Trump’s Iran options
As the second week of America’s war with Iran comes to a close, signals from the White House indicate that the attacks will continue. The lack of a clearly defined political objective for the war makes it difficult to predict at what stage Trump will declare victory. Trump’s statement that they have already largely achieved their goals and that the war could end very soon appeared aimed at calming markets spooked by the spike in oil prices. At the same time, by saying America is winning the war, Trump wants to convey the message that if he decides to withdraw, it will be his choice. Aware that the perception of the war is as important as its realities, Trump wants to create the impression that ending the war is in his hands, thereby retaining the ability to declare victory regardless of the facts on the ground. Trying to keep his political maneuvering room wide, Trump has various options before him, from ending the war immediately to invading Iran. However, the Iranian regime’s war strategy will determine the boundaries of these options.
THE VICTORY DECLARATION OPTION
Trump could declare victory by stating that the goal of the war was to destroy Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure and that they have already accomplished this. By using such rhetoric, Trump has partially reassured markets. However, if he declares victory and withdraws, he would face the risk of Iran continuing its attacks. Already dealing with the perception that he has failed to adequately protect Gulf allies and Israel from attacks, Trump would be accused of standing by while Iran strikes the region if he claims that America’s operations have defined their mission. Therefore, he needs to reach a tacit or explicit mutual ceasefire agreement with Iran.
Iran believes that seeking a deal in the diplomatic process is perceived as weakness by the US and Israel and that it must eliminate this perception. For this reason, rather than rushing into a ceasefire, Iran is demanding conditions that would prevent a potential future attack and a roadmap for the lifting of sanctions. Since it would be political suicide for Trump to concede to Iran while declaring victory, such a ceasefire could only be achieved through a secret agreement. In this case, the victory declaration option would, in a scenario where Iran is unwilling to agree to a ceasefire, effectively become a declaration of weakness for Trump.
THE OPTION OF FORCING IRAN TO SURRENDER
Knowing he would struggle to give substance to a victory declaration scenario, Trump might continue bombing until Iran surrenders. It could be said that the Iranian regime has coalesced much more tightly because of the war. Trump may have thought that a decapitation strike against Khamenei would yield a result similar to Venezuela’s, but a similar scenario did not materialize in Iran. Bombing the country until the regime’s new leadership is hunted down and forced into submission would be an open-ended engagement with serious costs, making it an option unlikely to be embraced by the American public.
If Congress provides financial and political support and the American public is convinced of the war’s necessity, a longer-term operation might be possible. However, Iran’s capacity to strike oil markets and Gulf countries would deter Trump from a prolonged war. The fact that the Iranian regime has not surrendered so far, having overcome the shock of Khamenei’s killing, further weakens the likelihood of its surrender in the future. In such an equation, by setting such a high-level political goal as the regime’s surrender, Trump would tie his own hands and enter a dynamic where he harms himself as the process drags on.
THE REGIME CHANGE OPTION
The regime change option would be an even longer and more complex process than the option of forcing surrender. This is a scenario where air and naval strikes would not suffice, a major ground operation would be essential, Iranian resistance would be at its peak, and it would require at least tens of thousands of American troops to enter by land. This option, where American public pressure against a new invasion would increase dramatically, could amount to political suicide for Trump. Considering the lack of a political organization capable of replacing the regime, even if American forces entered by land and captured Tehran, building a new regime would take many years and likely end in failure, as in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Many critical advantages present in Iraq’s overthrow of Saddam (the Iraqi Kurds, extensive military operation preparations, the Saddam regime’s lack of resistance) would not apply to Iran. It would require an uprising by Iranian Kurds, opening a front from Azerbaijan in the north, the US Navy being able to use the Strait of Hormuz (where traffic would be halted due to Iran’s missiles), support from Gulf countries, and sending tens of thousands of American troops into a ground operation with a massive budget. Considering that even preparing for this scenario would take months, it’s clear the regime change option is not very realistic. Moreover, it is evident that, unlike in Venezuela, there is no regime ready to work with America after the incapacitation of the regime’s leader.
Although Trump tries in his rhetoric to project an image of keeping all three main options on the table, declaring victory stands out as the most realistic option. Even in this scenario, it should be remembered that he does not have complete control and that Iran’s stance will also be a factor. Iran might set conditions like guarantees that America will not attack again and the lifting of sanctions. However, if it denies Trump an exit and tries to ‘humiliate’ him, America could become more aggressive and turn to the second or even third options. It is clear that no power involved in the war can achieve a true victory, but all will want to declare one. In this context, the war with Iran, for Trump, has become less of a genuine military confrontation and more a matter of political timing: deciding when and how to say “I won” and declare a ceasefire.
