 23	· Former Minister of the Interior of Egypt Habib El Adly and four security officers will stand trial for killing protesters.
March 26	· Essam Sharaf vowed to press a fight against corruption.
March 28	· Egyptian authorities tightened the security for International Atomic Energy Agency Director General, Mohammed El Baradei. The brother of El Baradei stated that his brother risks assassination attempt in any minute thus additional security measures must be taken.

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