A belated confession in Davos
President Erdoğan’s “One Minute” outburst at the 2009 Davos summit went down in history as a stance that exposed the injustice of the international order and Israel’s privileged position within the system. Having said that he would never return to Davos, Erdoğan must have seen—ironically, in the debates at the most recent summit—that Davos has now arrived at the very point he articulated back then. Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s speech stood out as the clearest example of this. Admitting that they had always known the rules-based international system was rigged in favor of great powers, Carney delivered a speech declaring the end of the liberal international system. This time, we heard from Western leaders the very criticisms Erdoğan has insisted on for years—that the international system does not function and that a more just order is needed. Such speeches, delivered on the Davos platform—one of the most traditional and powerful defenders of the international liberal system—demonstrate just how deep the system’s crisis has become. Carney’s remarks amounted to a belated acceptance by the West of Erdoğan’s critique of an “unjust system.” The real question, however, is this: are middle powers ready to act on this diagnosis and pay the price?
‘If you are not at the table, you are on the menu’
Without naming the U.S. or Trump directly, Carney criticized America’s disregard for international law and norms and argued that middle powers like Canada could help build a new global system. Saying that the period we are living through should now be seen not as a “transition” but as a “rupture,” Carney was essentially voicing the discomfort felt by countries within the Western alliance over Trump’s use of American power without even attempting to cloak it in the language of international law and norms. Trump’s decision to frame the Maduro operation merely as a national security issue was a turning point. In doing so, he brushed aside principles such as non-aggression and respect for national sovereignty. Trump’s persistent push to annex Greenland to the U.S. subsequently laid bare the deep crisis within the West once again. European countries, unable to send a clear message about defending Greenland against the U.S., also failed to declare that they would fight for international norms and rules.
In a context where there are no longer any defenders of the rules-based international order, Carney’s speech moved closer to the “values-based realism” proposed by Finnish President Stubb. Stubb’s Foreign Affairs article, which calls for balancing values and interests, proposes a reformed multilateralism and rebuilding trust in the international system by including rising powers in decision-making processes. Making similar assessments and issuing the warning that “those not at the table will be on the menu,” Carney went a step further by emphasizing collective action among middle powers. He argued that this would make it possible to escape the constraining effects of bilateral relationships with great powers. By suggesting that different coalitions could be formed on different regional and global issues to protect shared values and interests, Carney was not going much beyond acknowledging a reality that has existed for a long time. For instance, the UN Security Council’s failure to resolve the Syria and Palestine issues had already led different regional countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye) to form variable partnerships on different matters (humanitarian aid, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, Gaza). Similarly, when the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement or the Iran nuclear deal, the remaining parties continued without Washington by forming alternative coalitions.
Is hope in middle powers?
In many cases where great powers have blocked solutions within the international system, middle powers that took the initiative ended up bearing the costs largely on their own. Türkiye’s long-standing opposition to Israel’s expansion of occupation and ethnic cleansing policies, for example, drew backlash from both the U.S. and Europe rather than support from other middle powers. When South Africa filed a genocide case against Israel, few countries joined the case aside from Türkiye, and the U.S. Congress passed legislation imposing sanctions on the judges involved. These examples show that when middle powers act on values and principles, they are not only targeted by great powers but also left alone by other middle powers. If leaders like Carney truly believe in the capacity of middle powers to build a new system, they must be willing to show solidarity when it matters and stand up to great powers. That Western leaders are now voicing the view that the system does not work and that a new order is needed is a positive development, even if it is late. However, how the costs that will arise when concrete steps are taken will be paid is of critical importance.
Middle powers will inevitably have to take great-power interests into account, one way or another. In other words, building an international system “neither with nor without great powers” does not appear realistic. At this point, leaders of countries like Canada that define themselves as middle powers need to establish concrete mechanisms of solidarity with their counterparts and be prepared to bear the costs such mechanisms may generate. These debates, held on a platform like Davos that has become a symbol of the liberal order, should not remain a mere intellectual exercise. America’s withdrawal from global leadership does not mean it will retreat from international politics; on the contrary, it shows that it may use its power more harshly and arbitrarily. As we have seen in the cases of Venezuela, Iran, Greenland, and Gaza, Washington has demonstrated that it will not hesitate to wield national power with a claim of full freedom of action. For this reason, solidarity among middle powers can only be meaningful if it is backed by concrete mechanisms and cost-sharing. Otherwise, Carney’s call in Davos will lose its impact from the outset, dulled by the reflex of “not angering Washington.”
